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This study utilizes the binomial hierarchical generalized linear modeling (HGLM)  
technique and nationally representative data (SASS 2003-2004) to examine the 
relationship between teacher unions and teacher quality in America’s large urban and 
suburban districts and the effect of teacher unions on the intra-district distribution of 
teacher quality across schools with varying poverty and minority student concentration in 
the largest districts. Results reveal that compared with non-unionized districts, strongly 
unionized districts tend to have higher proportions of NCLB defined highly qualified 
teachers, teachers with at least five years of experience, teachers with subject-area 
degrees, and teachers with subject-area certifications in the large urban and suburban 
districts. But, strongly unionized and non-unionized districts have comparable 
proportions of empirically-defined high quality teachers and teachers who graduated from 
selective colleges. Weakly unionized districts are less likely to attract and retain 
experienced teachers than non-unionized ones. This study also finds that in the largest 
districts school poverty/minority level has a stronger (and negative) effect on the 
distribution of experienced teachers in strongly unionized districts than in non-unionized 
districts, which suggests that in strongly unionized districts the teacher quality gap is 
much wider across high and low poverty/minority schools in terms of employing 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
Purpose of the Study 
 Teacher unions have been at the forefront of media reports, educational policy 
debates, and public school reforms. Hannaway and Rotherham (2006) summarized two 
polarized views that dominate the public discussion of teacher unions’ impact on public 
schools.  Critics argue that collective bargaining, the central piece of teacher unions, is 
the biggest barrier to improving American public schools (Moe, 2006). Proponents 
counter by stating that the common goals teacher unions pursue are consistent with the 
educational interests of the students; the common good of teachers improves the quality 
of education for students (Casey, 2006). Disregarding the opposing views of unions’ 
influence on school improvement, the rhetoric of both sides on the union-impact 
argument indicates the acknowledgement that teacher unions have a significant impact on 
public schools. Teacher unions have a bearing on most aspects of public education, 
teachers, students, school operation and educational policies (Moe, 2006; Johnson & 
Donaldson, 2006). Yet, there is no denying that one of unions’ direct, most obvious 
effects on public schools is on teacher related policies, such as teacher pay, teachers’ 
working conditions, teacher assignments, and teacher evaluation and dismissal. These 
teacher-related policies, in turn, have impacts on who enters and who stays in education, 
how their talents and skills are used, and how they are supported for their professional 
growth. In this way, one would assume that teacher unions would be associated with 
teacher quality, but very limited research has examined this relationship. This study 
intends to utilize nationally representative data to examine the relationship between 
unions and teacher quality in America’s large urban and suburban districts. 
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 Teachers make a difference in the learning of students and their long-term life 
opportunities. Parents, educators, researchers, and policy makers all agree the centrality 
of teachers in student learning (Rice, 2003; Darling-Hammond, 2000; Sanders & Horn, 
1998). Teachers’ role in learning is particularly critical in urban school districts, where 
children often have less support at home (Jacob, 2007). But urban schools serving poor 
and minority students often have difficulty hiring qualified teachers, let alone high 
quality teachers (Lankford, Loeb & Wyckoff, 2002; Levin & Quinn, 2003).  
Among the stake holders of teacher quality issues, teacher unions are not a silent 
one, particularly after the mid-1980s (Kahlenberg, 2006). Teacher unions claim that 
“teacher quality is an essential union responsibility” (AFT, 2003, p.5), and strengthening 
teacher quality a central mission of unions (NEA, 2007a). Many union-negotiated 
policies have potential to influence districts’ ability to employ and retain high-caliber 
teachers, and the strength of unions in local districts greatly affects the scope of the 
negotiated policies. Teacher unions are more powerful in large districts than in small ones 
(Hess & Kelly, 2006; Rose & Sonstelie, 2004). And teachers in urban and suburban 
districts have more choices regarding where to teach given the relatively large number of 
school districts in a geographic area. Therefore, the relatively high mobility of teachers 
and the stronger union power in large urban and suburban districts present an optimal 
opportunity to examine whether teacher unions play a role in teachers’ decision on where 
to teach, i.e. whether teacher unions affect teacher quality.  
Despite the importance of and debate on the possible influence of teacher unions 
on teachers and schools, very limited empirical research has examined the effect of 
teacher unionization, and even fewer studies about teacher unions’ effect on teacher 
3 
 
quality (Goldhaber, 2006; Johnson & Donaldson, 2006). In a recent review examining the 
effects of collective bargaining on teacher quality, Johnson and Donaldson (2006) have to 
focus on intermediate factors that are related to teacher quality, such as teacher pay, 
working conditions, class size, preparation time, and hire and dismissal. They conclude 
that little research has assessed the impact of unions, and unions’ effect on teacher quality 
is “shaped far more by rhetoric and ideology than by disinterested thorough inquiry” 
(p.138).  
 My own literature review detailed in chapter two reaches the same conclusion as 
that of Johnson and Donaldson. Most teachers’ union research focuses on the effect of 
unionization on teacher salaries, and finds that collective bargaining increases teacher 
salaries between three and nine percent (e.g. Baugh & Stone, 1982; Hoxby, 1996). A few 
studies document union’s effects on teachers’ working conditions in terms of student-
teacher ratio (e.g. Eberts & Stone, 1986; Hoxby, 1996), and teachers’ in-school time use, 
such as preparation time and time meeting with parents (Eberts, 1984). These scant 
working conditions studies tentatively suggest that unions improve teachers’ working 
conditions through reducing class size, shortening teachers’ instructional time, and 
increasing paid preparation time. 
  Very few studies, in fact only three, have been found that examined the impact of 
teachers’ unions on teacher attributes commonly assumed to reflect teacher quality, such 
as teacher experience, teacher certification, teacher preparation programs and degrees, 
teacher coursework or teacher test scores (see Rice, 2003; Zumwalt & Craig, 2005). Two 
studies show that stronger collective bargaining contracts tend to retain teachers (Rees, 
1991), and attract more fully certified teachers into these districts, but do not alleviate or 
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exacerbate the teacher quality gap within districts (Koski & Horng, 2007). One study 
suggests that teacher unionism is highly associated with the 1963 to 2000 decline of 
teacher aptitude, as represented by college test scores (Hoxby & Leigh, 2004). Evidence 
is mixed on the relationship between teacher unions and student achievement, a direct 
measure of teacher effectiveness. Some research finds that stronger union presence is 
associated with increased student test scores (Nelson & Rosen, 1996; Steelmen, Powell & 
Carini, 2000; Eberts & Stone, 1987). In contrast, other studies find unionization is 
negatively related to student achievement as measured either by test scores or drop out 
rates (Kurth, 1987; Hoxby, 1996) 
 Several possible reasons explain this scant empirical literature of teacher 
unionization effects on teacher quality. First and foremost, in the educational community 
there exists no consensus on how to define teacher quality. Though many scholars and 
policy makers are deeply engaged in teasing out the characteristics and properties of 
teacher quality, the definition of it holds a wide range of complexities (Fenstermacher & 
Richardson, 2005). Secondly, union effects are difficult to isolate empirically because 
teacher unions do not come into being haphazardly (Goldhaber, 2006). Many factors 
contributing to the formation and strength of teacher unions, such as the competency of 
school administrators, may very probably be associated with the characteristics of schools, 
and teachers schools employ. Thirdly, disaggregating union effects is further complicated 
by the so called “spillover effects” of teacher unions, the fact that nonunion states and 
districts tend to copy the practices of their unionized peers (Johnson & Donaldson, 2006). 
As a preventive effort to discourage their teachers from unionization and to compete for 
prospective teachers, schools offer salaries and working conditions comparable to those 
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in unionized ones. The “spillover effects” make it even harder for researchers to isolate 
the effects of teacher unions on teacher quality.  
Defining Teacher Quality 
 In this dissertation study, acknowledging the complexities born with teacher 
quality, I review the common approaches of defining teacher quality, including teacher 
unions’ definition(s) of teacher quality. After scrutinizing the prevailing approaches, I 
adopt two composite measures of teacher quality in this research: One is derived from 
existing empirical literature and the other from the federal government’s viewpoint—
NCLB’s definition. The empirically based teacher quality measure includes four 
components: selectivity of the postsecondary institutions teachers attended, holding at 
least a bachelor’s degree in the teaching field, holding a certificate in the teaching field, 
and at least five years of experience. The NCLB’s definition of teacher quality consists of 
three components:  at least a bachelor’s degree from a four-year institution, full state 
certification, and competence in the subject area (for elementary school teachers, as 
demonstrated by full certification in the subject area; and for middle and secondary 
school teachers, as demonstrated by an academic major in each core subject area taught). 
After analyzing unions’ effect on the two composite proxies of teacher quality, I further 
study unions’ relationship with the major components of the composite measures, which 
are the selectivity of teacher preparation institutions, in-field degree status, in-field 
certification status, and teacher experience. Under the overarching theme of union effect 
on teacher quality, I am also interested in its effect on the distribution of teacher quality. 
Union-negotiated teacher staffing rules frequently give preferences to teachers with 
seniority in transferring within districts and keeping their positions when schools 
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experience layoffs. When they have a choice, teachers typically avoid high-poverty, high-
minority, and low-achieving schools (Ascher & Fruchter, 2001; Peske & Haycock, 2006). 
Some argue through their negotiated contracts, teacher unions contribute to or exacerbate 
the teacher quality gap between schools of different characteristics. So this study also 
investigates whether unions are associated with the intra-district teacher quality 
distribution across schools. 
Categories of Unionization 
 In the history of their development, teacher unions adopted and are now still 
employing two major negotiation approaches with the district management, namely 
“collective bargaining” and “meet and confer.” Meet and confer preceded the occurrence 
of collective bargaining, and it remains a less binding type of formal negotiation. Within 
the meet and confer framework, management is under no legal obligation to discuss 
specific topics with its employees or reach any agreement (Koppich, 2006). Even when a 
meet and confer session does produce a written agreement, called a memorandum of 
understanding (MOU), the agreement only lists the mutual commitment but carries no 
legal obligation with either party (Koppich, 2006). On the other hand, dubbed the 
“powerful tool” of teacher unions (Angus & Mirel, 2001, P.32), collective bargaining is 
the central piece of unionization and did not come into education until the post-1960s 
(Cresswell, Murphy & Kerchner, 1980). A collective bargaining agreement is a “legal 
contract laying out the rights and obligations of teachers and the school board” (Hess & 
Kelly, 2006, p.56). The agreement “establishes the terms and conditions of employment 
of employees, places limitations on the ability of the employer to change those terms and 
conditions, and specifies certain kinds of duties or requirements of employees” 
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(Lieberman, 2000, p.19). These two approaches of labor relations exert differential 
influence on school policies (Kerchner & Mitchell, 1988), which could lead to different 
distributions of teacher quality.  
Not only are there noticeable differences between collective bargaining and “meet 
and confer” agreements, but also variations exist among collective bargaining agreements 
across districts. Within the broad category of collective bargaining, teacher unions still 
represent a variety of power strengths and behavior across the U.S.  The power of teacher 
unions in negotiating contracts favorable to their interests is also related to union 
membership in a district (Rose & Sonstelie, 2004). Collective bargaining generally will 
not occur unless at least 50 percent of teachers are union members (Hoxby, 1996). 
Therefore, to better identify the different categories of unionization and their ensuing 
power in negotiating with the school districts, in this research I construct a unionization 
measure by combining the information on union contract type and membership, 
following the strategy adopted by Hoxby (1996). Specifically, the unionization measure 
has three categories: stronger unionization, weaker unionization, and no unionization. 
“Stronger unionization” measure is constructed as having a collective bargaining 
agreement and union membership exceeding 50 percent of total number of district 
teachers. The “weaker unionization” category is defined as either 1) having a “meet and 
confer” agreement or 2) having a collective bargaining agreement but with union 
membership no more than 50 percent of total number of district teachers. The “no 




 This study is based on a conceptual framework grown out of literature review (see 
Chapter Two) that multi-level factors —state, district, and school factors— influence 
teachers’ choice to work in a particular school (as graphically presented in Figure 1). A 
district’s teacher quality, as measured by the concentration of teachers possessing certain 
characteristics linked with teacher quality in a district, is influenced by the district 
characteristics at the center of Figure 1 as well as state-level policies and practices. 
District-level factors, such as provisions of varying types of union contracts, district 
demographics, district wealth, hiring practice, influence teachers’ decision to work in the 
districts. Local community features, such as crime rate, non-teaching job opportunities, 
also affect prospective teachers’ decision to teach in a particular district.  The influence 
of district characteristics on teacher quality is represented by Arrow A in Figure 1. In 
addition, studying the effects of teacher unions needs to differentiate between the effects 
of a union on a district and the district characteristics that make a union more likely to 
form (Hoxby, 1996; Goldhaber, 2006). Therefore, the inclusion of other district 
characteristics, other than union status, also serves to alleviate the endogeneity concern.  
 In addition to local factors, a state’s collective bargaining law also has an 
overarching influence on the existence of unions, and the strength of negotiated district 
contracts in that state (Hess & Kelly, 2006). State level teacher-related policies, such as 
certification and licensure standards, professional development policies, all presumably 
affect teacher quality in the state. Thus, state level factors are included in this conceptual 
framework to control for their possible confounding effects on the distribution of teacher 
quality, as indicated by Arrow B.   
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 This framework also hypothesizes that teacher quality at the school level, as 
measured by the proportion of teachers possessing certain characteristics linked with 
teacher quality in a school, is influenced by individual school characteristics in addition 
to the district and state level factors. School characteristics, such as leadership, size, 
poverty status, student population, working conditions etc influence the distribution of 
teacher quality within districts as indicated by Arrow C. Furthermore, district-level 
polices such as union status may also interact with these school level factors to exert 
differential influence on teacher quality across schools within a district, as captured by 
Arrow D. For example, district unionization status may interact with school poverty level, 
thus affect the intra-district distribution of teacher quality across schools with varying 
poverty levels. 
 With the conceptual framework built out of literature on unions and teacher 
quality, I acknowledge that my analytical models may not include all of the variables. 
The reason is simply that some factors, such as state-level certification policies or job 
opportunities for college graduates, are not accessible to this dissertation research. 
Therefore variables measuring these factors are not included in the analytical models. 
These omitted variables present one of the limitations of this study, which is discussed in 
detail at the limitations section of this study. 
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Figure 1:  Conceptual framework for the relationship between teacher unions and teacher quality in the district; the association 
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In this dissertation research, I examine the relationship between teacher unions 
and teacher quality in large urban and suburban districts. Specifically, this study focuses 
on two research questions: 
1. What’s the relationship between a district’s union status (stronger unionization, 
weaker unionization, no unionization) and teacher quality in the district among 
the large urban and suburban districts in the U.S.? Teacher quality is measured by: 
a. The proportion of teachers in a district who are classified as high quality 
by the empirically-established teacher quality (ETQ) indictor (composed 
of selectivity of the postsecondary institutions teachers attended, holding 
at least a bachelor’s degree in the teaching field, holding a certificate in 
the teaching field, and at least five years of experience); 
b. The proportion of teachers in a district who are classified as high quality 
by the NCLB-defined highly qualified teachers (HQT) indicator 
(composed of at least a bachelor’s degree from a four-year institution, 
full state certification, and competence in the subject area); 
c. The proportion of teachers in a district who possess one of the following 
teacher quality components: selectivity of the postsecondary institutions 
teachers attended, holding at least a bachelor’s degree in the teaching 
field, holding a certificate in the teaching field, and at least five years of 
experience 
Teacher unions, particularly seniority-based transfer rules, give experienced 




unionization theory suggests that experienced teachers would choose to use the rules to 
leave the undesirable schools, typically high poverty and high minority ones, to teach at 
schools they find more desirable. My second research question intends to examine this 
conventional belief. Due to data availability issue, I confine my second research question 
to the largest districts in the U.S. The largest districts refer to those districts listed among 
the top 100 largest districts by the National Center on Education Statistics (USDE, 2008). 
Specifically, I seek to investigate:  
2. In the largest school districts in the U.S., how does a district’s union status 
affect the intra-district distribution of teacher quality across schools with different 
poverty level and minority student concentration? Here, teacher quality is 
measured by: 
a. The proportion of teachers in a school who are classified as high quality 
by the empirically-established teacher quality (ETQ) indictor; 
b. The proportion of teachers in a school who are classified as high quality 
by the NCLB-defined highly qualified teachers (HQT) indicator; 
c. The proportion of teachers in a school who possess one of the following 
teacher quality components: selectivity of the postsecondary institutions 
teachers attended, holding at least a bachelor’s degree in the teaching 
field, holding a certificate in the teaching field, and at least five years of 
experience. 
Significance of the Study 
The relationship between teacher unions and teacher quality is a fundamental and 




attention to this thorny issue, strikingly scarce empirical evidence exists to help them 
make informed decisions. Because of the scant number of studies, a recent review has to 
focus on intermediate factors, such as teacher pay, working conditions, teaching 
assignments, evaluation and dismissal, to gauge the effects of collective bargaining on 
teacher quality (see Johnson & Donaldson, 2006).  In addition, virtually all studies except 
one (Koski & Horng, 2007) on the effects of teacher unions used data from the 1970s and 
early 1980s, when the educational context was much different from the one exists today. 
This research provides a piece of new empirical evidence on the effect of teacher unions 
on teacher quality by analyzing data from the Schools and Staffing Survey, 2003-2004 
(SASS 03-04). SASS 03-04 provides the most up-to-date national level data to study 
teacher unions’ effect in the current educational context which affects the way unions 
function.  
 The multilevel modeling technique adopted in this study provides a significant 
advance over traditional one-level analysis performed by prior generation of unions’ 
effect studies.  The hierarchical structure of schools within districts, districts within states 
has to be accounted for in studying union’s effect on teacher quality. For example, unions 
operate at the district level, while the collective bargaining law at the state level has an 
instrumental effect on districts’ unionization status as well as the bargaining scope of 
union contracts. The multilevel modeling technique takes into account the hierarchical 
structure of the data in studying unions’ effect on teacher quality. In addition, the 
investigation of unions’ effect on the intra-district distribution of teacher quality across 
schools also calls for multi-level modeling. Whether teacher unionization interacts with 




primary interest to policy makers in understanding union effect and it is an area that 
needs empirical evidence. 
 In summary, using most updated national level data and advanced analytical 
technique, this study provides a piece of empirical evidence which could help 





CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 Teacher unions have been in existence since mid-nineteen century, and their role 
and power have also been evolving with the development of the American society. 
Studying teacher unions’ effect on teacher quality requires an understanding of teacher 
unions’ history, status quo, its role in education and the complexities involved in defining 
teacher quality. 
This chapter begins with a brief history of teacher unions in the U.S, focusing on 
the evolution of teacher unions in terms of their goals and policy emphases. The second 
section describes the status quo of union activity in school systems across the U.S. 
Section three reviews existing literature that measures unions’ activities, including union 
contract studies and union impact studies on teacher-related outcomes, such as teacher 
pay and teacher quality. Section four synthesizes most commonly used approaches of 
defining teacher quality, and compares teacher unions’ definition(s) of teacher quality 
with those in other policy arenas. After synthesizing dominant ways of defining teacher 
quality, I present definitions of teacher quality adopted in this study and the theory of 
action underlying this unions’ effect research. This chapter concludes with a summary of 
findings from the review of literature. 
A Brief History of Teacher Unions in the United States 
The National Education Association (NEA) and the American Federation of 
Teachers (AFT) are the two major teacher unions in the United States.  Today, the NEA 
and AFT are regarded as the most powerful political forces in public education and 
impact a variety of educational issues (Lieberman, 1997; Murphy, 1990). However, the 




influence than they have today. The turning point in the role of teacher unions was the 
advent of collective bargaining in the 1960s, which greatly enhanced the power of the 
two teacher unions. Growing from 770,000 members in 1960 (Murphy, 1990, p.277), 
today the NEA and the AFT have a combined membership of 4.3 million 1(NEA, 2007c; 
AFT, 2007b). Currently, collective bargaining of teachers is established in 42 states and 
the District of Columbia (DC)2 (Nelson, 2006), and all 50 states and DC have teacher 
unions and more than 80 percent of all teachers are union members (Fischer, 2003). 
In this section, I present a brief history of teacher unions in the U.S. with a focus 
on major union developments, particularly those after the establishment of collective 
bargaining. For every major stage of evolution, I provide unions’ goals, major policy 
emphases, and possible factors driving these policy level emphases. 
The Founding of the Two Teacher Unions and Their Early Stage Evolution 
The National Education Association (NEA) 
  The National Teachers’ Association, the predecessor of the National Education 
Association (NEA), was founded in 1857 with the objective of making teaching “a 
profession, not just an ordinary vocation” (Wesley, 1957, p. 30). In 1870, The National 
Teacher’s Association merged with the National Association of School Superintendents 
resulting in its name of NEA and the new organization was dominated by school 
administrators and college professors. School administrators constituted 50 percent of the 
                                                 
1 This figure includes some non k-12 teachers, such as nurses, paraprofessionals, college students and 
university faculty and staff (NEA, 2007c; AFT, 2007b) 
2 Teachers in the following eight states do not work under collectively bargained contracts: Alabama, 
Georgia, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia and West Virginia (Nelson, 2006). 
Though, according to NEA (2005), teachers in Alabama and West Virginia have permissive collective 




active membership during the 1890s and classroom teachers only 11 percent (Murphy, 
1990). 
 During the 19th century, the NEA remained a small educational organization with 
no permanent full-time staff, and its membership did not exceed 2000 members (Wesley, 
1957, p. 397). The organization did not regard itself as a union until the late 1960s, but 
instead sought to improve the teaching profession and reform American education 
(Vinovskis, 2000). In particular, the NEA focused on circulation of educational 
knowledge, curriculum issues, and more federal involvement in education. Through 
paper presentations and speeches delivered at its annual conventions, the NEA promoted 
communication among educators. The NEA established committees and commissions to 
deal with more specific educational issues. The NEA’s Committee of Ten on Secondary 
School Studies in 1893 tried to standardize the American high school curriculum (Cremin, 
1988) and had a major influence on education. The NEA also called for increased federal 
assistance to education. 
 The NEA grew rapidly and truly presented itself as a national educational 
association in the early twentieth century. Its membership expanded from about 8,500 in 
1917 to more than 141,000 in 1927 and 200,000 by 1940 (Donley, 1976). Its 
comprehensive membership represented all facets of public education: teachers, 
superintendents, and university professors. The control of the organization and of the 
teaching occupation was still placed in the hands of administrators, though teachers 
comprised the majority of the NEA’s membership (Kerchner & Mitchell, 1988, p. 59).  
 In the early twentieth century, financial pressures of the time and other social 




(Murphy, 1990).     Despite its anti-union attitude, the NEA, at the urge of its members 
spent much of the decade of the twenties working to raise teachers’ salaries through its 
general program of raising standards of the teaching profession (Murphy, 1990, p.140). 
The NEA felt if standards were raised high enough, teachers would be paid accordingly 
(Murphy, 1990). However, this assumption never fully came to fruition and teachers still 
earned lower salaries even when compared with factory workers with less education in 
the early twentieth century (Cresswell, Murphy & Kerchner, 1980, p.137). 
The American Federation of Teachers (AFT) 
Contrary to the NEA’s initial mission as a professional education organization, 
the AFT was founded in 1916 as a teachers’ union. The initial goals of AFT were to unite 
teachers and represent teachers in negotiations with school boards (Urban, 1982, chapter 
6). 
 By the end of nineteenth century, teachers became more concerned about their 
personal economic needs like salaries, pension, etc, and believed the union could provide 
a way of attaining their goals (Wesley, 1957). However, the administrator-controlled 
NEA did not take teachers’ interests seriously and rejected unionism. Teachers’ self-
interest initiatives clashed with the NEA ideology of the selfless service of the teaching 
profession (Kerchner & Mitchell, 1988, p.54). As a result, NEA members Margaret 
Haley and her elementary teacher colleagues formed the Chicago Federation of Teachers 
(CFT) outside of the NEA in 1897 to “fight for the rights to which they were entitled”, 
specifically, better compensation (Braun, 1976, p.22-23). However, their request for 




1988, p.56), and Haley was regarded as a ‘fiend in petticoats” by Nicolas Murray Butler, 
then president of the NEA (p.56).  
 In 1916, the CFT merged with three other local unions3 to form the American 
Federation of Teachers, and later was granted a charter by the American Federation of 
Labor (AFL), a group of private-sector unions (Urban, 2000, P.8; Murphy, 1990).  
 Throughout its beginning decades, the AFT had a limited national presence and 
struggled for its existence, relying on financial assistance from the AFL and its successor 
organization, the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organization 
(AFL-CIO) (Murphy, 1990, p. 113-114; Selden, 1985, p. 8-9). Its membership 
represented less than five percent of the total national teaching force during 1916-1960 
(Cresswell, Murphy & Kerchner, 1980, p.110, Table 4-1). Therefore, the AFT did not 
achieve much in its goal of representing teachers and teachers’ interests nationally. Next I 
will review the obstacles to the AFT’s strong teacher unionization. 
Limited Influence of Teacher Unions between 1910 and 1960 
 Between 1910 and 1960, teacher unionists faced several barriers which prevented 
them from organizing teachers effectively. Among them were the lack of a legal 
framework for teacher unions and the public’s general disposition against public 
employee unionization, as well as the AFT’s internal rifts. 
 First, early teacher unionists had no legal protection of their rights to organize, 
and they were subject to retaliation for joining a union. At the state level, courts did not 
support teachers’ union activities.  Local school board’s “yellow-dog” contracts in the 
mid-1910s, which declared no rehiring of teachers who belonged to unions, significantly 
                                                 
3 The Federation of Women High School Teachers, the Chicago Federation of Men Teachers, and one local 




put a hold in the growing of unionized teachers (Murphy, 1990). State Supreme courts, 
for example, in Illinois and the State of Washington upheld boards of education’s 
“yellow-dog” contracts in 1917 (Cresswell, Murphy & Kerchner, 1980, p.150). Due to 
the anti-union movement, the AFT’s membership shrank drastically from 4,500 in 1916 
to 2,400 in 1917 and 1,500 in 1918 (Murphy, 1990, Appendix table 6).  
 Second, perhaps the biggest barrier was the popular belief that teachers, as public 
employees, should not have the right to strike. After the 1919 Boston police strike, 
Samual Gompers, the founding president of American Federation of Labor (AFL) made it 
clear that no public employee unions affiliated with AFL should have a strike clause 
(Murphy, 1990, p.109). Therefore, from its inception, the AFT had a policy that its local 
unions would not strike (Henderson, 2004). Further, most state laws prohibited strikes by 
public employees, and where state law did not ban strikes, courts ruled teacher strikes to 
be illegal (e.g. the Connecticut Supreme Court decision in 1951) (Henderson, 2004, p.4).  
 A third barrier lay in unions’ internal factions. Divisions within AFT prevented 
the solidarity required for bargaining effectively. Gender issues were persistent. Women 
activists sought not only economic protection, but also considered unionism as an avenue 
for social change (Murphy, 1990, p.103). And the latter pursuit was unpopular with male 
unionists. In addition, gender division existed in high schools where women and men had 
their separate unions. Male high school teachers were eager to control the process of 
negotiations, while women strived for equal representation in the discussion (Murphy, 
1990, p.103). What was more, high school teachers and elementary school teachers had 
different requests from unions. The elementary teachers fought for a single salary 




school teachers wanted to keep the wage differentials based on the positions (Kahlenberg, 
2006; Murphy, 1990, p.88).  
 The AFT during the period of 1930 and 1940s also struggled for its identity 
(Cresswell, Murphy & Kerchner, 1980, p.78). The leadership had always been in debate 
about whether the AFT should evolve into a “bread-and-butter” union, which would 
strive for securing higher wages and better working conditions for members, or a social 
re-constructionist union, which would fight for social change, such as civil rights, racial 
discrimination and women rights (Cresswell, Murphy & Kerchner, 1980, p.78).  
 As a result, these dissentious issues within teacher unions, as well as the anti-
union legal and societal structures, curbed teacher unionism from growing stronger in the 
first half of the twentieth century.  
Conditions for Stronger Unionism Began to Emerge in the 1950s and 60s 
  Though difficult barriers existed against organizing teachers effectively, certain 
factors began to emerge for stronger unionism in the mid twentieth century. In the 1950s 
and1960s, in addition to teachers’ declining economic situation and dissatisfaction with 
their working conditions, the demographic change of the teacher population as well as 
private sector unionism movement offered more opportunity for teacher militancy and 
stronger unions.  
 The post-World War II time represented one of the greatest periods of economic 
growth in the United States, but not for educators. Teachers’ financial situation was 
becoming increasingly despairing. Teachers’ salaries had always been low; however, by 
1947 and 1948, the situation became worse than before (Cresswell, Murphy & Kerchner, 




the greatly increase in cost of living, the 1947-48 average salary (of teachers) had less 
purchasing power than the lower average salary in 1929-30” (Eton, 1975, p. 24). Besides 
the worsening financial situations, teachers were also tired of their working conditions 
(Kahlenberg, 2006). For example, teachers did not have school grievance procedures to 
protect them from abuse by administrators. They were forced to stay late for long staff 
meetings as demanded by principals (Murphy, 1990). Teachers, though proclaimed by the 
NEA leadership to be professionals, had non-educational responsibilities such as 
removing snow on school grounds and monitor cafeteria and bathrooms (Kahlenberg, 
2006).  
 The demographic change was a second reason for teachers’ militancy (Henderson, 
2004, p.8). After World War II, due to the GI bill, many veteran soldiers came back to 
school and were prepared to join the teaching occupation. These more educated male 
teachers, who had markedly higher expectations for being professionals, found them 
become “workers in the education industry”; they taught in overcrowded classrooms, and 
earned a salary with decreased spending power (Selden, 1985, p.228). The influx of male 
teachers with worsening financial situations led a push to stronger unionism. 
 A third factor lay in the large scale private-sector labor movement in the 1950s. 
After World War II, organized labor in the private sector won the legal sanction and 
protection to secure considerable wage and benefit gains through collective bargaining. In 
1952, the AFT president, Carl Megel, noted the salary for the average factory worker was 
approximately $400 more than that for teachers in 1951 (Murphy, 1990, p.210; Urban, 
1982, p.140). This $400 difference was sizable given teachers’ average annual salary of 




held college degrees, the income disparity between teachers and workers with 
considerably less education, was a frustration and motivation for teachers to look into the 
workers’ unionization practice (Cresswell, Murphy & Kerchner, 1980, p.137). Teachers’ 
unions began to determine whether the form of industrial unionism was suitable for their 
needs (Cresswell, Murphy & Kerchner, 1980, p. 80).  
 The structure for stronger teacher unionism, namely collective bargaining, started 
to emerge in the 1950’s. Teachers’ organization rights began to gain the attention of 
legislators after World War II. One piece of notable legislation was the passage of the 
first state act for school bargaining in Wisconsin. The statute recognized the rights of 
teachers to organize and bargain collectively, but declared strikes against schools to be 
illegal. The statute also was the first to require school boards to recognize and bargain 
with teachers’ unions (Cresswell, Murphy & Kerchner, 1980, p.150). 
 In the period between 1952 and the New York schoolteachers strike in 1962, 
under the slow moving conditions favoring teacher unionism, teachers cautiously pursued 
some changes, such as in getting rid of the discriminatory laws regarding married woman 
teachers, and gaining due process procedures for dismissal (Murphy, 1990, p.211). 
 The favorable social and legal surroundings as well as the worsening economic 
situations of teachers, contributed to several collective bargaining agreements between 
local teacher organizations and school boards in Illinois, Connecticut, and Rhode Island 
(Cresswell, Murphy & Kerchner, 1980, p.150). However, the breakthrough of teachers’ 
unionism in U.S history did not come until the watershed New York schoolteacher strike 
in the early 1960s. 




 The rise of the United Federation of Teachers (UFT) in New York City, a local 
affiliate of AFT, gave collective bargaining a new thrust. In 1960, after a one-day strike 
to reinforce demands for collective bargaining rights and certain working conditions, the 
superintendent quickly agreed to a collective bargaining election and dropped all charges 
against striking teachers (Selden, 1985, p.34). In the collective bargaining election, 
teachers would choose whether they opted for collective bargaining and which union they 
wanted to represent them.  Teachers granted an overwhelmingly “yes” to collective 
bargaining, and elected the UFT to represent them in bargaining with the School Board 
(Murphy, 1990, p.215). After the negotiation on the scale of pay raise was broken, over 
20,000 out of 40,000 New York City teachers struck for one day (Cresswell, Murphy & 
Kerchner, 1980, p.85; Murphy, 1990, p.215). The strike successfully prompted the 
governor, the state legislators, and the city to pour in an additional $82 million to the 
school system, and each of the city’s teachers received an average annual pay increase of 
$700 (Cresswell, Murphy & Kerchner, 1980, p.85).  
  After the New York City victory, bargaining status of AFT locals began to be 
established in other major cities in the nation (Cresswell, Murphy & Kerchner, 1980, 
p.85). Between 1961 and 1965, forty collective bargaining elections took place involving 
more than 96,000 teachers, of which over 74,000 teachers voted for the AFT locals for 
representation and about 21,000 voted for NEA representation (Murphy, 1990, p. 224, 
footnote 38).  
The NEA’s Response to the AFT’s Collective Bargaining Strategy 
 The AFT’s victory in bargaining elections as well as in membership growth did 




collective bargaining, the NEA developed a policy of “professional negotiations” to 
differentiate from the AFT’s union style collective bargaining (Henderson, 2004).  
Professional negotiations, essentially the NEA’s “meet and confer” agreement between 
teachers and school boards, covered compensation and working conditions, as did 
collective bargaining, but still kept a non-strike policy and prohibited use of outside 
parties to mediate (Stinnett, 1968, p. 90, 119, 122).  
Furthermore, the underlying ideologies of collective bargaining and “meet-and-
confer” agreement are fundamentally different (Kerchner & Mitchell, 1988, p.5). Meet-
and-confer practice was based on the assumption that teachers’ interests coincided with 
those of the school employer (Kerchner & Mitchell, 1988, p.5). In other words, teachers 
want what their school district wants. In contrast, collective bargaining assumed that each 
side had its own interest, defined problems differently, and would pursue its own interests 
in dealing with the problems (Kerchner & Mitchell, 1988, p. 5).  
 Another difference between collective bargaining and “meet and confer” involved 
the different roles of school administrators. In collective bargaining, school 
administrators usually represent the school boards in bargaining with teachers. In contrast, 
in NEA’s professional negotiations, administrators were supposed to advocate for 
teachers, acting as intermediary between the school board and teachers (Kerchner & 
Mitchell, 1988, p.6). The professional negotiation, sought to preserve NEA’s status as a 
professional association for both teachers and school administrators and avert any 
potential breach within the “everybody included” association, especially between 




 During meet and confer meetings, teachers from high school, elementary school, 
and middle school might have different requests and they did not have the obligation to 
act on behalf of each other or as a whole, and only with the intent to secure their own 
interests (Koppich, 2006). As a result, school boards often successfully took advantage of 
the differences among groups of teachers to defer or manipulate the negotiations 
(Koppich, 2006, p. 206). Moreover, the boards had no legal obligation to discuss specific 
topics teachers requested, or to reach any agreement, or to carry out promises (Koppich, 
2006, p.206). Teachers, thus, jokingly called this process “meet and defer” (Kerchner & 
Mitchell, 1988, p. 65). The NEA adopted a non-strike policy and prohibited use of 
outside parties to mediate (Stinnett, 1968, p. 90, 119, 122).  At the time when the “meet 
and confer” style professional negotiations did not work for teachers, for example, if 
boards did not accept teachers’ requests, the NEA would impose, instead of strikes,  such 
sanctions as advising teachers not to work for the districts (Henderson, 2004).   
During the years of the 1960s when the NEA implemented the professional 
negotiating strategy, teachers who engaged in professional negotiation disappointedly 
found that they could not easily solve their disputes with the boards—they did have 
different interests (Kerchner & Mitchell, 1988, p.66). In contrast, teachers with collective 
bargaining rights gained more ground. Experiencing the disappointment of professional 
negotiations and witnessing the successes of collective bargaining, more and more NEA 
affiliates began to turn to collective bargaining, strikes, and contract negotiations. In 
1968-1969, the NEA locals accounted for 80% of the strikes and 40% of the employees 
involved in the total 123 teacher strikes (NEA research, 1969, p. 4-5, cited in Henderson, 




negotiated ever since, NEA affiliates accounted for 90.5% of the contracts and 61.2% of 
the teachers covered (NEA research, 1969, p.4-5, cited in Henderson, 2004, p.11). 
 As local associations committed to collective bargaining, the differing interests 
between teachers and school administrators became apparent; therefore, increasing 
numbers of administrators began leaving the NEA either voluntarily or as demanded by 
state bargaining statutes or school boards (Henderson, 2004, p.11). The NEA, in rivalry 
with the AFT to compete for membership and dues, began to embrace collective 
bargaining actively and pursued to limit administrators’ influence in the association.  
Thereafter, with the disaffiliation of three organizations4 representing administrators in 
1972, the NEA finalized its transformation into a teacher union (West, 1980, p.83-84). 
Growing Influence: Collective Bargaining in the 1970s and 80s 
 With the pressure from the AFT, the NEA, and other unions representing 
government employees, more and more states began to pass public employee collective 
bargaining laws. By the late 1970s, 31 states had enacted collective bargaining laws 
requiring some form of contractual arrangement between school system and employees, 
and 7 out of the other 19 states did not require but permitted school boards to enter into 
contracts with teachers (Cresswell, Murphy & Kerchner, 1980, p.153). The remaining 12 
states’ school boards were prohibited from entering collectively bargained contracts with 
teacher unions. The laws also describe a process for identifying a bargaining unit as well 
as the legal scope of the agreement. A bargaining unit defines the individuals to be 
covered by a contract; and the scope of agreement indicates the subjects that must be 
                                                 
4 The three organizations were the American Association of School Administrators, the National 




negotiated, those that may be negotiated, and those that are not allowed to be negotiated 
(Koppich, 2006, p.207). 
 Due to the established legal structure as well as the effectiveness of the teacher 
strike in New York, the incidence of teacher strikes spread in the 1960-1970s. In 1964 
there were 9 teacher strikes; in 1966, 30; in 1967, 105; and in 1975-76 school year, a 
record high of 203 (Kahlenberg, 2006). The capacity of strikes to disrupt school 
operation put tremendous pressure on public officials to broker agreements.  
 Further, since the advent of collective bargaining in early 1960s, union 
membership increased dramatically. The NEA membership rose from around 714,000 in 
1960, before the first major collective agreement, to a little less than 2 million in 1976. 
The AFT went from 56,156 to 446,000 during the same period (Cresswell, Murphy & 
Kerchner, 1980, table 4-1). The percentage of teachers represented by unions grew from 
55.5 percent in 1960 to more than 90 percent by the late 1970s (Cresswell, Murphy &  
Kerchner, 1980, table 4-1). Research in the 60s and 70s found that the AFT and NEA 
tended to attract teachers with different characteristics. Men were more likely to join the 
AFT and women were more likely to join the NEA (Lowe, 1965). Teachers with master’s 
degrees were more likely to be attracted to the AFT, whereas teachers with lesser training 
were more likely to join the NEA (Lowe, 1965; Fox & Wince, 1976). It is not clear 
whether the same pattern still holds at present time. 
 Along with the growth of collective bargaining and its growing membership, 
unions began to exert increased influence on state and national educational policies aside 
from district-level collective bargaining. In addition to other policy involvement, unions 




transformed from a professional educational association, and its renewed emphasis on 
professionalization was no surprise. Since the 1970s, the NEA lobbied for teacher-
dominated independent state professional boards to set policy regarding teacher education, 
licensing, professional development, and advanced certification (Ballou & Podgursky, 
2000). The local NEA affiliates were the major moving force behind the first 
establishment of independent professional boards in Oregon (1973) and Minnesota 
(1980). The momentum for professional boards continued into 1990s and 15 states had 
independent or semi-independent boards by 2000 (Ballou & Podgursky, 2000). The 
professional boards in eleven states have full authority to set standards for licensure. In 
the other four states, the state board of education still retains the authority to veto actions 
of the professional board (NEA, 1998, p.21 cited in Ballou & Podgursky, 2000). 
 Both the NEA and AFT were strong supporters of the founding of the National 
Board for Professional Teaching Standards in 1987 (Lieberman, 1993). The Board was 
established to create rigorous and practice-based examinations for experienced teachers 
(NBPTS, 2006b). The NEA and the AFT, taken together, held at least one third of the 
Board’s membership and the presidents of the two national unions automatically filled 
two positions in the Board (Ballou & Podgursky, 2000). 
The Bargaining Scope in the 1960s to Early 80s 
 The scope of collective bargaining reflected the major goals and policy emphases 
of unions. During the period from the 60s to mid-70s, teacher unionism operated by the 
means of industrial style bargaining. The major reason was that states modeled their 
public sector bargaining laws directly on the 1935 National Labor Relations Act, which 




bargaining scope was considered, teachers sought the basic goals for which industrial 
workers had fought in the 1930s—improved salaries and benefits, limitation on work 
load, and due process in transfers and discipline (Selden, 1985, p.109). Contracts set forth 
standardized pay scales, seniority-based layoffs, teachers’ in-school work responsibilities, 
grievance procedures, and mandated evaluation procedures (Johnson & Kardos, 2000). 
Between the mid-1960s and mid-70s, teacher unions bargained on more provisions that 
were favorable to their interests and had the potential to benefit students indirectly, such 
as smaller classes, time for teachers to prepare for classes, and provisions granting 
teachers the right to refuse teaching assignments outside their field (Johnson & Kardos, 
2000). By 1975, a NEA’s survey revealed that almost one-third of teacher collective 
bargaining agreements contained clauses limiting class size and out-field assignments 
(Yrchik, 1992, p. 22-23, cited in Henderson, 2004, p.15). Class size changed from an 
average of 28 for elementary schools in 1965 to an average of 23 in 1975; and in 
secondary schools class size reduced from 22 to 19 during the same period (Doherty, 
1981, p.69) 
 In addition to the “bread and butter” bargaining items specified in state 
legislatures, unions began to move to negotiating educational policy issues, including the 
participation of teachers in curriculum policies, the discipline of students, and the 
establishment of specific education programs (Kahlenberg, 2006). A survey completed by 
the NEA in 1971 showed that approximately 53 percent of contracts examined had some 
clauses on pupil discipline, about 25 percent had curriculum review language, and about 
23 percent involved textbook selection processes (Cresswell, Murphy &  Kerchner, 1980, 




 Some contracts also included clauses that directly assisted the existing union in 
maintaining its position as the exclusive representative of teachers in the district, such as 
an agency clause. The agency shop clause requires that “all employees covered by a 
union contract must either be members of the union or pay a fee to cover the cost of being 
represented” (Cresswell, Murphy & Kerchner, 1980, p.329). Paying dues or a fee thus 
becomes a condition of continued employment, and eliminates the occurrence of “free 
riders”. The agency shop clause, thus, obtained some level of security for the existing 
union in a school district. 
Persisting Controversies and Criticisms 
 By the early 1980s, controversies around the adoption of the industrial model of 
unionism in education began to emerge, and criticism of the teacher unions and union 
provisions persists to the current time. Critics claimed that collective bargaining was the 
biggest impediment to improving American public schools (Moe, 2006; Lieberman, 1997; 
Brimelow, 2003) 
 Traditional teacher unionism first came under scrutiny in the 1980s (Kerchner & 
Koppich, 2004). Critics charged that unions did much harm to education because the 
narrow self-interest of teachers often diverged from the needs of students (Moe, 2006). 
The rigid union contracts reduced flexibility required for initiating school reform. The 
union work rules, which were effective in protecting teachers from arbitrary treatment by 
administrators, sometimes also excessively limited administrators’ discretion, and set low 
expectations for teachers’ responsibilities. For example, in some districts where contracts 




these requirements and refused to participate in school reform initiatives (Johnson, 2004, 
p. 40). 
 Union detractors argued that the stringent seniority rule limited school 
administrators’ ability to assign the best-qualified teachers to the positions and schools 
they were most needed (Liberman, 1997). In school districts where strict seniority rules 
applied to teacher assignments, a teacher with more years of experience might bump a 
junior teacher without giving much consideration to whether the change disrupted school 
operations (Archer, 2002 cited in Johnson, 2004, p.40). Under the seniority rule, more 
experienced teachers chose more desirable jobs, usually in affluent schools, thus leaving 
low-income and low performing schools with inexperienced and less qualified teachers 
(Liberman, 1997, p.221). A school principal anticipated serious problems with the 
seniority rule: “I can anticipate the time when I’m not able to interview teachers if I have 
a vacancy in the building. Instead, the seniority list will determine who goes here and 
who leaves my building (Johnson, 1984, p.80).”  
 Union critics also argued that provisions in collective bargaining agreements 
made it time consuming, or even impossible for administrators to fire incompetent 
teachers (Stern, 2003, p. 24; Johnson, 2004, p.41). For example, in Florida, the 
involuntary rate of dismissal for teachers was 0.05 percent in 1997, compared with 7.9 
percent in Florida’s workforce as a whole (Brimelow, 2003, p.41). The average cost of 
dismissing a teacher in New York during the 1990s was reportedly $200,000 (Toch, 1996 
cited in Kahlenberg, 2006). Even teachers themselves felt unions should not be too 
protective of incompetent teachers. A teacher interviewed by Johnson (1984) echoed this 




job” (p.131). The presence of incompetent teachers, thus, created dissatisfaction among 
teachers. 
 The single salary schedule also discouraged effective teachers from staying in the 
teaching positions, critics claim (Liberman, 1997; Moe, 2006). Under the single salary 
schedule, seniority and academic degrees were rewarded, while actual teacher quality and 
student learning were sidelined; great teachers often left classrooms and switched to 
higher paying positions in school administration or non teaching jobs (Liberman, 1997, 
p.213; Hoxby & Leigh, 2004). 
 The controversies centering on teacher unionism are deeply imbedded in its 
industrial characteristics. Industrial style bargaining generally follows three assumptions 
in conducting negotiations and teacher unionists transferred them directly from industry 
to education in the 1960s (Johnson & Kardos, 2000).  
 First is the belief that interests of labor and management are opposite to each 
other, and that one side’s gain is the other’s loss (Johnson & Kardos, 2000). Kerchner and 
Koppich (1993) describe this oppositional relationship as a key feature of industrial 
unionism, stating: “Industrial unionism assumes permanent adversaries. It organizes 
around rigorous representation of the differences between teachers and managers (p.15).”  
However, in education, teachers and administrators generally have common interests in 
providing effective education to their students. Neither schools nor unions can change the 
status quo without the other. Teachers by themselves are incapable of reorganizing 
schools, implementing professional standards or increasing student learning (Kerchner & 




school schedules, or alter the duties of teachers without accompanied change in labor 
contracts and defined role of teachers (Kerchner & Caufman, 1993, p.2) 
 The second assumption of collective bargaining is that standardized practice is 
desirable; uniform operations across an organization make more efficient production 
(Johnson & Kardos, 2000). In education, union contracts make certain that the same 
standards and regulations apply to all teachers in a district, including salary schedules, 
workload, evaluation procedures (Johnson & Kardos, 2000). This standardized practice, 
thus, leaves principals and teachers with little latitude to respond to the needs of an ever 
diversifying student population. 
 Third is the assumption that similarly skilled workers are interchangeable and 
should be treated alike (Johnson & Kardos, 2000). In education, this assumption means 
that teachers with the same level of education and experience are undifferentiated and are 
to be treated uniformly. When schools initiate performance-based-pay, unions perceive 
this as a threat to their internal solidarity. Just as Kerchner, Koppich, and Weers (1997) 
observed “Union power is threatened when the boundaries of existing job classifications 
are breached and when schools provide different treatment to teachers of the same 
classification” (p.39). Unions, therefore, have historically opposed differentiation among 
teachers in pay, such as merit pay. They contend that merit pay is divisive and 
inappropriate for public education (Berube, 1988, p.141). 
Union Reform from the late 1980s to Today 
 Industrial style unionism proved inadequate to address the problems of education 
identified in the 1980s (Johnson, 2004). Changing economic conditions during the 1970-




a crisis in education (Henderson, 2004, p.17). Public school teachers and unions were 
under constant attack for inadequately educating the nation’s young generation.  
 The release of A Nation at Risk in 1983, created an upsoar of the attacks on 
public education, and called for excellence in education. This reform movement, dubbed 
the “excellence” movement, emphasized higher academic standards and quality of 
teaching, which included the suggestion for merit pay (Berube, 1988, p.141). 
 In response to the increasing challenges created by the excellence movement, 
teacher unions, first the AFT under their reform-minded leadership, strived to meet them 
by encouraging reform initiatives (Kahlenberg, 2006). For example, Albert Shanker, then 
AFT president, changed his previous position that unions did not represent the interest of 
students because they were not union members (Lieberman, 1998). While suspected and 
challenged by the AFT’s longtime more traditional-minded members, Shanker called for 
“a second revolution” (Shanker, 1985), in which teachers would bargain for quality of 
education through professionalism. The professional image Shanker projected was what 
he borrowed from medicine: Teachers ought to be like doctors, who controlled standards, 
entry requirements and were not supervised (Berube, 1988, p.144). Shanker’s call for a 
national certification board of teachers, equivalent of board certification for doctors, 
contributed significantly to the creation of the above mentioned National Board of 
Professional Teaching Standard. Shanker made his case by arguing that if teachers did 
not go beyond collective bargaining, teachers will fail in their “major objective: to 
preserve public education in the United States and to improve the status of teachers, 




 Under Shanker, the AFT also offered compromises on the three key issues that 
unions were under constant attack: protection for incompetent teachers, resistance to 
merit pay, and opposition to school choice (Kahlenberg, 2006). The AFT endorsed the 
AFT local Toledo, Ohio’s peer review plan under which more experienced teachers 
would assess their peers’ performance and may suggest termination of employment. On 
the issue of school choice, the AFT advocated for public charter school (Cameron, 2005, 
p.106).   
 The AFT, under Shanker, embraced the standards movement (Koppich, 2006). It 
launched its “Making Standards Matter” series, looking analytically at each state’s 
achievement standards and the extent to which they were linked to state accountability 
systems. The AFT also lobbied for tough legislation for evaluating state standards 
(Kahlenberg, 2006). 
 The NEA, at least at its national leadership level, was slow to catch up with AFT 
as to the idea of reforming unions, just like its belated adoption of collective bargaining 
in the 1970s. In 1997, twelve years after Shanker’s speech on reforming union practice, 
NEA president Bob Chase urged a New Unionism, which put “issues of school quality 
front and center at the bargaining table” and advanced the interests of students and 
schools (Chase, 1997, cited in Kahlenberg, 2006, p. 23). He argued that if unions didn’t 
embrace reform efforts from within the public school system, public schools “would be 
dismantled from without” (Chase, 1997, cited in Kahlenberg, 2006, p. 23). 
 With the encouragement of its national leadership, some reform-minded locals 
began to depart from industrial-style union contracts and practices. To answer the 




Toledo, Ohio first launched a controversial peer review plan in 1981 (Murray, 2004). 
Under this plan, experienced teachers from a joint labor-management committee would 
review the performance of their peers and sometimes advocate for termination of 
employment (Johnson & Kardos, 2000, p.29). Several other districts, such as Cincinnati, 
and Rochester followed suit, and won the support of teachers. This collaboration blurred 
the traditionally held adversarial line between administrators and teachers. Remarkably, 
teacher peers tended to be tougher reviewers. The peer review process led to considerably 
more teacher termination than before the program began (Johnson & Kardos, 2000, p.29). 
The plan also created controversy in that unions deviated from their traditional 
responsibility of equal representation of members (Kahlenberg, 2006). 
 Inspired by their leaders’ call for new approaches to labor relations, some local 
districts began to experiment with different negotiation practices. They experimented 
with approaches called “principled” or “win-win” negotiations (Fisher & Ury, 1981). 
Rather than facing opponents across the table, negotiators sat side by side in labor-
management task forces, seeking solutions to challenging problems.  
 Several districts, such as Cincinnati and Rochester also introduced the program of 
career ladder with promotional steps that identified and rewarded increasing skills and 
assuming new responsibilities. In these districts, therefore, unions broke through the 
undifferentiated single salary schedule (Johnson & Kardos, 2000, p. 29). 
 In 1996, the above described districts as well as other reform oriented NEA and 
AFT union locals established the Teacher Union Reform Network (TURN), whose 
mission states unions are “ to seek consistently higher levels of student achievement by… 




professional issues” (Teacher Union Reform Network, 2006). Though TURN locals by 
no means represent the totality of union reform, they are among the longest running and 
more extensive reforms (Kerchner & Koppich, 2004). TURN locals expanded bargaining 
scopes beyond those narrow “bread and butter” issues to a wide range of issues, including 
shared decision making, peer assistance and review, accountability, professional 
development, parent involvement, alternatives to the conventional compensation system, 
charter schools, low-performing schools, learning standards, curriculum reform, and uses 
of time (Johnson & Kardos, 2000, p.27; Kerchner and Koppich, 2004, p.190). 
Koppich (2006) also documented a reform initiative in Rochester for teachers to 
sign individualized contracts with their principals to tailor to their students’ learning 
needs. These school-based agreements, piloted in the 2005-2006 school year, can cover 
areas such as school work year, teacher assignments, teaching conditions, class size, and 
the structure of the student day, with the expressed purpose to “improve school 
performance and focus on student achievement.” (p.214). In sum, reform unions, like the 
ones cited here strived to meet the challenges posed by ever-increasing diversified needs 
of students. 
 The expansion of the bargaining scope to educational policy did not proceed 
unchallenged and remained contested terrain. Proponents of reform unionism argue that 
only through involving teachers fully in the process can school improvement be achieved 
(Kerchner, Koppich and Weeres, 1997). However, antagonists claim that once shared 
decision making is included in the collective bargaining contracts, flexibility is lost, and 
the attention soon shifts to whether the principals adhere to the contracts, and the 




2002). Eberts and his colleagues (2004) expressed two concerns about writing reform 
measures into contracts. First, they argued little empirical evidence exists as to the 
effectiveness of these reform efforts; some are better than others. However, once they are 
included in the bargaining contracts, it may be difficult to remove them. Second, unions 
are eager to get their members in the reform process, but do not explicitly address 
teachers’ accountability for the reform results. 
 The slow implementation of union reform initiatives, as well as some state 
legislatures’ actions, mirrors these concerns. Two points attest to the slow 
implementation of union reform. First, the number of districts undertaking reformed 
bargaining approaches is very small; the TURN only comprises fewer than 25 locals 
(Kerchner and Koppich, 2004). Second, no definite implementation results exist 
regarding their effectiveness in improving schools. Though no comprehensive evaluation 
of local districts’ reform results is available, some case studies provide a cue for the 
difficulty of these reforms. For example, in shared decision making, one of the first 
reform measures of unions, school committee members in many cases could not reach 
agreement (Kerchner and Koppich, 2004). One often-recounted story exemplifies this 
point: A school in Los Angeles spent a year discussing who would have access to the 
photocopy machine (Kerchner and Koppich, 2004, p.190).  
 State legislators are moving away from favoring unionism. Some states, such as 
Wisconsin, Illinois, Michigan, and Pennsylvania have aimed at limiting negotiable issues, 
perhaps with the underlying theory that unions’ involvement in core educational decision 
would hurt the pace of school reform (Koppich, 2006, p.214). In 1994, the Michigan 




over issues of school operation such as the date a school year starts, the decision to 
privatize non-instructional support personnel, and other issues (Boyd, Plank, and Sykes, 
2000). 
 Another reason for unionism’s slow progress in reform comes from inside the 
unions. Union reform is subject to the internal split visions of members. As Kahlenberg 
(2006) pointed out that reform oriented union presidents in a number of union locals—
Chicago and San Francisco, for example, have suffered recent election defeat to 
challengers who are more traditional unionists. 
 Kerchner and Koppich, long time researchers in reform unions, concluded that the 
current reform unions “has little of the momentum that characterized the growth of 
collective bargaining in the 1960s and 1970s” (2004, p.197). However, union researchers, 
at the same time, hold qualified optimism about the new unionism in that younger 
members, particularly those hired in the 1980s and after, are relatively more concerned 
about school-quality issues than about salaries and benefits compared with veteran 
teachers (Kahlenberg, 2006). 
Conclusion 
 This brief history of teacher unions presents a picture of teacher unions’ growth in 
response to external economic cycles, political developments, social changes, and legal 
statutes. Teacher unions’ development is also subject to internal factors, such as 
competition between the two leading national unions, leadership visions, and the 
demographic change of teachers. During different stages of development, unions 




evolved from survival to winning better contracts for teachers, to exerting policy 
influence in education with power gained from collective bargaining. 
 The economic needs of teachers, coupled with the societal labor movement drove 
teachers to stronger favor of unionism, including provision for collective bargaining. 
However, as the economy changed from one based on manufacturing to one driven by 
high-skilled knowledge work, schools are faced with a new task of preparing students 
with such required skills (Reich, 1991). Quality schooling for students requires quality 
teachers (Rice, 2003). Traditional industrial-style unionism protects teachers from 
possible arbitrary, punitive treatment from administrators, but its rigidity may also 
confine teachers’ ability to improve school performance. The reform unionism, though 
only piloted in a small percentage of local districts, has the potential to address the 
concerns critics have for unions. Yet, it is too early to predict any major change to 
traditional unionization. Teacher unions within themselves still have different views on 
which way to go: traditional or reform unionism?  
Union Activities in School Systems across the U.S 
 This review briefly describes the status quo of union activities, focusing on types 
of union negotiations, laws within which unions operate, geographical distribution of 
union activities, the bargaining scope of union contracts, and the frequency of work 
stoppage or strikes. With this relatively constrained scope of review, I acknowledge that 
teacher unions perform many other types of activities, such as advocacy for national 
education policy (e.g. teacher education accreditation and licensing), research, and local 
union influence in school board elections. Nonetheless, due to the lack of empirical 




 Teacher unions typically adopt two types of negotiations with school districts, 
“meet and confer” and collective bargaining. “Meet and confer” is the least binding type 
of formal negotiations between an administration and a union; and a memorandum of 
understanding (MOU) is the outcome (Hoxby, 1996). Anecdotal evidence suggests that 
some of the legally non-binding MOUs may be treated as legally binding documents by 
district officials (Hess & West, 2006). Yet, little empirical data is available on the 
prevalence, content, or results of nationwide “meet and confer” negotiations. Within the 
two major negotiation strategies, the “meet and confer” negotiations receive little 
attention; researchers almost solely focused on collective bargaining and its impact on 
school operation. 
Dubbed the “powerful tool” of teacher unions (Angus & Mirel, 2001, P.32), 
collective bargaining refers to “the negotiation and administration of a written agreement 
between the school district as employer and an organization representing employees” 
(Cresswell, Murphy & Kerchner, 1980, p. 2). The resulting written agreement, or 
collective bargaining agreement, is the legal document that both parties must abide by in 
their activities. Currently, collective bargaining of teachers is established in 42 states and 
the District of Columbia (DC)5 (Nelson, 2006), and all 50 states and DC have teacher 
unions and more than 80 percent of all teachers are union members (Fischer, 2003).  
 In nearly all states, teacher collective bargaining is regulated at the state level 
(Hess & Kelly, 2006). Thirty-four states and the District of Columbia have enacted laws 
requiring districts to engage in collective bargaining with organized teachers, and 
                                                 
5 Teachers in the following eight states do not work under collectively bargained contracts: Alabama, 
Georgia, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia and West Virginia (Nelson, 2006). 
Though, according to NEA (2005), teachers in Alabama and West Virginia have permissive collective 




teachers in 10 states have “permissive collective bargaining rights at the discretion of the 
employer” (NEA, 2005). The remaining six states prohibit teachers from having 
collective bargaining rights (NEA, 2005; Fischer, Schimmel & Stelman, 2007; Krueger, 
2002).6 Some anecdotal evidence suggests that unions in these prohibitory states may 
conduct “meet and confer” negotiations with the school districts (Hess & West, 2006). 
Nonetheless, a comprehensive review of union activities in these states is not available.  
 Geographically speaking, collective bargaining activities are less prevalent in the 
southern states, which may be manifested by the fact that sixe states in the south prohibit 
collective bargaining (NEA, 2005). Differences in the distribution of bargaining activity 
across the urban, suburban, and rural areas are not particularly visible according to Ebert 
and Stone (1986). They found that contrary to perceptions unionization had a low 
correlation with district urbanicity locale. However, their findings pertained to the union 
status in the 1980s; whether these findings still paint a reasonable portrait of current 
collective bargaining establishments is unknown. Up-to-date information on the 
distribution of unions across the U.S. definitely warrants further research. 
 The collective bargaining legislation has substantial effects on the density of 
union activities in a state (Saltzman, 1985). Yet, it is naïve to believe that unions function 
uniformly across districts within a particular state. Researchers (Hess & Kelly, 2006) 
have found variation in teachers’ use of collective bargaining even in states that require 
school districts to collectively bargain with teacher unions. The presence of a state 
                                                 
6 For the six states that teachers are prohibited from collective bargaining, NEA (2005) specifically 
indicates that teachers in North Carolina, Texas, and Virginia are prohibited from having collective 
bargaining rights. In the other three states, Georgia, Mississippi, and South Carolina, teachers have no 
legally established collective bargaining rights. According to Fischer, Schimmel & Stelman (2007), “…in 
the absence of such [collective bargaining] laws, teachers do not have a constitutional right to bargain 




legislative bargaining statute does not guarantee that all districts will collectively bargain. 
For example, in California, which has a mandatory bargaining law, 6.3 percent of 
districts with fewer than 500 students have no collective bargaining contract; one district 
with a student enrollment of more than 10,000 (Clovis) also does not collectively bargain 
(Riley, Fusano, Munk & Peterson, 2002). 
 The bargaining scope refers to whether bargaining on certain issues is mandated, 
permitted, or prohibited (Hess & Kelly, 2006). In practice, the scope of negotiations is 
structured by the state collective bargaining law and other state laws regulating district 
operations (Hess & Kelly, 2006). For example, many state regulations, besides collective 
bargaining legislations, govern teacher compensation, teacher employment, the school 
year, and class size.  Because the regulating state laws vary, bargaining scope varies. A 
more detailed examination of bargaining scope is presented in the “content of contract” 
section below. 
 Among the various union activities, strikes are the most visible. A form of work 
stoppage, striking is typically the last resort when negotiations have reached an impasse 
(Hess & Kelly, 2006). Forty states have passed legislation prohibiting teacher strikes, 
though many of these statutes list no penalties (Hess & Kelly, 2006, p.67). Even in states 
with no-strike laws, teachers occasionally strike. Union leaders generally regard the 
threat of a strike as a deterrent that can force the district back to the table (Hess & Kelly, 
2006, p.67). The number of teacher strikes nationwide fell from the peak number of 241 
in 1975 to 99 in 1991 and 15 in 2003 (McDonnell and Pascal, 1979; Hess & Kelly, 2006).  




 In this section, I review empirical literature on unions’ effects by paying special 
attention to their impact on teachers.  Researchers have typically examined union effects 
from first, the content of union contracts (bargaining scope) and second, union action. 
The “union action” studies focus on the impact of union status on the actual operation of 
schools or districts.  In the following sub-sections, I first present the results of a contract 
content review, and the review of unions’ impact will follow. I review union effect 
studies on teacher pay, working conditions, and teacher quality. Under the “teacher pay 
and working conditions” category, I examine teacher unions’ influence on teacher salary, 
class size, and teacher’s time use at school. The “teacher quality” classification will 
focus on teacher unions’ effect on teacher retention, teacher test scores, and student 
academic achievement (including drop out rate). 
 In selecting empirical literature to include in this analysis, I follow the following 
criteria. First, all studies included are designed explicitly to examine the relationship 
between teacher unions and some outcome or measures of union impact, such as union 
contract, teacher pay, teacher quality, or student achievement. Second, the studies are 
primarily drawn from peer-reviewed academic-journals; a few widely cited book chapters 
and research center studies are also included.  Third, the studies included are from the last 
three decades, specifically from the mid-1970s to the present.  
Examination of the Content of Union Contract 
 Currently, no national-level comprehensive data are available on the content of 
teacher collective bargaining contracts. The few available recent efforts generally focus 




teacher evaluation, transfers, layoffs, class size, and length and structure of the school 
day (Ballou, 2000; Hess & Kelly, 2006).  
 Ballou’s (2000) study of Massachusetts teacher unions is the most scholarly of all 
the contract studies (Hess & Kelly, 2006). Ballou selected 40 contracts in 1999 which 
included the three largest urban districts in the state, and a sample of suburban and small 
towns. In addition, the researcher took care to ensure the selection of a mix of high-, 
medium-, and low-income communities. Besides reviewing contracts, Ballou also 
interviewed school administrators. Contract provisions governing compensation, teacher 
evaluation and discipline, transfers, layoffs, and length and structure of the work day 
were the foci of his study.  
 Ballou’s contract study confirmed that compensation was determined solely by 
the accumulation of college credits and experience. Though contracts did contain some 
flexibility, district officials rarely took advantage of this flexibility to recruit candidates 
for the hard-to-staff fields or to attract candidates with special skills and backgrounds. 
Teacher evaluation clauses generally allowed administrators to conduct unannounced 
observations, but the cumbersome procedures required for any disciplinary actions 
undermined administrators’ opportunities and willingness to take action.  
 Regarding transfers, Ballou found, though only few contracts required transfers be 
solely on the basis of seniority; however, in practice, current teachers would occupy the 
more desirable positions and leave the more difficult jobs to new and inexperienced 
teachers. When layoffs were required, most districts proceeded in the reverse order of 
seniority in the affected program area. Sixteen (40 percent) districts permitted 




teachers’ workload by restricting class size, number and length of classes, number of 
classes and subjects, length of the work year, and length of after-school meetings.  
 The Ballou (2000) study concluded that considerable variation existed among 
contracts and administrators typically failed to take advantage of the flexibility of at least 
some issues. Contracts in small affluent towns were least restrictive, while large urban 
districts and less affluent towns tended to have more restrictive provisions. 
 The most recent effort in analyzing the content of teachers’ contracts was 
conducted by Hess and Kelly (2006). They examined the restrictiveness of contract 
language on items such as the length of the school day, class size, and teacher transfers in 
a stratified, random sample of 20 districts nationwide. Half of the sample was from states 
with mandatory collective bargaining and half from states without mandatory collective 
bargaining. The study found that due to the ambiguity of contract language, no clear-cut 
conclusions can be made on the contracts’ restrictiveness. The researchers found that 
“some contracts include both ambiguous language and strict prescriptions within the 
same article” (p. 83), thus leaving no clear guidance for practitioners. Resonating Ballou 
(2000)’s findings, Hess and Kelly (2006) suggested district leadership should bear some 
of the responsibility for the inflexibility customarily attributed to teacher unions.  
 In summary, recent studies on teacher union contracts are very limited in number, 
and the available ones usually focus on particular provisions, such as class size, teacher 
compensation, and transfer. From the very limited available studies, I conclude that 
traditional bargaining items, such as compensation and working conditions, are still the 
foci of contracts. Some evidence may also suggest that union contracts, are not as rigid as 




advantage of the negotiated contracts in managing the schools. Yet, without more studies 
on union contracts, it is impossible to obtain a comprehensive review of the current status 
of contract content.  
Examination of Union Impact on Teacher Pay and Working Conditions 
 Empirical literature measuring teacher unions’ impact on teachers primarily 
focuses on teacher salaries (e.g. Baugh & Stone, 1982; Hoxby, 1996). In addition, few 
studies document union’s effects on teachers’ working conditions in terms of student-
teacher ratio (e.g. Ebert, 1984; Hoxby, 1996), and teachers’ in-school time use, such as 
preparation time and time meeting with parents (Eberts, 1984).  
Teacher Pay 
 The studies designed to measure teacher unions’ pay premium— the effect of 
unionization on teacher salaries—are purely quantitative in nature, and most, if not all, 
are conducted from an economic perspective. Most of the studies draw on data from the 
1970s, about ten years after collective bargaining was established in education. Several 
utilize data from the early 1990s (such as Duplantis and colleagues, 1995), and some 
employ panel data spanning from early 1970s to 1990s (such as Hoxby, 1996).  
 Aside from focusing on different time periods, the studies vary in measures of 
compensation as well as measures of unionism. Measures of compensation differ in the 
unit of analysis adopted. These different units include estimates of hourly wage levels 
and wage changes of individual teachers; average salaries paid by districts; and average 
salaries at the state level. Researchers also employ different measures of unionism 
(Goldschmidt & Painter, 1987), such as the proportion of a state’s teachers represented 




bargaining statutes, the existence of union contracts (see Duplantis et.al, 1995), and union 
membership (such as Baugh & Stone, 1982). Some studies even adopt more sophisticated 
measures of unionism by combining two or more of the aforementioned measures (such 
as Hoxby, 1996).  
 Despite the variation in measures of salary and unionism, except for several 
studies that examine data in the early 1970s (Balfour, 1974; Kasper, 1970; Zuelke & 
Frohreich, 1976), studies that use data from the late 1970s and thereafter have repeatedly 
found a positive effect of unionization on teacher pay (Baugh & Stone, 1982; Hoxby, 
1996; Duplantis and colleagues, 1995). The failure of early 1970s studies in finding 
positive union pay premium may be due to the shorter existence of unions in the U.S.; 
collective bargaining did not emerge until the mid-1960s. Furthermore, most studies 
found unions had a small (approximately 3 to 10 percent) effect on teacher salaries. 
Nonetheless, Baugh and Stone (1982) found that teacher unions increased teacher salaries 
by 12 to 22 percent. In addition, studies of perceptions of teachers, superintendents, and 
school board members indicate that collective bargaining have positive effects on salaries 
and fringe benefits (Kersey, 1986; Rogers, 1988; Salter, 1986)  
 Using stratified national samples from the 1970s (specifically, 1974, 1975, 1977 
and 1978) taken from the Current Population Survey7, Baugh and Stone (1982) examined 
the relationship between unions and individual teacher wages. They employed two 
techniques to measure the unionism effect: cross-section wage-level regressions (a point 
estimate) and wage-change regressions. In both models, they measured unionism by 
individual teachers’ union membership, and controlled for teachers’ years of education, 
                                                 





years of teaching experience, grade level, and state of residence. The wage-level models 
revealed that the union premium for teachers in 1974 and 1977 was 7 and 21 percent, 
respectively. The wage-change model estimated the wage premium for teachers who 
started as nonunion teachers and were union members one year later; and the estimated 
union premium from 1977 to 1978 was 12 percent. In other words, by joining unions, 
teachers’ salaries increased by 12 percent. However, the failure to control for the cost of 
living and alternative job opportunities may confound the findings, at least for the wage 
premium estimates. 
 In their study of the impact of teacher unions in states without collective 
bargaining legislation, Duplantis and colleagues (1995) found that the average teachers’ 
salary in districts with collective bargaining agreements (CBA) was 9.5 % higher than the 
average salary in districts without collective bargaining agreements. Duplantis and his 
colleagues surveyed districts with more than 10,000 students in the eleven states without 
collective bargaining laws in 1992, and got a total sample of 82 districts, including 26 
districts with and 56 without collective bargaining agreements. In addition to district’s 
CBA status, the researchers controlled for factors that might serve as alternative 
explanations for the salary premium effect, such as a district’s cost of living indices 
including per capita income and median value of housing, union political influence, and 
the availability and quality of alternative employment opportunities. One of the 
weaknesses of this analysis lies in its failure to control for the spillover effect of unions, 
namely, unionized districts’ non-unionized neighboring districts might pick up the salary 
schedules from organized districts to compete for teachers. Therefore, the failure to tease 




 Hoxby (1996) employed a more sophisticated method in studying the effect of 
unionization on teacher pay and educational productivity. The study matched district-
level data across the nation from the Census of Governments (1972, 1982, 1992), and the 
decennial Censuses of Population and Housing. Hoxby used a stricter definition of 
unionization than other researchers. For districts to be included in her study as unionized 
districts, they had to conform to the following all three criteria: 1) the labor relation was 
in the form of collective bargaining; 2) a contractual agreement existed between the 
administration and the teacher unions, and 3) at least 50 percent of teachers were union 
members. Using techniques called instrumental variables estimation and differences-in-
differences, the study took into account the status of a state’s collective bargaining laws 
and made efforts to reduce bias that may be attributed to omitted variables. Comparing 
the changes in districts’ average teacher salary differences between 1972 and 1982 and 
between 1982 and 1992, the analysis identified a union premium of about 5 percent. 
Hoxby’s (1996) method in gauging the effect of unionism is among the most advanced 
and come closest to an unbiased estimate of the union wage premium (Johnson & 
Donaldson, 2006). 
 In sum, teacher salaries are a well studied area within union impact research. The 
literature provides evidence that collective bargaining increases teacher salaries between 
3 and 9 percent. However, to obtain a more accurate picture of union effects on teachers’ 
compensation, researchers must also take into account fringe benefits. When unions 
negotiate contracts with school districts, a significant amount of negotiation is spent on 
fringe benefits. In addition, the fringe benefits for unionized teachers are generally 




Health care, one substantial component of fringe benefits in particular, in recent years is 
the biggest issue at the bargaining table (Hess & Kelly, 2006). Nonetheless, researchers 
have done little in studying the impact of unionism on fringe benefits. Perhaps the biggest 
obstacle lies in the difficulty of gathering the data to quantify the benefits. 
  Some studies, however, attempt to investigate the influence of unionism on 
teachers’ working conditions. Below is a synthesis of the results from these studies. 
Working Conditions 
 Unions strive to improve working conditions for their members. Traditionally, 
they have done so by focusing on reducing class sizes, limiting the length of school days 
and increasing paid preparation time. However, scant empirical studies on teacher 
working conditions exist, and particularly even fewer studies focused on the unions’ 
effect on teacher work time. 
 In his study on unions’ impact on teacher time allocation, Eberts (1984) 
demonstrated that collective bargaining reduced teachers’ instructional time, but 
increased the time teachers spend in class preparation. Eberts’ study drew data from a 
national survey of elementary teachers conducted over a three-year period during the 
mid-1970s. After controlling for teacher, school and district characteristics, the cross–
sectional study found that teachers in CBA districts had 4 percent (about 3 minutes per 
day) more of paid preparation time, and spent 3 percent (9.4 minutes per day) less time 
on instruction compared with their non-unionized peers.  
 Teacher unionism and class size studies, just as the union salary premium studies, 
have pursued analysis on various levels (such as state, district, school levels), and have 




study the relationship between teacher unionism and student-teacher ratios. Their study 
found that teacher unionism, measured either by percentage of union membership or 
percentage covered by collective bargaining contracts, was associated with a higher 
student-teacher ratio. However, their approach of conducting the study is not without 
criticism. The pooling of a span of 11 years of data and a limited number of control 
variables are among the most noticeable. The pooling of years of data ignores the fact 
that the unionization effect is likely to accumulate over time (Eberts & Stone, 1988). As 
Goldhaber (2006) stresses, Kleiner and Petree also failed to control for other state level 
policies that might correlate with non-union status, such as those on limiting class size. 
 Two studies utilizing less aggregated data, such as district and school level data, 
found that collective bargaining was associated with reduced class size. The 
aforementioned Eberts (1984) study also investigated unionization on class size, and 
found the student-teacher ratio was nearly 12 percent lower in schools with collective 
bargaining contracts. The Hoxby (1996) study used a more sophisticated statistical design 
(differences- in- differences specification with instrumental variables) and found that 
student-teacher ratios in districts with collective bargaining agreements decreased by 9 
percent (or 1.7 students).  
 On the whole, given unions’ emphasis on improving teachers’ working conditions, 
it is a surprise to find that so few past empirical studies have attempted to measure the 
actual effect. Though far from conclusive, existing literature tentatively suggests that 
unions improve teachers’ working conditions through reducing class size, shortening 
teachers’ instructional time, and increasing paid preparation time.  




 Teacher unions and their advocates argue that benefits such as higher pay and 
better working conditions attract higher quality teachers to the profession and retain them 
(Casey, 2006). Despite the ideological belief, little empirical evidence exists as to teacher 
union’s impact on teacher attributes commonly assumed to reflect teacher quality, such as 
teacher experience, teacher certification, teacher preparation programs and degrees, 
teacher coursework or teacher test scores (Rice, 2003). In this section, I review three 
studies that have been found, one on teacher retention, one on teacher test scores, and the 
last one on distribution of credentialed and experienced teachers to offer a snapshot of 
unions’ effect on these aspects. In addition, I present several studies that examine unions’ 
influence on student achievement, another frequently used proxy for teacher quality.  
Teacher Retention 
 Previous research has established that teacher experience is associated with 
teacher effectiveness, though in a non-linear way (see a synthesis by Rice, 2003).  
However, very little empirical evidence exists as to unions’ impact on teacher experience. 
After a careful review of the existing literature, one piece of research offers a snapshot of 
the union provision’s impact on teacher retention. Rees (1991) conducted an analysis of 
the relationship between the strength of a grievance procedure and the rate in which 
teachers exit from the profession. Using data from New York State, the author found that 
teachers with the two strongest types of grievance procedures8 in their contracts had a 
substantially lower probability of quitting than those working under the most common 
                                                 
8 The author categorized 8 types of grievance procedures. From strongest to weakest, they are: 1. Binding arbitration 
for contract and non-contract disputes; 2. Binding arbitration for contract disputes, advisory arbitration for non-contract 
disputes; 3. Binding arbitration for contract disputes; final step for non-contract disputes is the Superintendent or Board 
of Education; 4. Binding arbitration for contract dispute. No non-contract grievances; 5. Advisory arbitration for 
contract disputes. Final step for non-contract disputes is advisory arbitration, the Superintendent, or the Board of 
Education; 6. Advisory arbitration for contract disputes. No non-contract grievances; 7. No arbitration. Grievances in 
some contracts limited to contract disputes. Final step is the Superintendent or the Board of Education; and 8. No 





type of grievance procedure. Rees also hypothesized that if teacher turnover negatively 
affected administrative costs or student learning, the adoption of a stronger grievance 
procedure could improve school productivity.  
 This study provides a piece of evidence that the strength of union contracts could 
have influence over teacher retention, thus on teacher experience. Yet, due to a lack of 
evidence from other states and on retention rates differentials between unionized and 
non-unionized districts, it is hard to gauge the overall effect of unionism on teacher 
experience. Future research utilizing national-level data in particular, could offer a more 
comprehensive examination on the linkage between teacher unionism and teacher 
experience. Furthermore, researchers need to study the effect on teacher experience by 
other provisions of collective bargaining agreements other than the single grievance 
procedure. 
Teacher Test Scores 
 Using state-level data from 1963 to 2000, Hoxby and Leigh (2004) investigated 
the decline of teacher aptitude as measured by the mean combined SAT scores of their 
colleges. Hoxby and Leigh provided two hypotheses in explaining the decline of aptitude. 
One was the “pull” hypothesis: greater pay parity in non-teaching occupations may have 
drawn able women out of teaching. Second was the “push” hypothesis: teacher 
unionization may have compressed pay, benefits, and non-monetary returns for aptitude, 
and thus pushed out high-aptitude women.  The dependent variable in the regression 
analysis was the percentage of female college graduates in an aptitude group9 in a state in 
a cohort who became public-school teachers. Controlling for a state’s labor law status, 
                                                 
9 Six aptitude groups were created: those from colleges with SAT scores in the top five percentiles, the next 10, 15, 20, 




female-male earning ratios in non-teaching jobs, male pay in non-teaching occupations, 
the study found that unions’ “push” effect explained 80 percent of the proportion decline 
of highest aptitude teachers.10 In other words, the decline of women teacher aptitude was 
mainly due to the fact that high aptitude women experienced substantial financial and 
non-monetary losses due to unionization.  
 This piece of research suggests that teacher unionism is highly associated with the 
decline of teacher aptitude, as represented by college test scores. However, just as other 
union studies using state aggregate data, this study may also subject the results, at least 
partially, to alternative explanations, such as state level policies on teacher recruitment.  
Distribution of Credentialed and Experienced Teachers 
 Drawing data from the State of California, Koski and Horng (2007) studied how 
the transfer and leave provisions within collective bargaining agreements affect the 
distribution of quality teachers between districts and between schools within districts. 
The researchers first surveyed and requested each of districts in CA a copy of their 
current collective bargaining agreements and they got a response rate of 71 percent.11  
Then they further narrowed the sample of districts to have four or more schools to allow 
for sufficient within-district transfer opportunities. The final sample size was 488 (86 %) 
out of 565 districts with the desired 4-plus-schools feature. Koski and Horng coded the 
transfer and leave provisions in the CBAs and assigned each district a single 
transfer/leave score which reflects strength of those provisions.12 The two measures of 
teacher quality used in the between district study were (1) the percent of teachers in the 
                                                 
10 Highest aptitude teachers refer to those from colleges with SAT scores in the  top 5 percentile. The highest aptitude 
female teachers declined from five percent in 1963  to one percent in 2000 of the total female teachers. 
11 Most of the CBAs were collected during the 2005-2006 school year. 





district who were fully credentialed, and (2) the percent of teachers in the district with 
more than two years of teaching experience. Applying regression technique in analyzing 
the effect of transfer/leave score on between-district teacher quality distribution, the study 
controlled for district size, class size, student academic performance, proportion of 
minority students, types of school districts (elementary, high school, or unified school 
districts), urbanicity, teacher service days, teacher salary and per pupil expenditure. The 
researchers found that districts with more determinative transfer and leave provisions had 
greater percentage of credentialed teachers. However, the transfer and leave provisions 
were not a significant predictor of the distribution of experienced teachers among districts. 
 In studying the effect of transfer and leave provisions on within-district 
distribution of teacher quality, Koski and Horng (2007) applied Hierarchical Linear 
Modeling (HLM) technique. The outcome variables were two school-level teacher 
quality proxies: (1) the percent of teachers in the school who were fully credentialed, and 
(2) the percent of teachers in the school with more than two years of teaching experience. 
The HLM model included two district-level variables—transfer/leave score, and district 
size and four school-level control variables—average class size, percentage of minority 
students, school enrollment growth, and student enrollment. The HLM results indicated 
that the strength of transfer and leave provisions was not significantly associated with 
within-district, between-school teacher quality inequality. 
 This newly conducted study offers a piece of evidence that a stronger collective 
bargaining agreement, as measured by its teacher hiring and transfer rule, is associated 
with between-district teacher quality difference in CA districts. Within districts, the 




such as those with differing minority student concentrations. However, the findings from 
one state are not necessarily generalizable to the whole nation. Research drawing data 
from other states or from nation-wide data could provide further evidence on this 
relationship between unions and distribution of credentialed or experienced teachers. 
Student Achievement 
  Empirical evidence for drawing conclusions about teacher unions’ impact on 
student achievement is quite thin. Goldhaber (2006) performed a rather comprehensive 
review of quantitative studies on student achievement, and concluded that the small body 
of work existing varied in quality and yielded mixed findings. Among possible 
explanations for the divergent findings are: the time horizon the researchers focused on 
(“snapshot looks” at union impacts versus longitudinal effects); the characterization of 
unionization (e.g. collective bargaining districts versus non-collective bargaining districts 
or the percent of union membership); and the varied research methodologies and samples 
used by researchers (Goldhaber, 2006). In addition, the unit of analysis (state, district or 
individual student) as well as measures of achievement (college entrance exam scores, 
drop out rate or other achievement test scores) are additional contributing factors to the 
mixed findings.  
 State-level cross-sectional analyses of unionization effects on student 
achievement tend to yield positive findings (such as Nelson & Rosen, 1996; Steelman, 
Powell, & Carini, 2000). Steelman and colleagues (2000) examined the relationship 
between statewide unionization measures and state averages of SAT and ACT scores. 
The authors used data from the 1993-1994 Schools and Staffing Survey, with SAT and 




and colleagues used the percentage of teachers in a state represented by either collective 
bargaining or meet-and-confer agreements. Taking efforts to mitigate extraneous 
variables’ confounding effect on achievement, the study controlled for student 
demographic factors, median familial income, geographic region and students’ 
participation rate of taking the SAT and ACT. The study found that greater collective 
bargaining and meet-and- confer coverage was associated with increased student SAT 
and ACT scores. The researchers suggested that the positive link between unionization 
and student achievement was a function of attracting better teachers through securing 
better pay and working conditions, the promotion of teacher professionalism, and 
improved administration.   
 Though studies using SAT test score levels (point estimate) as an indicator of 
educational quality found positive results, a study using state average SAT score changes 
over time, found contrary results. Kurth (1987) examined the decline in state SAT scores 
between 1972 and 1983 by focusing on three possible explanations: the changing social 
environment (measured by percentage of working women, urbanization, and divorce rate), 
the change of financial resources devoted to education (measured by local funding levels, 
per-pupil spending, teacher pay, and school consolidation), and the emergence of teacher 
unions (measured by percentage of state teachers represented by either collective 
bargaining or meet-and-confer agreements). The findings showed that unionization had a 
negative effect on SAT scores. Kurth thus concluded that teacher unionism was “the most 
significant factor in the decline of scores” (p. 351).This study is unique in its recognition 




status in 1972, rather than 198313, to reflect the union effect on the change in SAT scores 
from 1972 to 1983. However, the collapsing of collective bargaining and meet-and-
confer agreements into one category limits the researcher’s ability in identifying each and 
every agreement’s unique effect. 
 Complicating matters more, a few micro-level studies focusing on district level or 
individual student academic performance also provided mixed results. Eberts and Stone 
(1987) analyzed data from a nationwide sample14 of 14,000 fourth graders in the late 
1970s. Using a union/nonunion productivity differential 15  technique, the researchers 
found that over a period of one school year and holding other input constant, students in 
union districts obtained about 3 percent higher achievement gains than those in nonunion 
schools. In addition, students with average pretest scores benefited the most from 
unionization among all students, about 7 percent in achievement gains. The researchers 
attributed the favorable impact to the standard classroom instructional techniques in 
union districts, which worked best for average students. Nonetheless, students whose 
achievement was well below or above average performed better (about 7 percent) in non-
union districts, which the researchers suggested could be due to greater use of specialized 
programs and instructional techniques than in union districts.  
 The above discussed Hoxby (1996) study, which combined district-level data 
from two national datasets at three points (1972, 1982, and 1992) within a thirty year 
period, used district’s dropout rate as a proxy for student achievement. With a more 
sophisticated statistical model trying to account for confounding factors, the author found 
                                                 
13 Kurth’s reasoning was that SAT scores were the culmination of eleven or twelve years of education.  Not 
until 1983 would students educated entirely by teachers unionized in 1972 begin taking the SAT test. 
14 The dataset is Sustaining Effects Study under a grant from the Office of Education (now the Department of 
Education). The data base contains information on educational programs for a stratified sample of about 14,000 fourth 
graders in 328 elementary schools nationwide. 




that unionized districts had 2.3 percent higher student dropout rates than non-unionized 
districts. Again, Hoxby’s study was lauded as a most close to unbiased estimate due to its 
effort in trying to account for “endogeneity” of union effect. By endogeneity, it means the 
level of unionization effect in a school district may be related to some key determinants 
of student achievement that are not accounted for in the research design (Johnson & 
Donaldson, 2006; Goldhaber, 2006). 
 In summary, existing research efforts have failed to reach any agreement on the 
student achievement effect of teacher unionism. On every level of analysis, whether state, 
district or individual student level, conflicting results emerge. With careful review of the 
statistical models employed, I concur with Goldhaber’s (2006) endogeneity concern with 
some of the research designs. The unaccounted factors that relate to both student 
achievement and unionization could pose a serious challenge to the overall findings of 
the unionization effect. 
Conclusion 
 A synthesis of existing research on union activities across school districts in the 
previous subsection reveals that teacher unions exert significant influence on teachers, 
students, schools and school districts. However, despite the importance of teacher unions’ 
effect on public education, educational scholars have demonstrated little interest in 
examining the influence of unions on the nation’s schools. Almost all research 
investigating the effects of unions is conducted by economists. 
 Within the few existing studies, teacher pay is a predominant theme. Research in 
the past thirty years shows that unionized teachers enjoy higher salaries than their peers 




not exceed 10 percent. The few available studies on teacher working conditions 
tentatively suggest that unionized teachers teach smaller classes, have shorter 
instructional time, and have more paid preparation time. Studies also demonstrate that 
unionized schools tend to spend more than non-unionized schools on a per pupil basis. 
 Despite teacher unions’ direct association with teachers, researchers have 
demonstrated little attention to unions’ effects on teacher attributes that educators 
generally assumed to have influence on teacher quality, such as teacher experience, 
teacher training programs, teacher certification (Rice, 2003). Two studies show that 
stronger collective bargaining contracts tend to retain teachers (Rees, 1991), and attract 
more fully certified teachers into these districts, but do not alleviate or exacerbate the 
teacher quality gap within districts (Koski & Horng, 2007). One study suggests that 
teacher unionism is highly associated with the 1963 to 2000 decline of teacher aptitude, 
as represented by college test scores (Hoxby, 2004). Evidence is mixed on the 
relationship between teacher unions and student achievement, a direct measure of teacher 
effectiveness. Some research finds that stronger union presence is associated with 
increased student test scores (Nelson & Rosen, 1996; Steelmen, Powell & Carini, 2000; 
Eberts & Stone, 1987). In contrast, other studies find unionization is negatively related to 
student achievement measured either by test scores or drop out rates (Kurth, 1987; Hoxby, 
1996) 
 Readers should keep several caveats in mind when reviewing the above 
synthesized union impact studies. The most noticeable one, of course, lies in the scarcity 
of studies, which makes it hard to draw final conclusions on union impact. Another 




from the 1970s and early 1980s except the study by Koski and Horng (2007). The context 
of these studies was very different from the one that exists today (Goldhaber, 2006). The 
past twenty years have seen an unprecedented focus on school improvement and school 
reform is now a prominent national policy (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2006). Among 
them, the accountability movement and the drive for greater school choice, such as 
charter schools and vouches, are most noticeable reform efforts. Meanwhile, with these 
context changes, teacher unions have initiated some reforms (as evidenced by Kerchner 
& Koppich, 1993; Koppich, 2006; Murray, 2004). These changes in educational context 
as well as within teacher unions may well change the way unions impact teachers, 
students, and the overall performance of schools. To illuminate the heated debate on 
teacher unions, more up-to-date independent studies are needed to guide public policy. In 
the absence of research, policy making will be swayed by purely ideological beliefs 
rather than hard empirical evidence.   
Teacher Quality Definitions 
 Teachers make a significant difference in the lives of children.  Parents, educators, 
researchers, and policy makers all agree the centrality of teachers in student learning. In 
addition, the mandate of “highly-qualified” teachers by The No Child Left Behind Act 
further substantiates that teacher quality matters in student learning (Cochran-Smith & 
Fries, 2005). Given the consensus on the importance of teacher quality, little consensus 
exists as to how to define it, how to measure it or how to improve it. Various approaches 
to defining teacher quality underline the ideological assumptions people hold toward 




dominant methods of defining teacher quality and come up with definitions that I will use 
in carrying out my research. 
 For decades, educators and policy makers have debated approaches to improving 
teacher quality (Ramirez, 2004).  Two major schools of thought on how to improve 
teacher quality, Professionalization versus Deregulation, focus on the merit of 
certification in teacher qualification. Professionalization advocates and deregulators 
disagree on the effects of state regulation of the teaching profession, and believe that the 
debate centers on the effects of certification on teacher quality (Darling-Hammond & 
Ball, 1998; Walsh, 2001a). Advocates of teacher professionalism believe the key to 
improve teacher quality is to raise standards for prospective teachers and upgrade teacher 
education programs (such as The Carnegie Task Force on Teaching, the Holmes Group, 
1986; and the National Commission on Teaching and America’s Future, 1996). 
Professionalism believes teacher quality is not only defined by the knowledge teachers 
possess in terms of subject matter but also by knowledge and skills of teaching gained 
through teacher preparation programs. Generally speaking, teacher professionalism 
embraces a broad view of teacher quality that is not limited to measured student 
performance. 
 In contrast to teacher professionalism, the “deregulation” (Zumwalt & Craig, 
2005) or “neoconservatives,” as labeled by Lasley and colleagues (2006), advocates for 
the reduction or deregulation of teacher certification requirements. Proponents of 
deregulations such as National Council on Teacher Quality (for example see, Walsh, 
2006) and Progressive Policy Institute (for example see, Hess, 2001) call for reducing 




candidates and expanding alternative forms of teacher training and licensure. 
Deregulators have a narrower view of teacher quality which is primarily based on 
measured student achievement. They place greater emphasis on teachers’ content 
knowledge and high levels of verbal ability, which they claim have a stronger 
relationship with student achievement (Walsh, 2001b).  The deregulators claim that the 
knowledge base that colleges of education seek to impart is “uneven, incomplete, highly 
disputed and vulnerable to ideological and interest-group manipulation” (Finn, 2001, p. 
140). 
The views of good teaching are value laden. What teachers are expected to know 
and be able to do, even what results they are expected to produce, are subject to people’s 
normative perceptions. As Wilson and Youngs (2005) point out, that depending on 
perspectives, teachers may be viewed as civil servants or professionals; teaching may be 
viewed as moral or technical work; or as a science or an art. Based on differing 
ideologies, teachers’ work products may be viewed mainly as increased student academic 
achievement, or cultivation of socially responsible and productive citizens rather than 
simple content learning (Kanstoroom & Finn, 1999; Rotherham & Mead, 2004; Goals 
2000, 1994; Becker, Kennedy & Hundersmarck, 2003). These assumptions about 
teaching and teachers’ roles fundamentally affect how people define teacher quality, and 
the ways to attain it or assess it. Levine (2006) observes that the clash of beliefs about 
teaching is “reshaping the world of teacher education, driving it headlong in opposing 
and incompatible directions” (p.14). 
Given the differing views of teaching and ambiguous goals of teachers’ work, it is 




from those that focus on who should teach and how teachers should be trained to the 
kinds of knowledge and training teachers should possess (Darling-Hammond & Ball, 
1998; Hess, 2002; Haberman, 1996).  However, in practice researchers typically adopt 
three ways to measure teacher quality: value-added models (Sanders & Rivers, 1996); 
standards-based teacher evaluation models (Milanowski & Kimball, 2005; Holtzapple, 
2003); and teacher qualifications (Rice, 2003; Wilson & Youngs, 2005). These 
approaches quantify teacher quality through three differing benchmarks: student 
outcomes, teaching practices, and teacher preparation, respectively. The “value-added” 
models advocate estimating teacher effectiveness by examining the students’ 
achievement gains brought by each teacher over three or four years (Sanders & Horn, 
1998; Sanders & Rivers, 1996). Standards-based teacher evaluation models focus on 
evaluating teachers’ instruction on the basis of teaching standards (Danielson, 1996; 
Danielson & McGreal, 2000). The third approach is to use teacher qualifications, namely 
elements of teacher preparation that qualify prospective teachers for their teaching 
positions, as a measure of teacher quality. In the educational policy arena, concerned 
about preparing and recruiting the best candidates to classrooms, educators and policy 
makers most commonly use the third approach to measure teacher quality.  
Among the stakeholders of teacher quality issues, teacher unions are not a silent 
one, particularly after the mid-1980s (Kahlenberg, 2006). Teacher unions claim that 
“teacher quality is an essential union responsibility” (AFT, 2003, p.5), and strengthening 
teacher quality is a central mission of unions (NEA, 2007a). In this section, I present 
measures of teacher quality through teacher qualifications, teacher unions’ stand on 




Approaches of Defining Teacher Quality 
Federal Government’s Approach 
 The federal law of No Child Left Behind (NCLB), the most discussed federal 
education effort in the past half century, specifically stipulates a “highly qualified 
teacher” provision. Under the terms of NCLB, a highly qualified teacher is defined as one 
who holds at least a bachelor’s degree from a four-year institution, holds full state 
certification (including certification obtained through alternative routes to certification), 
and demonstrates competence in their subject area.  The law’s second requirement 
suggests that neither professional knowledge and skills nor completion of a teacher 
preparation program are necessary to be a highly qualified teacher (Ramirez, 2004; 
Porter-Magee, 2004). Though most states’ traditional certification requirements include a 
pedagogy requirement and the completion of a teacher preparation program, the 
alternative certifications do not (Feistritzer & Chester, 2003). Thus the law opens some 
opportunities for alternative preparation programs. This content knowledge provision 
infers the federal government’s emphasis on math and science education, which is critical 
to the U.S. competitiveness in the emerging information economy (Porter-Magee, 2004). 
The inference comes from the fact that the content knowledge provision is based on the 
body of research which suggests content knowledge has greater impact on student 
achievement, primarily in areas of math and science (Monk, 1994; Monk & King, 1994; 
Greenwald, Hedges & Laine, 1996; Rowan, Chiang & Miller, 1997; Goldhaber & Brewer, 
1998; Brewer & Goldhaber, 2000). The federal government also recognizes student 
achievement as the indicator of teacher quality. Just as stated in the U.S. Department of 




quality teaching and student achievement, NCLB has refocused the national dialogue on 
how teachers should be trained and certified as well as who should teach.”  
Education Researchers’ Approaches 
  In addition to the federal government’s definition of teacher quality, researchers, 
such as Jennifer K. Rice (2003), and a panel organized by American Education Research 
Association (AERA) have reviewed studies on teacher quality, and defined teacher 
quality based on empirical evidence (Cochran-Smith & Zeichner, 2005).  
 From an educational economics’ perspective, Rice (2003) bases her definition of 
teacher quality on the practice of typical school hiring and compensation system, which 
assumes that years of teaching experience, teacher certification, etc. are indicators of 
high-quality teachers. Therefore, in her review of empirical evidence associated with 
teacher quality, Rice adopts five broad categories of teacher quality indicators: teacher 
experience, teacher education programs and degrees, teacher certification status, 
specific coursework teachers taken in preparation for the profession, and teachers’ own 
test scores. One thing standing out in Rice’s review of teacher attributes studies is the 
researcher’s inclusive definition of teacher performance. In other words, the researcher 
reviewed the effects of the teacher quality indicators on student achievement gains (on 
standardized tests) as well as the effects on other teacher performance measures, such as 
principal’s evaluation of teachers and teachers’ perception of their own performance. The 
researcher argues that the broad approach of including other teacher performance 
indicators may capture teacher quality aspects student standardized scores do not 




 Rice (2003)’s review of empirical studies reveals that, when using more refined 
measures, many elements of teacher characteristics contribute to teacher quality, such as 
preparation in both pedagogical and subject content, education programs and degrees, 
experience, and test scores. Going beyond the broadly defined variables (for example, 
highest degrees, and undifferentiated course credits), more refined measures of teacher 
attributes (for example, subject-specific degrees, and subject-specific pedagogical 
coursework) are better predictors of teacher performance. Rice’s analysis also 
demonstrates that various teacher quality indicators interact to make high-quality teachers, 
and teaching context matters (for example teaching levels, subject areas, and types of 
students and classrooms) in the effectiveness of these quality measures. 
 The American Educational Research Association (AERA) commissioned a panel 
to analyze the relevant research findings on teacher education and published a handbook 
titled Studying Teacher Education (Cochran-Smith & Zeichner, 2005). This panel’s 
charge was to “try to make sense of what the research did and did not say about teacher 
education and to craft a new research agenda…” (p.ix). Gleaning and providing “critical 
and evenhanded analysis of the weight of empirical evidence relevant to key practices 
and policies,” the AERA panel book presents teacher characteristics research on the 
indicators of teacher quality (Zumwalt & Craig, 2005). The panelists, Zumwalt and Craig 
(2005) use such teacher quality proxies as college entrance tests scores (SAT and ACT), 
college GPA, college major, status of college attended, teacher tests,  teacher 
certification status, program certification status, and teaching experience. Utilizing these 
quality indicators, the panelists paint a national picture of who teachers are, how they are 




academic ability and achievement such as SAT and ACT scores and GPA, Zumwalt and 
Craig (2005) conclude that inconclusive evidence exists as to their effect on student 
achievement; though, generally teachers’ verbal ability scores are positively related to 
student test scores. The panel also points out that no evidence exists as to the “relative 
importance of teacher verbal ability compared to other aspects of teacher quality” (p.181).  
 The AERA panelists, Wilson and Youngs (2005) examined three other teacher 
quality indicators, teacher testing, traditional teacher certification, and accreditation of 
teacher education programs, which the panel termed the three as accountability processes. 
On teacher testing, the panelists conclude that the National Teacher Examination (NTE) 
did not predict teacher effectiveness; no research exists as to Praxis tests’ relationship 
with test-takers’ later effectiveness as teachers (as measured by student achievement, 
pupil ratings, classroom observations, employment history, or principal ratings). Wilson 
and Youngs’ (2005) another finding about the teacher testing is that “we know very little 
about the content and concurrent validity of many of the more than 600 tests currently in 
use” (p.610), given the increasing high stakes associated with passing or failing the tests. 
With regard to the effect of certification, Wilson and Youngs (2005) find that the 
available literature favors certified teachers, particularly in the area of mathematics, with 
“seven of the eight studies reviewed found positive correlations between certification and 
student achievement’ (p. 614).  However, the panelists also acknowledge that existing 
studies on teacher certification utilized rather rough measures of certification status and 
few investigated the fields other than mathematics teaching. On the impact of program 
accreditation, Wilson and Youngs (2005) conclude little empirical research exists as to its 




 The AERA panel’s conclusion about research on teacher education is that better 
research will help inform discussion of accountability of teacher education, but research 
itself will not suffice (Wilson & Youngs, 2005). Wilson and Youngs believe three 
important normative issues underlie the current accountability process: what certified 
teachers are expected to know and be able to do; who ought to make the decisions; what 
is the purpose of certification and accreditation. The collective normative assumptions 
will shape the issues of accountability processes rather than the empirical research. 
 In summary, from the empirical point of view, though far from conclusive, 
teacher quality is positively related to teachers’ content knowledge, verbal ability scores, 
and selectivity status of colleges that teachers attended. A positive association between 
teacher experience and teacher quality is most evident in the first several years of 
teaching. The relationship between certification status and teacher quality is even less 
conclusive, but existing limited evidence tends to favor certified teachers. Other teacher 
quality indicators, such as program certification status, Praxis test scores, and field 
experience, are rarely studied, thus it is not clear about the relationship between these 
indicators and teacher quality. 
Teacher Unions’ Stand on Teacher Quality 
 Teacher unions, particularly at the national level, support improving teacher 
quality  
through the professionalization of teaching (Ballou & Podgursky, 2000; Kahlenberg, 
2006). The NEA and AFT, with the professional unionism movement since the late 1980s 
(Kerchner & Koppich, 1993), advocate and lobby for enhancing the conventional teacher 




entering and exiting the teaching preparation program, enforcing teacher licensing, and 
establishing national standards for teacher licensure, such as the National Board for 
Professional Teaching Standards (NBPTS) (Ballou & Podgursky, 2000; AFT, 2003; NEA, 
2007a). The professional unionism, or “reform unionism” as labeled by Koppich (2006), 
or “new unionism” called by then-NEA president Bob Chase (Kahlenberg, 2006), also 
promotes incorporating other elements of the teacher professionalism agenda into 
teachers’ contracts, such as mentoring of new teachers, financial support for professional 
development, new evaluative practices, such as peer review and peer assistance, 
alternative compensation programs (Kerchner & Koppich, 2004; Murray, 2004). Both 
unions argue that through expanding the scope of collective bargaining to include 
professional issues, collective bargaining can and should be a tool for improving teacher 
quality (Rotherham & Mead, 2004; Teacher Union Reform Network, 2007). 
 Unions believe “teacher quality is an essential union responsibility” (AFT, 2003, 
p.3). In its teacher quality publication, “Where we stand: Teacher quality” (AFT, 2003), 
AFT explicitly declared its position on the issue of teacher quality. The AFT embraces a 
number of factors which are supposed to determine the quality of teachers, including: the 
preparation teacher candidates receive and the entry-level standards to teaching; working 
environment (including induction programs, and compensation); professional 
development; and peer assistance and peer review. Specifically for a teacher education 
program, the AFT calls for raising existing entrance standards by requiring: a 2.75 grade-
point average (GPA) as an initial entry requirement, a national voluntary test in the core 
subject areas, higher standards of subject-matter knowledge, academic performance and 




addition, the AFT calls for teacher preparation to be organized, at a minimum, as a five-
year process.  
 Though the NEA’s stand on the issue of teacher quality is not as articulate as that 
of the AFT, the NEA embraces similar propositions as the AFT. The NEA supports 
rigorous state-level standards, state licensing systems, mentoring programs for beginning 
teachers, high quality professional development, and National Board certification of 
master teachers (NEA, 2007a). In addition, the NEA supports peer review or peer 
assistance in teacher evaluation, and pay for performance. One thing the NEA 
particularly emphasizes is professional development and induction. The NEA Foundation 
(formerly the National Foundation for the Improvement of Education) develops and 
disseminates reports on the continuing development and mentoring programs for 
practicing classroom teachers (NEA Foundation, 2009). Its recommendations for the 
improvement of professional development were endorsed by NCTAF, and were included 
in NCTAF’s professionalism manifesto: What Matters Most: Teaching for America’s 
Future (1996).  
 Teachers unions have been strong advocates of the professionalization of teaching 
(Ballou & Podgursky, 2000). Professionalization of teaching involves regulating teacher 
preparation programs as well as licensing teachers. The unions support both the 
accreditation of teacher preparation programs and teacher licensure, particularly National 
Board certification (Ballou & Podgursky, 2000). The National Council of Teacher 
Education (NCATE) is the dominant agency in the accreditation of teacher education 
programs in the United States. The NEA was one of five founding organizations that 




Rotherham and Mead (2004) credit teacher unions as one of the two major supporters16 
for NCATE’s substantial growth and formal recognition in state policy. Today, 540 of the 
nation’s 1,300 teacher training institutions are accredited by NCATE, and these 
institutions prepare 70 percent of the total teacher workforce (Rotherham & Mead, 2004). 
Teacher unions adopt a variety of ways to promote a central role for NCATE. For 
example, the NEA adopted resolutions to urge prospective teachers to attend institutions 
accredited by the NCATE (Ballou & Podgursky, 2000). Further, the unions call on local 
affiliates to promote the employment opportunities of gradates from NCATE-accredited 
programs, requesting the union locals to “develop collective bargaining language 
requiring local school boards to hire only those professionals who have graduated from 
NCATE-approved institutions” (Ballou & Podgursky, 2000. p.73 ). 
 The unions’ support for teacher professionalism can be tracked by their heavy 
involvement in the establishment of NBPTS as well as their support to National Board 
certified teachers (NBPTS, 2006a). The AFT’s late president, Albert Shanker, first gave 
the creation of NBPTS a national prominence by calling for a national certification board 
of teachers (Lieberman, 1993). The NEA and AFT were the founding members of 
NBPTS, and comprise one third of its membership on the board (Ballou & Podgursky, 
2000). The unions’ publications regularly feature articles on National Board certified 
teachers, and on how to prepare portfolios and other materials required by the Board 
(NEA, 2007b; AFT, 2007a). The unions also lobby and bargain for financial assistance to 
the Board applicants and higher salaries for Board-certified teachers (Ballou & 
Podgursky, 2000). 
                                                 





 Aside from the strong support for NCATE and NBPTS accreditation, the unions 
are also involved in other notable professionalism agenda, such as the establishment of 
standards on professionalism, and the founding of many of the organizations that promote 
teacher professionalism. For example, both the NEA and AFT supported the foundation 
of the National Commission on Teaching and America’s Future in 1994. The president or 
past president of the NEA and AFT hold two of the 29 commissioner positions in the 
NCTAF (NCTAF, 2007). The NEA and AFT are two of the eight organizations that form 
the current Holmes Partnership to advance the agenda of professionalizing teaching 
(Holmes Partnership, 2007). Both the NEA and AFT are also two of the eight 
organization members of Interstate New Teacher Assessment and Support Consortium 
(INTASC), whose primary mission is to develop standards and instruments for teacher 
education program accreditation and individual teacher licensing (INTASC, 2007) . 
 Generally speaking 17 , the unions at the national level support the bold 
professionalism reform measures of improving teacher quality, such as peer review or 
peer assistance, pay for performance and incentives for teaching in hard-to-staff schools. 
Yet, the national level support does not mean local union affiliates are equally in 
agreement with their national organizations. Great variations exist across local unions in 
their negotiation with the school management. In fact, though the exact number of local 
unions who have adopted the more progressive professionalism efforts is not available, 
the number is surely small, and professional unionism is still at the stage of finding its 
direction (Koppich, 2006). 
                                                 
17 Even at the national level, with the change of leadership, the support for professional unionism varies 




 Unions’ support for the professionalization of teaching infers that unions’ 
definition of teacher quality centers on graduation from NCATE-certified programs, 
possession of an academic major, passage of licensure tests, knowledge of the discipline 
as well as the subject areas, and possession of National Board certification.  
 Analysts like Rotherham and Mead (2004) and Ballou and Podgursky (2000) 
believe union’s embrace of teacher professionalism allow the unions to adopt the rhetoric 
of “higher standards” to advance their organizational goals. Regulating the teaching 
profession, such as the accreditation of teacher education programs and teacher licensing, 
would lead to restricting the supply of teacher candidates, which would put pressure on 
salaries (Ballou & Podgursky, 2000). In addition, Rotherham and Mead (2004) argue that 
by gaining control over entry into the profession, unions hope to strengthen their 
influence over education policy and practice. 
 Union researchers, such as Kerchner, Koppich, and Weeres (1997) believe 
unions’ embrace of professionalism is indeed the quest for quality, and it is the 
responsibility of unions to define and defend quality in the knowledge era. Kerchner and 
colleagues reasoned that in the knowledge-era just like other organizations, schools attach 
quality to outcomes rather than procedures. The quality outcome requires that “teachers 
deeply understand and be able to articulate what quality is” (p.44). The researchers 
believe that teacher unions can improve educational quality through the work of teachers. 
Teachers can do so through redefining teaching, setting national curriculum and 
performance standards, and establishing peer review. These perceived ways of improving 




 In conclusion, teacher unions embrace the ideology of teaching professionalism, 
and consider professionalism as the key to preserving public education in the U.S. and 
improving the status of teachers (Shanker, 1985). Thus, unions’ definition of teacher 
quality is in line with professionalism’s stand on teacher quality. However, despite the 
national level support and advocacy for professionalism and the practice of several 
dozens of notable reform-minded local unions, professional unionism is not spreading as 
broadly and quickly as traditional collective bargaining did (Koppich, 2006). Therefore, 
disconnect may exist between professional unionism’s rhetoric and the practice, 
particularly on the more innovative measures of improving teacher quality, such as 
performance pay, peer review, etc. Research on the actual union practice of issues related 
to teacher quality may allow for well-informed judgments. 
Teacher Quality Measures 
 In light of the dominant ways of defining teacher quality and the empirical need 
for studying the union effect on teacher quality, I adopt two proxies of teacher quality in 
this study: One is the empirically based, and the other NCLB required. Recognizing that 
any single measure of “teacher quality” may not capture the characteristics of teachers 
that produce desirable student outcomes, both proxies are composites of several single 
measures of teacher characteristics.  
 The measure from the empirical perspective is composed of four components: 
selectivity of teacher preparation institutions, subject-specific degree, subject-specific 
certification, and teacher experience. Studies (such as Summers & Wolfe, 1975; 
Ehrenberg & Brewer, 1994) indicate that selectivity of the institutions teachers attended 




selectivity may serve as a reflection of teachers’ cognitive ability (Rice, 2003, p. 28). 
Both subject-specific degree and certification have been suggested as robust measures of 
teacher quality, at least in the secondary math or science subject areas (Rice, 2003; 
Floden & Meniketti, 2005). Teacher experience has a positive relationship with student 
achievement, with the experience advantage most evident in the first five to nine years 
(Murnane & Phillips, 1981; Ferguson, 1991; Ferguson & Ladd, 1996). To capture this 
experience factor, I adopt a threshold of five years of experience. 
 The NCLB stipulates teacher quality by defining a “highly qualified teacher” as 
one who holds at least a bachelor’s degree from a four-year institution, holds full state 
certification, and demonstrates competence in their subject area.  The construction of the 
two proxies will be illustrated further and in more details later in the Methodology 
section 
The following theory of action section maps out the underlying assumptions of 
how teacher unions are related to teacher quality.  
Unions’ Effect on Teacher Quality: Theory of Action 
The national teacher unions, the NEA and AFT claim they deeply care about 
teacher quality and engage in activities that are related to improving teacher quality. Yet, 
teacher unionization in the U.S. is highly decentralized. Union contracts negotiated at the 
local level have the ultimate impact on teachers, and have the potential to affect teacher 
quality. Below I theoretically map out the relationship between the items unions typically 
negotiated and teacher quality. I develop this theory of action section following Weiss’s 




 Teacher unions are to represent and protect job-related interests of their members.  
Through negotiations with district management, teacher unions obtain wage and non-
wage outcomes. Each item under the two broad categories has a theoretically positive or 
negative effect on teacher quality. The wage outcomes include the single salary scale18 
and increased teacher pay. The single salary scale, under which teachers are paid only 
based on their years of experience and education, not on their performance, dissuades 
abler candidates from entering the teaching profession; hence it has a negative effect on 
teacher quality. Increased teacher pay and better working conditions, one of non-wage 
outcomes, make teaching more attractive to a larger pool of candidates, thus positively 
impact teacher quality. Typically negotiated working-condition items include safer 
facilities and increased instructional resources, reduced class size, and work time 
(including length of school year and day, paid preparation time, time on non-teaching 
duties). 
Besides working conditions, the non-wage outcomes include teacher assignment, 
grievance procedure, and provisions related to instructional policies, such as professional 
development, and induction and mentoring. Regarding teacher assignment, union 
contracts typically stipulate seniority rules in transfer and leave, and grant teachers the 
right to refuse teaching assignment outside their field.  Granting teachers the right to 
refuse to teach outside their field has a positive effect on teacher quality. The seniority 
rules grant preference to teachers with seniority in filling vacancies within the district or 
in keeping them in current positions when schools are forced to lay off teachers. As 
teachers exercise their seniority preference rules, experienced teachers move to high-
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performing, more affluent schools, leaving more needy schools with less experienced or 
less qualified teachers (Allgood & Rice, 2002). Another impact of seniority rules is that 
hiring new teachers may not begin until within-district transfer is over, thus significantly 
hinders districts’ ability to hire new high-quality teachers as some studies found (Levin, 
Mulhern & Schunch, 2005; Levin, Quinn, 2003). Thus, the seniority rules negatively 
affect districts’ teacher quality particularly in high-minority high-poverty schools. 
However, just as the name suggests, the seniority rules have theoretically positive effect 
on retention of experienced teachers.  
Grievance procedure in teacher evaluation and dismissal has dual and contrasting 
effects on teacher quality. On one hand, grievance procedure makes it hard to fire 
incompetent teachers, thus negatively affect teacher quality. On the other hand, it could 
positively affect teacher quality because it protects teachers from mismanagement of 
administrators, and it is good for teacher morale and retention.  
Similar with the dual effects of grievance procedure, professional development 
(PD) provisions also have two-sided effects. Some PD provisions may be very rigid by 
focusing on limiting how many/often PD sessions occur or how long they last (Johnson & 
Donaldson, 2005). To the extent that well-designed and content-oriented PD is associated 
with teacher quality (Garet, Porter, Desimone, Birman & Yoon, 2001), these rigid PD 
stipulations may prevent teachers from attending high-quality PD activities, thus may 
have a negative effect on teacher quality. Some other PD provisions may focus more on 
outcome and instruction, and link PD with training and induction, assessment of schools 
and teacher, etc. In this way, PD provisions may have the potential to positively impact 




in union contracts decrease new teacher turnover, thus theoretically have a positive effect 
on teacher quality. 
In summary, teacher unions through the negotiated contract provisions have the 
potential to positively or negatively impact teacher quality in districts. The inability to 
quantify each effect makes it inappropriate and inaccurate to gauge unions’ effect by 
simply subtracting the number of “positive impact” from the number of “negative 
impact”. We will not be able to gauge the net effect of teacher unions on teacher quality 
without examining empirical data. This dissertation study intends to provide a piece of 
empirical evidence in this regard. 
Summary of literature Review 
Through the review of literature, this chapter presents a picture of teacher unions’ 
evolution in response to external economic cycles, political developments, social changes, 
and legal statutes. Unions’ history also demonstrates that teacher unions’ development 
and standing are subject to internal factors, such as competition between the two leading 
national unions (the NEA and AFT), leadership visions, and the demographic changes of 
teachers. The synthesis of existing research on union activities across school districts 
reveals that teacher unions exert significant influence on teachers, students, schools and 
school districts.  
Review of the empirical studies reveals that despite the fact that teacher unions 
play an important role in public education, research on unions’ effects are scarce. Among 
the limited numbers of studies on teacher unions, most focused on unions’ effect on 
teacher pay. A few studies investigated teacher unions’ effect on student achievement, 




quality. Because of the scant number of studies, a recent review has to focus on 
intermediate factors, such as teacher pay, working conditions, teaching assignments, 
evaluation and dismissal, to gauge the effects of collective bargaining on teacher quality 
(see Johnson & Donaldson, 2006). Besides the finding that very limited number of 
studies examined unions’ effects, another finding pertains to the timing of the studies:  a 
significant portion of the literature used data from the 1970s and early 1980s except the 
study by Koski and Horng (2007). The current education context, such as accountability, 
and the implementation of NCLB, is much different from the one in the 70s or 80s. These 
changes in educational context as well as within teacher unions may well change the way 
unions impact teachers, students, and the overall performance of schools. 
The review of literature related to teach quality provides rationale for the teacher 
quality measures adopted in this study. The theory of action section in this chapter maps 




CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY 
 This dissertation study is conducted within a framework that hypothesizes that 
school, district, and state level factors affect schools’ ability to employ and retain quality 
teachers. Chapter one provided a conceptual framework (Figure 1) of the hypothesized 
relationships between a district’s unionization status, district teacher quality, and intra-
district distribution of teacher quality. In this chapter I describe the data sources as well 
as the empirical strategy adopted to examine the hypothesized relationships. 
This chapter begins with a description of the data sources and the data collection 
procedures of the major data source—Schools and Staffing Survey (SASS), 2003-2004. It 
then continues with the empirical framework and description of variables. This chapter 
concludes with an illustration of the statistical procedures for conducting this study.  
Description of Data Sources 
I utilized seven data sources to conduct this dissertation study, with SASS 2003-
2004 the principal one.  These seven sources include: a) Schools and Staffing Survey 
(SASS), 2003-2004 (USDE, 2007a); b) Common Core of Data (CCD) (USDE, 2009b); c) 
Comparable Wage Index Data File (CWI) (USDE, 2006); d) Collective Bargaining 
Rights for Education Employees in the United States provided by the National Education 
Association (2005); e) Barron’s Profiles of American Colleges (Barron’s Educational 
Series, 2006); f) The Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) lists of 
colleges in the U.S. (USDE, 2007b); and g) Census 2000 School District Demographics 
Project (USDE, 2009a). 




I drew the majority of my data for this study from SASS 2003-2004, restricted-
use dataset, which is well suited for exploring relationships between district union status 
and teacher quality issues. Information about this data source is provided in the SASS 
2003-2004 User’s Manual (USDE, 2007a). Sponsored by the U.S. Department of 
Education’s National Center for Education Statistics (NCES), the SASS 2003-2004 
provides information about teachers, administrators, and the general condition of 
elementary and secondary schools in the U.S. Specifically, SASS 2003-2004 collected 
information on teacher preparation, teacher qualifications, working conditions of 
teachers, teacher union membership, and the basic conditions in schools and districts as 
workplaces. SASS also extended the data collection to include measures of school and 
district policies, such as unionization status and teacher hiring practice. The sampling 
design of SASS provides national and district-by-district characterization of schools and 
teachers, and because of the sample’s size, SASS allows for disaggregation of data along 
key characteristics of schools and teachers (USDE, 2007a). Thus, aside from providing a 
comprehensive portrait of the teacher workforce across the nation, SASS also allows for 
the comparison of teachers and the structure of schooling on a district-by-district, and 
school-by-school basis, which serves the needs of this study. Being the “the largest, most 
extensive survey of school districts, schools, teachers, and administrators in the United 
States” (USDE, 2005, p.44), SASS provides the most up-to-date source of information to 
study unionization effects at a national level. 
The Common Core of Data (CCD) 
The Common Core of Data (CCD), the U.S. Department of Education's primary 




fiscal data about all public schools and public school districts in the United States (CCD, 
2009b). From CCD’s School District Finance Survey (F-33), School Year 2003-2004, I 
obtained the total district expenditure data for each district in the U.S. In addition, CCD’s 
2003-04 non-fiscal CCD Agency Universe data file provides data on district total 
enrollment, count of total FTE teachers and FTE secondary teachers.  Through the district 
ID variable “LEAID”, I linked the above four variables with the SASS 03-04 data file. 
The total expenditure and total student enrollment variables were used to calculate the per 
pupil expenditure variable included in the models. From total student enrollment and FTE 
teachers count, I obtained the district student-teacher ratio. From the count of total FTE 
teachers and FTE secondary teachers, I calculated the district percentage of secondary 
school teachers. In addition, the total student enrollment variable itself served as a control 
in the models. 
Comparable Wage Index (CWI) Data File  
This dissertation study involves district cost data— district total per pupil 
expenditures from CCD and district teacher salary schedules from SASS. It is 
problematic to use these cost data without adjustment because of the geographic cost 
differences across school districts. For example, districts that face high market price for 
teachers, such as New Work City, have to pay more than other districts, such as 
Suwannee County School District, FL, to purchase the comparable service of teachers 
(Taylor & Glander, 2006). For comparability across districts, the cost variables need to be 
adjusted to account for the uncontrollable cost of education. Therefore, in this study, I 
incorporate the Comparable Wage Index (CWI) developed by the National Center for 




the developers, Lori Taylor and William Fowler, the Comparable Wage Index (CWI) is 
“a measure of the systematic, regional variations in the salaries of college graduates who 
are not educators with the assumption that these non-educators are similar to educators in 
terms of age, educational background, and tastes for local amenities” (Taylor & Fowler, 
2006, p.1). For this study, I merge the CWI of year 2004 (CWI2004) with the SASS 
2003-04 district data file by the district ID number “LEAID” assigned by the NCES. In 
the district file, district PPE and salary schedule data are adjusted as specified in CWI’s 
Users’ Guide19 (Taylor & Glander, 2006). 
Data file of Collective Bargaining Rights for Education Employees in the United States 
 A state’s public sector collective bargaining law has tremendous effects on the 
range of activities local unions can undertake. As illustrated in the literature review 
chapter, state collective bargaining statutes regulating teachers’ collective bargaining 
rights vary in their definitions of what union activities are authorized, allowed or 
prohibited. Meanwhile, the enactment of the law itself in a particular state is not an 
occurrence out of nowhere; rather it is a result of contributing factors from the local and 
state circumstances. Even after taking into account the observable characteristics of a 
school district such as demographics and school resources, unobservable factors in a 
particular state may be correlated with unionization (Hoxby, 1996). For instance, the 
strength of organized teachers and the general public’s sentiment toward them in that 
state may cause teacher unionization relatively easier than in other states. These 
unobservable factors in a state may themselves affect teacher quality in the state. The 
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inclusion of a state’s collective bargaining law status may capture some effects of these 
unobservable characteristics, such as the strength of teacher activism. 
 Another function of teacher unions, though not well documented in research, is 
advocacy at various levels of government. At the state level, teacher unions with strong 
influence in a state may play a role in making state-level educational policies that would 
affect a state’s attractiveness to potential teacher candidates and retention of teachers. 
The strength of a state’s collective bargaining law status may also serve as a crude 
measure of unions’ political influence on state-level teacher policies. I obtained a data file 
Collective Bargaining Rights for Education Employees in the United States from one of 
the teacher unions— the National Education Association. The collective bargaining law 
file contains information on whether teacher bargaining is mandatory, permitted or 
prohibited in the 50 states plus the District of Columbia (NEA, 2005). In the study, the 
state bargaining law status was linked into SASS district files through the “FIPS state 
code”. 
Barron’s Profiles of American Colleges 
 An important variable in constructing the empirically-based teacher quality 
indicator is the ratings of postsecondary institutions teachers attended. Barron’s Profiles 
of American Colleges (Barron’s Educational Series, 2006) rates all of the four-year 
accredited schools in the U.S (p.23). This index groups all the colleges listed in this book 
according to degree of admissions competitiveness. Researchers often use Barron’s 
ranking of colleges as an indicator of college graduates’ academic ability (such as 
Ehrenberg & Brewer, 1994; Summers & Wolfe, 1975; Lankford, Loeb & Wyckoff, 2002).  




institutions teachers attended, one component of the empirically-based teacher quality 
composite variable. 
The Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) List of Colleges in the 
U.S. 
SASS2003-2004 dataset provides the university IPEDS codes but does not 
contain the names of the postsecondary institutions teachers attended, while Barron’s 
Profile of American College (2006) only has the names of US colleges. In this 
dissertation study, the IPEDS list serves as a bridge to match the postsecondary 
institutions in SASS 2003-2004 dataset with Barron's list. 
Census 2000 School District Demographics Project 
Census 2000 School District Demographics Project is sponsored by the NCES of 
the U.S. Department of Education, to “enable users to directly access school district 
geographic and demographic data” (USDE, 2009a). Census 2000 School District 
Demographics Project collected data on educational attainment for the population over 25 
years of age residing within school district boundaries in the U.S. In this study, I merged 
this district residents’ education attainment information through the district ID variable 
“LEAID” with SASS 03-04. The education level of residents has a theoretical effect on 
teacher quality in the district (Koski & Horng, 2007); therefore, I included it in the 
models to control for its potential confounding effect on teacher quality.  




 SASS 2003-2004 is the fifth administration of Schools and Staff Survey.20 SASS 
2003-2004 consisted of five survey components: the school district survey, the principal 
survey, the school survey, the teacher survey, and the school library media center survey. 
This dissertation used data collected from the school district survey, school survey, 
principal survey, and teacher survey and further restricted to the data to the public school 
frame. 
 Schools were the primary sampling units. The public school sampling frame was 
based on the Common Core of Data (CCD) 2001-02 school year; public schools not in 
existence in school year 2001-02 were not included. The frame contains regular public 
schools and special purpose schools such as special education, vocational, and alternative 
schools.  
 The data collection for 2003–2004 SASS took place during the 2003–2004 school 
year. School districts were first contacted prior to the beginning of any data collection to 
obtain formal approval for their schools and teachers to participate as well as to obtain 
and/or verify their contact information. In fall 2003, a copy of district questionnaire was 
sent to a district-designated respondent in each of the sampled district, who was 
knowledgeable about the school district. The first mail-out phase was followed by a 
second mailing, and additional non-response follow-up conducted by mailing reminder 
postcards. Remaining non-respondents were assigned to field representatives, who 
obtained interviews by phone or personal visit. 
The 2003–04 SASS utilized a field-based methodology for the school-level data 
collection, namely principal, school, and teacher data collection. Field representatives 
                                                 





were responsible for all data collection at the sampled schools. During the period of June 
2003 to May 2004, following advance postcards and phone calls to sampled schools, the 
field representatives visited schools and distributed the appropriate school, principal, and 
teachers questionnaires. Follow-up on all questionnaires were conducted by telephone 
calls or personal visits. 
 The achieved sample sizes for SASS 2003-2004 were 43,244 public school 
teachers, 7,991 schools and 4,421 districts, with the response rates of 84.0%, 80.5% and 
81.9%,21 respectively. Non-response bias analyses conducted by NCES indicated that the 
non-response rates did not pose a substantial bias in SASS estimates.  
Questionnaire Descriptions 
School District Questionnaire 
 In the fall of 2003, district-designated administrators completed a self-
administered paper and pencil questionnaire that collected data on the school district, 
student body, teachers, district policies, and district-wide programs. Specifically, the 
questionnaire consisted of items about student enrollments, number of teachers, teacher 
recruitment and hiring practices, teacher dismissals, types of union contract, length of the 
contract year, teacher salary schedules, school choice, magnet programs, home schooling, 
graduate requirements, and professional development for teachers and administrators. 
The district questionnaire took about 60 minutes to complete.  
 For this dissertation study, I use the teacher union contract type information 
collected by the district questionnaire, because teacher unions negotiate contracts with 
district managements. Once a teacher union reaches an agreement with the district, the 
                                                 




agreement is a district-wide policy and affects teachers globally in the whole district. I 
provide more details on those included district-level variables in the Variable subsection. 
School and Principal Questionnaires 
 Almost concurrent with the collection of district information, SASS collected 
school and principal information through its school and principal questionnaires. Through 
school questionnaires, school principals or principal designees provided such school 
information as enrollment, staffing, class organization, and school programs. Principal 
questionnaires were addressed to principals and collected information on principals’ 
training and experience, attitudes about education and their schools, their schools’ 
professional development opportunities for teachers and so on. The paper and pencil 
school and principal questionnaires took around 55 and 30 minutes to complete, 
respectively. 
 This study draws school level data from the school questionnaires, supplemented 
with teacher professional development information from the principal questionnaires. I 
provide detailed information about the variables drawn from the questionnaires in the 
Variables subsection. 
Teacher Questionnaire 
Teacher questionnaires were distributed to sampled individual teachers by field 
representatives in the fall of 2003. The paper and pencil questionnaires collected data 
from teachers about their education and training, induction, professional development, 
teaching assignment, certification, workload, union membership, and perceptions and 
attitudes about teaching. The teacher questionnaire took about 55 minutes to complete. 




which teachers obtained their bachelor’s degree, their postsecondary major fields of study, 
and information on any other degrees they held. The respondents may choose from 81 
field of study codes listed in the questionnaire. 
 Teachers were asked about the subject areas of their assignments and content 
areas in which their certification(s) may allow them to teach. The questionnaire provided 
a list of 73 fields for teachers to choose from for reporting their teaching assignments and 
82 fields for their certification content area.  
 This dissertation research makes use of teacher assignments, fields of study and 
certification, teacher experience, as well as teachers’ postsecondary institution names 
(linking to the rating information from the Barron’s Profile file) to create a proxy for 
teacher quality that is based on empirical evidence. In addition, this study utilizes teacher 
assignments, fields of study and certification as well as teachers’ grade level information 
to create the NCLB-defined HQT variable. The teacher-level teacher quality variables are 
further aggregated to school and district levels to create the final dependent variables to 
be used in the analytical models. Also, I aggregate individual teachers’ union 
membership information to the district-level and create a variable measuring district 
percentage of teachers who are union members. I combine the district union contract type 
variable with the created district union membership variable to construct the unionization 
measure I use in this dissertation study.  I describe in more detail the construction of the 
teacher quality variables, unionization variables as well as other included measures in the 





The construction of the empirical framework follows the conceptual framework 
presented in Chapter One while taking into consideration of the available information 
from the data sources. The first empirical framework (see Figure 2) guides the 
construction of my districts-within-states analytical models for analyzing the relationship 
between district teacher unionization status and district teacher quality in the large urban 
and suburban districts.  The second empirical framework (see Figure 3) guides through 
the construction of schools-within-districts analytical models for investigating my second 
research question, namely unionization effects on the intra-district distribution of teacher 
quality across schools with varying poverty and minority student concentration in the 
largest districts.  
For my second research question, my preliminary analysis found that 52 districts 
out of the NCES’ list of top 100 largest school districts have sufficient data for 
conducting schools-within-districts analysis. In my analytical sample, on average, 
approximately 12 schools22 (total of 613 schools) were sampled from each of the 52 
districts. These 52 largest districts are located in 28 states, with a total of 11 districts in 2 
states (Florida and Georgia), and the remaining 41 districts in 26 states. The weak-
clustering of districts in states makes it impossible to model the state effect. Therefore, I 
built two-level models (schools nested in districts as shown in Figure 3) to investigate my 
second research question. Because I focused only on the 52 districts, the interpretation of 
the results is confined to these districts and should not be extended to the national 
population of schools. 
                                                 





 Below I describe procedures for the construction and selection of the dependent, 
major independent, and control variables. See Tables A1 (Appendix) for a full description 



























 State-level Factors 
• Collective bargaining law status 
- Mandatory (NEA) 
- Permissive (NEA) 
- Prohibitory (NEA) 
 
District-level Factors
• District Policies and Practice 
- Unionization status (SASS: D) 
- Per Pupil Expenditure (CCD) 
- Salary schedule (SASS: D) 
- Student/teacher ratio (CCD) 
• District characteristics 
- Enrollment (CCD) 
- % Secondary school teachers (CCD) 
- % minority students (SASS: D) 
- Poverty (% FARL students) (SASS: D) 
- Urbanicity (SASS: D) 
- Residents Edu. Level (Census 2000)
District-level Outcomes 
 Dist. proportion of ETQ teachers (SASS: T; Barron) 
 Dist. proportion of NCLB-defined HQTs (SASS: T) 
 Dist. proportion of experienced teachers (SASS: T) 
 Dist. proportion of teachers with subject-matter cert. (SASS: T) 
 Dist. proportion of teachers with subject-matter degree (SASS: T) 
 Dist. proportion of teachers who graduated from selective colleges 
(Barron) 
A B
Note: parentheses indicate source of data.  SASS: D— SASS district questionnaire; SASS: S—SASS school questionnaire; SASS: T—SASS teacher questionnaire; SASS: A—SASS 
principal questionnaire; CCD—Common Core of Data; NEA—the National Education Association; Barron—Barron’s Profiles of American College. Census 2000—Census 2000 School 
District Demographics Project 
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Figure 3:  Empirical framework for unions’ effect on intra-district distribution of teacher quality across schools with varying 

























• District Policies and Practice 
- Unionization status (SASS: D) 
- Per Pupil Expenditure (CCD) 
- Salary schedule (SASS: D) 
- Student/teacher ratio (CCD) 
• District characteristics 
- Enrollment (CCD) 
- Poverty/minority indicator (SASS: D) 
- Urbanicity (SASS: D) 
- Residents Edu. Level (Census 2000) 
School-level Factors 
• School characteristics 
- Poverty/minority indicator (SASS: S) 
- Enrollment (SASS: S) 
- % of IEP students (SASS: S) 
• School type (elementary vs. secondary vs. 
combined) (SASS: S) 
• School Practice 
- Student/teacher ratio (SASS: S) 
- Professional development characteristics 
(SASS: A) 
School-level Outcomes 
 Sch. proportion of ETQ teachers (SASS: T; Barron) 
 Sch. proportion of HQTs (SASS: T) 
 Sch. proportion of experienced teachers (SASS: T) 
 Sch. proportion of teachers with subject-matter cert. (SASS: T) 
 Sch. proportion of teachers with subject-matter degree (SASS: T) 
 Sch. proportion of teachers who graduated from selective colleges (Barron) 
A 
B 
Note: parentheses indicate source of data.  SASS: D— SASS district questionnaire; SASS: S—SASS school questionnaire; SASS: T—SASS teacher questionnaire; SASS: A—SASS principal 







The primary outcome variable of interest is the construct of “teacher quality”. 
Two measures of teacher quality were created based on the reviewed literature: one based 
on empirical research results, and the other one based on NCLB’s definition of highly 
qualified teachers. 
Empirically-based Teacher Quality (ETQ) Variable  
The empirically-based teacher quality (ETQ) measure is composed of four 
components: selectivity of postsecondary educational institutions teachers attended, 
holding a subject-specific degree, holding a subject-specific certificate, and at least five 
years of teaching experience. Below is a description of the construction process of the 
ETQ measure. 
Barron’s Profiles of American Colleges (2006) rated all accredited23 four-year 
postsecondary institutions in nine categories according to degree of admissions 
competitiveness: a) most competitive, b) highly competitive plus, c) highly competitive, d) 
very competitive plus, e) very competitive, f) competitive plus, g) competitive, h) less 
competitive, and i) non competitive. Previous research found that the higher rating a 
college on Barron’s Profiles, the better student achievement their graduates tend to 
produce (Ehrenberg & Brewer, 1994; Summers & Wolfe, 1975). I collapsed the ratings 
into two categories with category “very competitive” as the cutting point. Those colleges 
with ratings of “very competitive” and above were coded “more selective”, and colleges 
with ratings of “competitive plus” and below were coded “less selective”. I chose the cut 
point between the “more selective” and “less selective” colleges with reference to the 
                                                 
23 Colleges not ranked in Barron’s list (which indicates they are not accredited) are classified as less 
selective in this study. 
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university ranking information from the U.S. News and World Report. The rationale lies 
in that most (with three exceptions) of the top 50 public national universities ranked by 
the U.S. News and World Report were included in Barron’s categories “very 
competitive” and above.  In this way, about 31 percent of the universities included in the 
SASS 03-04 sample are classified as more selective according to the newly created 
binary selectivity measure. 
When constructing the ETQ measure, I first created two interim variables: one 
measuring whether a teacher has a degree in all the core academic subjects he or she 
teaches, 24  and the other measuring whether a teacher has a certification in all core 
academic subject areas he or she teaches. By combining the two interim variables, I 
created an in-field-in-all-assignment measure which has a value of “1” if a teacher has 
both certification and degree in all of his/her core subject assignments, otherwise “0”. 
Then I constructed the binary composite variable-ETQ-using the created 
postsecondary institution selectivity variable, in-field-in-all-assignment variable and 
teacher experience variable. The ETQ variable has a value of “1” if a teacher graduated 
from a more selective university, with an in-field degree and certification in all core 
subject assignments and at least five years of experience; otherwise it has a value of “0”. 
The rationale for creating a composite variable as a proxy of teacher quality is that it 
captures the cumulative impact of the multiple aspects of teacher quality that have been 
linked with student achievement (Akiba, LeTendre & Scribner, 2007). 
                                                 
24 The core academic subjects are defined as English, reading or language arts, mathematics, science, 






Finally, I aggregated the ETQ indicator variable to the school and district-levels 
and obtained the proportions of ETQ teachers in the respective levels. These aggregated 
variables were the dependent variables in the analytical models. 
As discussed above, the empirically-based teacher quality variable includes four 
components: selectivity of postsecondary institutions, in-field certification, in-field 
degree, and teaching experience. I also obtained the proportions of teachers with each of 
the four characteristics in the district and school levels, which were modeled respectively 
by the same set of predictor variables as those used in the composite teacher quality 
models. This way I was able to estimate unions’ effect on each of the four teacher quality 
components.  
The NCLB-based Teacher Quality Variable—Highly Qualified Teachers (HQTs) 
NCLB’s provision stipulates that a “highly qualified teacher” is defined as one 
who holds at least a bachelor’s degree from a four-year institution, holds full state 
certification and demonstrates competence in their subject area. NCLB further specifies 
that in order to be “highly qualified”, teachers need to meet all three requirements in all 
core academic subjects they teach. The first two requirements for highly qualified 
teachers—that they have a bachelor’s degree and full certification—are fairly 
straightforward to measure. NCLB provides specific options for teachers to meet the 
content knowledge requirement. New teachers must pass state subject-matter tests 
appropriate for the grade level and subject(s) taught and, in the case of new middle or 
secondary school teachers, must have completed an academic major (or equivalent 
coursework), graduate degree, or advanced certification in each subject taught. Veteran 
teachers may either meet the content-knowledge requirements for new teachers, or 
 
 100
demonstrate competency in all subjects taught using a “high objective uniform state 
standard of evaluation” (HOUSSE) developed by their respective states (USDE, 2002).  
Though veteran teachers may meet the content knowledge requirement by passing the 
state-specific HOUSSE, due to data availability in this study I applied the same criterion 
to both new and experienced teachers in meeting the content knowledge requirement. 
Specifically, I adopted the approach Kolbe and Rice (2008) used in constructing their 
“highly qualified teachers” indicator. The measure identified a highly qualified teacher as 
one who has: 1) at least a bachelor’s degree; 2) full state certification; and 3) subject 
matter competency (for elementary school teachers, as demonstrated by full certification 
in the subject area in which they teach; and for middle and secondary school teachers, as 
demonstrated by an academic major in each core subject area taught). 
Finally, I also aggregated the NCLB-defined teacher quality indicator variable to 
the school and district-levels to obtain the proportions of highly qualified teachers in the 
respective levels. These aggregated variables were the dependent variables in the 
analytical models. 
Independent Variables of Interest 
This dissertation focuses on the relationship between a district’s unionization 
status and teacher quality as defined above. On the district questionnaire, districts were 
asked what types of union contract the districts had with a teacher’s union or association. 
The union contract status variable has three categories: 1) a collective bargaining contract, 
2) meet and confer agreement, and 3) no agreement. In addition, on the teacher 
questionnaire, individual teachers were asked whether they belonged to a union. I 
aggregated the individual teacher level membership information to the district-level and 
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got the proportion of unionized teachers in the district. The unionization measure adopted 
in this study combines the district union contract status and union membership 
information.  Below I provide a description of the rationale. 
Not only are there noticeable differences between collective bargaining and “meet 
and confer” agreements, but also variations exist among collective bargaining agreements 
across districts. Within the broad category of collective bargaining, teacher unions still 
represent a variety of power strengths and behavior across the U.S.  The power of teacher 
unions in negotiating contracts favorable to their interests is also related to union 
membership in a district (Rose & Sonstelie, 2004). Collective bargaining generally will 
not occur unless at least 50 percent of teachers are union members (Hoxby, 1996). 
Therefore, to better identify the different categories of unionization and their ensuing 
power in negotiating with the school districts, in this research I constructed the 
unionization measure by combining the information on union contract type and 
membership, following the strategy adopted by Hoxby (1996). Specifically, the 
unionization measure has three categories: stronger unionization, weaker unionization, 
and no unionization. I defined the “stronger unionization” measure as having a collective 
bargaining agreement and union membership exceeding 50 percent of total number of 
teachers. The “weaker unionization” category includes districts that either 1) have a 
“meet and confer” agreement or 2) have a collective bargaining agreement but with union 
membership no more than 50 percent of total number of district teachers. The “no 




 To better isolate relationships between unionization status and teacher quality, I 
included several school, district, and state characteristics in the final analyses as statistical 
controls. Statistically controlling for contextual characteristics that may be confounded 
with the outcomes of interest results in more precise estimates of the effects of the 
independent variable of interest because the amount of unexplained variance is reduced 
(Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). 
The selection of control variables follows the conceptual framework presented in 
Chapter One, which is constructed from literature reviewed in Chapter Two. Yet, due to 
data availability, control variables only included those that were readily measurable and 
contained in the SASS 2003-2004 as well as other data files as specified in the 
Description of Data Sources section (see the empirical framework presented in Figure 2 
and 3). Detailed information about these variables is listed in Appendix Table A1.  
School-Level Control Variables 
 School-level control variables include student enrollment, school’s student 
demographics (e.g. percentages of minority students and percentages of LEP students), 
student-teacher ratio (total enrollment/Count of FTE teachers), school poverty status 
(percentage of students approved for free and reduced lunch program), school type 













Table 1: Factor Loadings of PD Characteristics Items (rotation solution) 
Item
PD for Teaching 
Improvement Component
Prof dev offered-evaluated for evidence of improvement in teacher classroom practice; 0.61
Prof dev offered-evaluated for evidence of effects on student achievement; 0.57
Prof dev offered-considered part of teachers' regular work; 0.43
Prof dev offered-planned by teachers in this school or district; 0.82
Prof dev offered-presented by teachers in this school or district; 0.83
Prof dev offered-accompanied by the resources that teachers need (e.g., time and materials) to 
make changes in the classroom. 0.74
Prof dev offered-support the school's improvement goals; 0.23
Prof dev offered-support the district's improvement goals; 0.01
Prof dev offered-support the implementation of state or local standards; 0.15
Rotated % of variance explained by factor 31.84
Cronbach α 0.83
Source: SASS 2003-2004; School level variables weighted by within-district weight.  
The SASS School Questionnaire provides direct or close to direct measures of all 
the school-level controls except the characteristics of professional development. The 
Principal Questionnaire collected information from principals about the frequency that 
schools provide professional development to teachers in the following nine categories: a) 
supported the school's improvement goals; b) supported the district's improvement goals; 
c) supported the implementation of state or local standards; d) evaluated for evidence of 
improvement in teacher classroom practice; e) evaluated for evidence of effects on 
student achievement; f) considered part of teachers' regular work; g) planned by teachers 
in this school or district; h) presented by teachers in this school or district; and i) 
accompanied by the resources that teachers need (e.g., time and materials) to make 
changes in the classroom. For example, the questionnaire asked principals “How often is 
professional development for teachers at this school designed or chosen to support the 
school’s improvement goals?”  Principals chose their answers from the following options: 
1 (never), 2 (rarely), 3 (sometimes), 4 (frequently), and 5 (always). I created a weighted 
 
 104
professional development composite, or termed component, by running principal 
component analysis (PCA) with Varimax rotation from the nine questionnaire items. 
I first performed a reliability analysis to test the consistency among the nine items. 
The reliability coefficient (Cronbach α=0.85) indicates these items are reliable measures 
of a component(s). The PCA scree plot result suggested one professional development 
component should be created. Table 1 presents the factor loadings for the items included 
in the PCA as well as the reliability coefficient and the rotated proportion of variance for 
the scale.  Ignoring items that have loadings less than 0.4, we can see that this component 
focuses on activities that support teaching, which I term Professional Development for 
Teaching Improvement. I also conducted a reliability analysis of the items forming the 
professional development composite and the Cronbach α of 0.83 indicates good 
reliability. The created composite serves as a measure of professional development 
provided in the schools.  
A school’s poverty and/or minority student concentration plays a role in the 
school’s ability to hire and retain high quality teachers. High poverty and/or minority 
concentration schools tend to have uncertified, inexperienced teachers and teachers 
without a major in the subject they teach (Ascher & Fruchter, 2001; Darling-Hammond, 
2004; Ingersoll, 1999). School poverty and minority student concentration are two 
independent variables of interest in answering research question two. However, in this 
research, because school poverty and minority concentration are highly correlated 
(coefficient=0.7), I created a school poverty/minority level composite variables by 
averaging the poverty and minority concentration level. 25  By including this school 
poverty/minority variable, the HGLM models are able to examine unions’ potential effect 
                                                 
25 Poverty/minority level=(%FARL+%minority student)/2. 
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on alleviating or gratifying the intra-district teacher quality gap across schools with 
different poverty/minority status in the largest districts. 
 I included other variables to control for their potential influences on the 
proportion of high quality teachers. For instance, teachers in elementary schools tend to 
have different academic degree background than those in secondary schools (Feistritzer, 
1999), which may have a confounding effect with union status on the teacher quality 
measures. Small class size in a school may serve to attract high quality teachers or 
decrease teacher quality due to the fact schools may be forced to hire low quality teachers 
to support small class size (Koski & Hornig, 2007). By incorporating these control 
variables, the coefficients of union status variables can be interpreted as union effects 
while holding constant these controlled factors. 
District-Level Control Variables 
 The inclusion of district-level control variables parallels previous union-effects 
studies’ strategies (Hoxby, 1996; Koski & Horng, 2007, etc). District-level control 
variables included district’s demographic characteristics, such as district size, district 
poverty status (as measured by percentage of students approved for free and reduced 
lunch program), the percentage of minority students, the education level of residents 
within district boundary, percentage of secondary teachers in districts and the urbanicity.  
Besides the demographic variables, I also included several district practice and policy 
measures to control for their possible confounding effects, such as per pupil expenditure, 
salary schedule for new teachers with bachelor’s degree, and student teacher ratio. I 
recognize that districts’ salary schedules have multiple steps, and I utilized the step for 
new teachers with bachelor’s degree as a proxy for a district’s salary schedule. The 
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district-level controls served to account for differences in teacher quality relative to the 
district locale and district resources. For example, research documented that urban 
schools differ from suburban ones in their teacher composition as to the competitiveness 
of teachers’ undergraduate institutions (Lankford, Loeb & Wykoff, 2002). Therefore, a 
district’s urbanicity has a theoretical relationship with teacher quality. Both per pupil 
expenditure and salary schedule variables were adjusted26 by Comparable Wage Index 
(CWI) to account for geographic variations in expenditure and salaries. The CWI-
adjusted per pupil expenditure and teacher salary variables accounted for the differences 
in teacher quality that may be attributed to them. High poverty districts with limited 
resources are less likely than affluent ones to have presumably high quality teachers, such 
as teachers with full-certification and more years of experience (Darling-Hammond, 
2003).  The percentage of secondary teachers in a district has a theoretical effect on 
teacher quality in that districts tend to have a difficult time hiring high quality teachers in 
secondary grades, particularly in hard-to-staff subject areas like math and science (Koski 
& Horng, 2007). Residents’ education level is measured by the percentage of adults in 
district boundary holding at least an associate degree. The inclusion of residents’ 
education level is due to its theorized effect that a higher percentage of college-educated 
adults within the district boundary is very likely to increase the pool and quality of 
teacher candidates (Koski & Horng, 2007). 
State-Level Control Variables 
As stated in the data source section, states vary in their legislation on teachers’ 
unionization rights. Some states mandate schools to engage in collective bargaining with 
                                                 
26 The adjustment was achieved through dividing the raw dollar amount by the index and then multiplying 
by the national average CWI for the year of 2004. 
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teacher unions, some permit teachers to bargain collectively, but don’t mandate schools 
to do so, and others prohibit teacher unions from collectively bargaining with schools. 
The inclusion of collective bargaining law at the state level contributes to more precise 
estimates of union effect. A state’s collective bargaining law status may capture some of 
the unobservable characteristics the particular state has that contribute to unionization or 
affect teacher quality. The law status variable has three categories: mandate, permit, and 
prohibit. I created three indicator variables to represent the three categories. 
Weights 
Due to its complex sampling design, SASS provided several sampling weights for 
researchers to adjust for the differential probabilities of sample selection and the effects 
of differential non-response of sub-groups when producing population estimates. In the 
districts-within-states models constructed to address my research question one, I utilized 
the district final weight (DNLWGT) in HGLM to compensate for the non-random 
sampling of districts. At the state-level, because the SASS sample included all states, no 
weight was applied. Thus results from the districts-within-states models can be 
generalized to the large urban and suburban districts in the U.S. In the schools-within-
districts models for investigating research question two, because my analyses focused on 
the 52 largest districts (no intent to generalize to national districts), no district-level 
weight was applied in HGLM. Due to the fact that no within-district school weight was 
available from the SASS data, I constructed a within-district school weight27 variable 
from the school final weight (SFNLWGT) and district final weight (DNLWGT).  The 
within-district school weight was applied in the school-level HGLM models for 
analyzing my second research question. 
                                                 
27 Within-district school weight= SFNLWGT/DFNLWGT. 
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Also because no within-school teacher weight or within-district teacher weight 
was available from the SASS data, I constructed within-school 28  and within-district 
teacher 29  weights from the teacher final weight (TFNLWGT), district final weight 
(DNLWGT), and school final weight (SFNLWGT), respectively. I made use of the 
within-school and within-district teacher weight variables in aggregating the teacher level 
teacher quality data to the school-level and district-level, respectively. The missing data 
analyses utilized the district-level weight variable (DFNLWGT) to compare 
characteristics of the analytical sample to the full SASS sample of large urban and 
suburban districts. For the descriptive statistics of schools and districts included in the 
analysis, I utilized the district final weight (DFNLWGT) in the sample of large urban and 
suburban districts, and the within-district school weight constructed in the sample of 
schools belonging to the largest districts. 
Analytical Procedures 
 In this section, I describe the procedure as well as statistical approaches I utilize 
in conducting this research. I first present the way I created my analytical samples from 
the SASS 2003-2004 data files.  Then I provide a description of how I performed my 
statistical analyses, including descriptive analyses as well as Hierarchical Generalized 
Linear Modeling (HGLM) analyses. 
Analytical Samples 
 The SASS 2003-2004 has a stratified design structure comprised of 43,244 public 
school teachers, 7,991 public schools and 4,421 districts around the nation. I constructed 
my two analytic samples through a four-stage process. At stage one, I selected full-time 
                                                 
28 Within-school teacher weight=TFNLWGT/SFNLWGT. 




elementary and secondary public school teachers who taught in core academic subjects.30 
The teacher sample was further refined to only include teachers with data on the 
measures important to this study, namely, degree, certification, years of teaching 
experience, the ranking information of postsecondary institution teachers attended, and 
union membership. At stage two, I refined the district sample to include only those 
districts which satisfy all the following three criteria 1) had valid teacher data, 2) had no 
missing values on all the district-level variables that are to be included in the analyses, 
and 3) included at least three teachers from the teacher sample. These district restrictions 
eliminated additional teachers from the initial teacher and district sample. 
 At stage three, I dropped districts with less than 10,000 students as well as 
districts in rural areas. Thus, I created my first analytic subsample, one that includes 
districts with enrollment over 10,000 students in suburban and urban areas, which I 
named “Large Urban and Suburban Districts”. I analyzed this sample to investigate the first 
research question: What’s the relationship between a district’s union status and teacher 
quality in the large urban and suburban districts? The “Large Urban and Suburban 
Districts” analytical sample has 480 districts (with 7,752 teachers sampled) nested in 49 
states. At stage four, I selected my second analytical sample, focusing on districts that (1) 
belonged to the top 100 largest districts in the United States, (2) contained no missing 
values on either district or school level variables that are to be included in the analysis, 
and (3) had at least three schools sampled from each district. Named the “Largest 
Districts” Sample, this sample has 613 schools nested within 52 districts (with an average 
                                                 
30Core academic subjects refer to English, reading or language arts, mathematics, science, foreign 




within-district sample of around 12 schools). The “Largest Districts Sample” served to 
investigate my second research question. 
 I performed a missing data analysis for the “Large Urban and Suburban Districts” 
to determine whether the exclusion of cases jeopardizes the generalizability of the 
findings to the large urban and suburban districts across the U.S. For the second analytic 
sample, since I focused on the top 100 largest districts and I did not intend to generalize 
its findings to other districts, I did not conduct any missing data analysis.  
In the missing data analysis of “Large Urban and Suburban Districts” sample, the 
analytic sample was compared with the excluded cases as well as the base sample on 
selected district characteristics, namely, district demographics, unionization status, and 
other variables measuring relevant district policies, such as student-teacher ratio, salary 
schedule. Differences between samples were tested using T-test (for continuous variables) 
and chi-square test (for categorical variables), respectively. Here the base sample refers to 
the non-rural districts with over 10,000 student enrollment, and in the SASS 2003-2004 
data file, a total of 578 such districts were sampled. The excluded sample is composed of 
districts that were in the base sample, yet excluded from the analytical sample due to 














Table 2: Missing Data Analysis for Large Urban and Suburban Districts 
 Variables 
 Unwgted 
Max.N   Mean SE Unwgted N Mean SE
Unwgted 
Max. N Mean SE Mana‐Mexcl Mana‐Mbase
Stronger Unionization 98 0.40 0.05 480 0.58 0.02 578 0.55 0.02 0.18** 0.03
Weaker Unionization 98 0.41 0.05 480 0.14 0.02 578 0.19 0.02 ‐0.27*** ‐0.05
No Unionization 98 0.19 0.04 480 0.27 0.02 578 0.26 0.02 ‐0.08 0.01
Urban 98 0.41 0.05 480 0.44 0.02 578 0.44 0.02 0.03 0.01
Suburban 98 0.59 0.05 480 0.56 0.02 578 0.56 0.02 ‐0.03 ‐0.01
Northeast region 98 0.13 0.03 480 0.07 0.01 578 0.08 0.01 ‐0.06* ‐0.01
Midwest region 98 0.23 0.04 480 0.17 0.02 578 0.18 0.02 ‐0.06 ‐0.01
South region 98 0.28 0.04 480 0.42 0.02 578 0.39 0.02 0.14* 0.03
West region 98 0.36 0.05 480 0.34 0.02 578 0.35 0.02 ‐0.02 ‐0.01
Salary Schedule--Bachelor 
w/o Experience (x1000) 98 33.53 0.35 480 32.71 0.15 578 32.85 0.14 ‐0.83* ‐0.14
District Student Enrollment 
(X1000) 98 19.11 1.19 480 33.04 2.91 578 30.48 2.39 13.92* 2.56
Per Pupil Total Expenditure 
(X1000) 98 9.40 0.20 480 9.35 0.10 578 9.36 0.09 ‐0.04 ‐0.01
%District Minority Student 
Enrollment 98 47.37 2.67 480 46.30 1.30 578 46.50 1.17 ‐1.07 ‐0.20
Student/Teacher Ratio 98 18.23 0.49 480 17.52 0.15 578 17.65 0.15 ‐0.71 ‐0.13





Table 2 above presents the missing data analysis results for the “Large Urban and 
Suburban Districts” sample. The base sample (n=max of 578) includes all non-rural 
districts with an enrollment over 10,000 students. The excluded cases sample (n=max of 
98) includes those districts that have missing data on any of the teacher and district-level 
variables used in this analysis and districts with less than three teachers sampled. 
Compared with the excluded sample, the analytic sample has a higher percentage of 
strongly unionized districts and a lower percentage of weakly unionized districts. A 
higher proportion of districts in the analytical sample are located in the south region, and 
a lower proportion in the northeast region. Districts in the analytic sample, on average, 
are larger (33,040 vs. 19,110) and offer lower salaries31 ($32,710 vs. $33,530) to novice 
teachers with bachelors’ degree. The two samples were comparable in other characteristic, 
such as poverty level, minority student concentration etc. A comparison between the 
analytic sample and the full base sample indicates that the “Large Urban and Suburban 
                                                 
31 Salary is adjusted with Comparable Wage Index (CWI). 
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Districts” analytic sample is not noticeably different from the base sample in terms of 
demographic characteristics, unionization status and other relevant district policies. In 
summary, although the analytic sample has significant differences with the excluded 
sample, it is comparable with the full sample of urban and suburban districts with 
enrollment over 10,000 students. Therefore, I can generalize the results derived from the 
analytical sample to the national population of non-rural districts with enrollment over 
10,000 students. 
Descriptive Analyses 
Prior to the HGLM analyses, I calculated population estimates of means (for 
continuous variables) and percentage distributions (for categorical variables) for all the 
district variables and school variables included in the analysis. Comparison analysis 
between districts with different unionization status was performed, and differences in the 
estimates were tested using either t-test (for continuous variables) or chi-square tests (for 
categorical variables). Results from the descriptive analyses provided information about 
the overall teacher quality in the large urban and suburban districts (also the largest 
districts) as well as variations in teacher quality, school characteristics and district 
characteristics in districts with different unionization status. In addition, the statistics and 
plots obtained in the descriptive analyses procedure assisted in outlier identification and 
assumption checking. Thus further data transformation or other data management 
techniques may be conducted after these analyses.  
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Hierarchical Generalized Linear Modeling (HGLM) Analyses 
I conduct this dissertation research within the context of multilevel modeling 
framework, which recognizes the nested structure of schools within districts, and districts 
within states (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). The hierarchical structure of the data, and the 
form of the dependent variables (proportions bounded between “0” and “1”), require an 
analytical technique that can simultaneously take into consideration both properties of the 
data. Hierarchical generalized linear modeling (HGLM) offers an appropriate framework 
to model multilevel data with dependent variables expressed as proportions (Raudenbush 
& Bryk, 2002, chapter 10). Particularly, I employed the binomial sampling model with 
logit link using HLM 6.07 software to conduct my analyses. I conducted two separate 
sets of HGLM models, districts-within-states models and schools-within-districts models, 
to study the effect of unions on district-level teacher quality and unions’ effect on intra-
district distribution of teacher quality, respectively. I modeled each of the empirically and 
NCLB-established teacher quality composite variables as well as their component 
variables separately. Specifically, the predicted variables were the two teacher quality 
composite indicators: a) proportion of empirically-established teacher quality (ETQ) 
teachers; b) proportion of NCLB defined highly qualified teachers (HQTs); and the four 
components indicators: c) proportion of  teachers with at least five years of experience; d) 
proportion of teachers with subject-matter certifications; e) proportion of teachers with 
subject-matter degrees; and f) proportion of teachers who graduated from selective 
postsecondary institutions. 
I present results from the binomial HGLM models in the log odds metric. Positive 
log odds coefficients are associated with districts/schools having a greater likelihood of 
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employing high quality teachers, whereas a negative log odds coefficient suggests an 
association with a lower likelihood. In addition, the log odds coefficients were also 
converted to odds (odds=exp(log-odds)), which represents the ratio between p, the 
probability of employing high quality teachers, and 1-p, probability of employing non-
high quality teachers. Subsequently, converting odds to probabilities, the analyses yielded 
districts’ and schools’ rates or proportions of high quality teachers employed. In this 
study, odds, log odds, likelihood, probability, and proportions are positively aligned: that 
is greater odds of districts employing high quality teachers also indicate a greater log 
odds, a greater likelihood,  a greater probability of districts employing a high quality 
workforce, and a higher/larger proportion of teachers being high quality ones. However, 
in reporting the results, I frequently use the odds metric, which permits an estimate of the 
percent increase or decrease in the odds of employing high quality teachers. The 
construction of HGLM models in this study closely followed the structure of an HGLM 
binomial model with logit link as specified by Raudenbush and Bryk (2002, p.294). 
Construction of Districts-Within-States HGLM Models 
Step I: Fully Unconditional Model.  I constructed district-within-state HGLM 
models to address my first research question: What’s the relationship between a district’s 
union status and its teacher quality in the large urban and suburban districts in the U.S? In 
step I, I first built an unconditional model, with no predictors, for the proportion of 
district-level teacher quality outcome variables to explore how variation in the outcome 
measures is allocated across states.  
Level-1 model:    ηij= β0j    
                                 with a  logit link, that is  ηij=log                  [3.1a] 
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Level-2 model:     β0j = γ00+ μ0j,   μ0j ~ N(0, τ00).                                        [3.1b]       
Where 
φij is  the probability of district i in state j employing high quality teachers; and 
ηij is the log odds of district i in state j employing high quality teachers; and 
β0j is the average log odds of districts employing high quality teachers in state j; 
γ00 is grand mean of log odds of districts employing high quality teachers across states; and  
μ0j is a random “state effect”, that is, the deviation of state j’s mean log odds from the grand mean 
of log odds.  These effects are assumed normally distributed with a mean of 0 and variance τ00. 
Within each of the j states, the variability among districts is assumed the same. 
 
Note, because variance in the log odds of employing high quality teachers is not random 
across level-1units (districts), but determined by the probability φij (where variance= φij 
(1- φij)), HGLM with binomial distribution does not estimate the level 1 (district-level) 
variance separately.  
 
Between-District HGLM Models (Step II, Step III, and Step IV Models).  Research 
question one intends to study the relationship between district union status and the district 
proportion of high quality teachers. At level-1 (district-level), a fully specified between-
districts model was constructed to examine the effects of a district’s union status on the 
probability of districts employing high quality teachers across districts within states.  I 
built the fully-specified model in a step-wise fashion. First, following the fully-
unconditional model, I constructed my step II models by adding only districts’ union 
status variables to examine union effects without any control variables. Then in step III, I 
further added district demographic variables to control for any possible effects they might 
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have on districts’ probability of hiring high quality teachers. Step IV models serve as the 
fully specified models by including the district policy measures (i.e. district per pupil 
expenditure, student-teacher ratio, and district salary schedule). 
 In all the district-level models (Equations 3.2-3.4), I grand-mean centered all the 
independent variables, constraining all the slopes associated with the predictors to be 
equal across states, and only allowed the intercept (β0j) to vary randomly from state to 
state. The intercept, β0j, was set as a function of state characteristics in the between-states 
model. Below are the step-wise models. 
Step II: District-level HGLM Models with Only Unionization Status: 
 Level-1: ηij=β0j+ β1j(Stronger Unionization) + β2j(Weaker Unionization)       [3.2a] 
 Level-2:  β0j= γ00+μ0j                                                                                                                                        [3.2b] 
                βpj= γp0 (p=1-2)                                                                                   [3.2c]     
Step III: District-level HGLM Models with Demographic Controls: 
Level-1:  ηij= β0j+ β1j(Stronger Unionization) + β2j(Weaker Unionization) + β3j (% 
Secondary School Teachers) + β4j(Urban) + β5j(District Enrollment32)+ 
β6j(Minority Student Concentration32)+ β7j(% FARL) +β8j(Residents Edu. 
Level)                                                                                                           [3.3a]                            
  Level-2:  β0j= γ00+μ0j                                                                                                   [3.3b] 
                  βpj= γp0 (p=1-8)                                                                               [3.3c] 
 
Step IV: Fully-specified District-level HGLM Models: 
                                                 




 Level-1: ηij=β0j+ β1j(Stronger Unionization) + β2j(Weaker Unionization) + β3j (% 
Secondary School Teachers) + β4j(Urban) + β5j(District Enrollment)+ 
β6j(Minority Student Concentration)+ β7j(% FARL) +β8j(Residents Edu. 
Level) +β9j(PPE) + β10j(St-T Ratio)+β11j(Salary Schedule)                                                                                 
[3.4a]                                                                                              
   Level 2:  β0j= γ00+μ0j                                                                                                                                    [3.4b] 
                  βpj= γp0 (p=1-11)                                                                              [3.4c] 
where   
β0j is the average log odds of district employing high quality teachers in state j; and  
β1j  measures the average log odds difference of employing high quality teachers between strongly-
unionized districts and non-unionized districts in state j (net of other district-level 
characteristics); and  
 β2j measures the average log odds of difference of employing high quality teachers between 
weakly-unionized districts and non-unionized districts in state j (net of other district-level 
characteristics); and  
 β3j- β11j  are the corresponding coefficients that indicate the direction and strength of associations 
between other district characteristics and the log odds of districts employing high quality 
teachers in state j (net of other district-level characteristics); and 
 γ00   is average log odds of districts employing high quality teachers across states; and  
 μ0j is a random “state effect”, that is, the deviation of state j’s mean log odds from the grand  mean 
log odds; and  
 γp0 is average slope of respective district-level variables across states. 
 
Step V: Fully Specified State-Level Model. Finally, I constructed the level-2 
(state- level) model to control for the effects of states’ collective bargaining law status on 
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the district mean intercept (β0j). Level-1 (district-level) model remains identical to 
Equation 3.4a. Level-2 (state level) model becomes,                
      β0j= γ00 + γ01 (Prohibit) + γ02 (Permit)+μ0j                                                                                        [3.5] 
Where 
γ00 is the average log odds of districts employing high quality teachers across states; and 
γ01 is the expected log odds difference between states with prohibitory collective bargaining 
laws and states with mandatory bargaining laws on the outcome; and  
γ02 is the effected log odds difference between states with permissive collective bargaining 
laws and states with mandatory bargaining laws on the outcome; and 
μ0j is a random “state effect”, that is, the deviation of state j’s mean log odds from the grand  
mean log odds. 
 
Although the resulting coefficients of state law classifications are not the focus of this 
study, they serve as important controls for possible extraneous state characteristics that 
may relate to districts’ unionization status and district teacher quality in that state.  
 
Construction of Schools-Within-Districts HGLM models 
Step I: Fully Unconditional Model. I constructed schools-within-districts models 
to investigate my second research question: How does a district’s union status affect the 
intra-district distribution of teacher quality across schools with different poverty level and 
minority student concentration? The building of models followed the same rationale as 
the building of districts-within-states models. At step I, I specified a fully unconditional 
model with no predictors added.   
Level-1 model:    ηij= β0j    
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                                  with a  logit link, that is  ηij=log                   [3.6a] 
Level-2 model:     β0j = γ00+ μ0j,   μ0j ~ N(0, τ00).                                           [3.6b]       
Where 
φij is  the probability of school i in district j employing high quality teachers; and 
ηij is the log odds of school i in district j employing high quality teachers; and 
β0j is the average log odds of schools employing high quality teachers in district j; 
γ00 is grand mean of log odds of schools employing high quality teachers across districts; and  
μ0j is a random “district effect”, that is, the deviation of district j’s mean log odds from the grand 
mean of log odds.  These effects are assumed normally distributed with a mean of 0 and 
variance τ00. Within each of the j districts, the variability among schools is assumed the same. 
 
Step II: School-level Model. Because the purpose of building schools-within-
districts models is to address the intra-district distribution of teacher quality across 
schools with varying poverty/minority status, at step II, I constructed the school-level 
model by including school level poverty/minority variable and other school level control 
variables. I group-mean centered the poverty/minority variable and allowed its slope to 
vary randomly across districts (i.e., the variance of its residue, μ1j, was set free). Thus this 
model allowed both the intercept and poverty/minority slope to vary randomly across 
districts. I grand-mean centered all other control variables and constrained their 
coefficients to be fixed across districts. Below are the model specifications. 
 Level-1 model:  
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ηij=β0j+ β1j(School Poverty/minority) + β2j(School Grade Level33) + β3j (School 
size34) + β4j(School PD) +β5j(%IEP)+ β6j(St-t Ratio)                    [3.7a]                                       
Level-2 model: 
            β0j= γ00+μ0j                                                                                                                                         [3.7b] 
                  β1j= γ10+μ1j                                                                                            [3.7c]                                     
            βpj= γp0 (p=2-6)                                                                                   [3.7d] 
where   
β0j is the average log odds of schools employing high quality teachers in district j; and  
β1j  is the coefficient measuring the direction and strength of association between school 
poverty/minority level and the log odds of school employing high quality teachers in district j 
(net of other school level characteristics); and  
β2j- β6j  are the corresponding coefficients that indicate the direction and strength of associations 
between school characteristics and the log odds of school employing high quality teachers in 
district j (net of other school level characteristics); and 
 γ00   is average log odds of schools employing high quality teachers across districts; and  
 μ0j is the unique effect of district j on mean log-odds of teacher quality; and  
      γ10 is the average log-odds of poverty/minority slope across districts; and 
 μ1j is the unique effect of district j on Poverty/minority slope; and 
 γp0 is average slope of respective school level variables across districts. 
 
Step III: District-level Model with Only Unionization status. At step III, school-
level model remained identical to equation 3.7a. When the poverty/minority slope varied 
across districts, I added district-level unionization status variables to model both the 
intercept and the poverty/minority slope. As the analysis found that the poverty/minority 
                                                 
33 Represents a set of dummy-coded indicator variables. 
34 Represents a set of dummy-coded indicator variables. 
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slope did not vary across districts in modeling some dependent variable (i.e. the 
proportion of HQTs), I did not add any district-level variables to model the intercept or 
poverty/minority slope. The rationale is that because modeling slope is to address the 
second research question of this study, i.e. the effects of districts’ unionization status on 
the intra-district distribution of teacher quality across schools with varying poverty and 
minority student concentration, there would be no need to further model the slope due to 
the non-varying nature of the slope. Assuming the poverty/minority slope varies across 
districts, the level-2 (district-level) model becomes 
         β0j= γ00+ γ01(Stronger Unionization)+ γ02(Weaker Unionization)+μ0j                   [3.8a]                                          
             β1j= γ10+γ11(Stronger Unionization)+ γ12(Weaker Unionization)+μ1j              [3.8b]                             
         βpj= γp0 (p=2-6)                                                                                                [3.8c] 
Where 
γ00 is the average log odds of employing high quality teachers across districts; and 
γ01 is the log-odds difference between districts with stronger unionization and districts with 
non-unionization regarding school employing high quality teachers; and  
γ02 is the log-odds difference between districts with weaker unionization and districts with 
non-unionization regarding school employing high quality teachers; and 
γ10 is the average log-odds of poverty/minority slope across districts; and 
γ11 is the log-odds difference between districts with stronger unionization and districts with 
non-unionization regarding the poverty/minority slope; and  
γ12 is the log-odds difference between districts with weaker unionization and districts with 
non-unionization regarding the poverty/minority slope; and 
μ0j and  μ1j are the unique effect to the intercept and slope associated with district j; and  




Step IV: Fully Specified District-level Model.   At step IV, I added all the district-
level control variables to model both the intercept and poverty/minority slope. Below is 
the final and fully specified school-within-district model. Again, the level-1 model is 
identical to equation 3.7a, and level-2 model becomes 
β0j= γ00+ γ01(Stronger Unionization)+ γ02(Weaker Unionization)+γ03(District 
Poverty/minority composite) + γ04(District Enrollment)+ 
γ05(Urban)+γ06(Residents Edu. Level)+γ07(PPE) +γ08(St-T Ratio) + γ09(Salary 
Schedule)+ μ0j                                                                                                                                          [3.9a]                           
 β1j= γ10+γ11(Stronger Unionization)+ γ12(Weaker Unionization) +γ13(District 
Poverty/minority composite) + γ14(District Enrollment)+ 
γ15(Urban)+γ16(Residents Edu. Level) +γ17(PPE) +γ18(St-T Ratio) + γ19(Salary 
Schedule)+μ1j                                                                                            [3.9b]                            
          βpj= γp0 (p=2-6)                                                                                               [3.9c] 
Where 
γ00 is the average log odds of having high quality teachers across districts; and 
γ01 is the log-odds difference between districts with stronger unionization and districts with 
non-unionization on school having high quality teachers; and  
γ02 is the log-odds difference between districts with weaker unionization and districts with 
non-unionization on school having high quality teachers; and 
γ03- γ09 are the corresponding coefficients that indicate the direction and strength of 
associations between other district characteristics and the log odds of schools employing 
high quality teachers (net of other district-level characteristics); and 
 γ10 is the average log-odds of poverty/minority slope across districts; and 
γ11 is the log-odds difference between districts with stronger unionization and districts with 
non-unionization on the poverty/minority slope; and  
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γ12 is the log-odds difference between districts with weaker unionization and districts with 
non-unionization on the poverty/minority slope; and 
γ13- γ19 are the corresponding coefficients that measure the effect of other district 
characteristics on the poverty/minority slope (net of other district-level characteristics); and 
μ0j and  μ1j are the unique effect to the intercept and slope associated with district j; and 
          γp0 is average slope of respective school level variables across districts. 
In summary, the key HGLM models in this dissertation study are the fully 
specified state-level models (3.4a and 3.5) and the fully specified district-level models 
(3.9a and 3.9b), which estimate the relationship between unionization status and teacher 
quality while taking into consideration other control variables. The fully specified state-
level models (3.4a and 3.5) seek to address the first research question, namely the 
relationship between a district’s unionization status and teacher quality in the district 
among the large urban and suburban districts in the U.S. Equation 3.9b addresses the 
second research question, that is the relationship between a district’s unionization status 
and the intra-district distribution of teacher quality across schools with varying poverty 
level and minority student concentration in the largest school districts. Chapter 4 presents 
the results from the descriptive analyses and HGLM analyses. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: RESULTS 
This chapter presents results from analyses conducted to explore the following 
research questions:  
1. What’s the relationship between a district’s union status (stronger unionization, 
weaker unionization, no unionization) and teacher quality among the large urban 
and suburban districts in the U.S.? Teacher quality is measured by: 
a. The proportion of teachers in a district who are classified as high quality 
by the empirically-established teacher quality (ETQ) indictor (composed 
of selectivity of the postsecondary institutions teachers attended, holding 
at least a bachelor’s degree in the teaching field, holding a certificate in 
the teaching field, and at least five years of experience); 
b. The proportion of teachers in a district who are classified as high quality 
by the NCLB-defined highly qualified teachers (HQT) indicator 
(composed of at least a bachelor’s degree from a four-year institution, 
full state certification, and competence in the subject area); 
c. The proportion of teachers in a district who possess one of the following 
teacher quality components: selectivity of the postsecondary institutions 
teachers attended, holding at least a bachelor’s degree in the teaching 




2. In the largest US school districts, how does a district’s union status affect the 
intra-district distribution of teacher quality across schools with different poverty 
status and minority student concentration? Here, teacher quality is measured by: 
a. The proportion of teachers in a school who are classified as high quality 
by the empirically-established teacher quality (ETQ) indictor; 
b. The proportion of teachers in a school who are classified as high quality 
by the NCLB-defined highly qualified teachers (HQT) indicator; 
c. The proportion of teachers in a school who possess one of the following 
teacher quality components: selectivity of the postsecondary institutions 
teachers attended, holding at least a bachelor’s degree in the teaching 
field, holding a certificate in the teaching field, and at least five years of 
experience. 
I present the results in three sections. The first section presents results for research 
question one, i.e. whether there is teacher quality differential between unionized and non-
unionized large urban and suburban districts. The second section presents findings for 
research question two, i.e. for the largest districts, whether a district’s union status affects 
the intra-district distribution of teacher quality across schools in the districts. The third 
section provides working condition comparison analyses between unionized and non-
unionized large urban and suburban districts. The supplementary analyses on working 
conditions intend to provide an insight into how teacher unionization might relate to 
teacher quality in the large urban and suburban districts. 
Each of the first two sections includes results from the descriptive analysis as well 
as from HGLM modeling. In the descriptive analysis, I present the results in the original 
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metrics of all variables except for the teacher quality variables for intuitive interpretation. 
The teacher quality variables are proportions in the HGLM models bounded between “0” 
and “1” (Note: Due to limit of space, in all the tables reporting HGLM model results, I 
use “%” to denote proportion in the outcome variavles). I but I present and report the 
descriptive statistics of teacher quality variables in the metric of percentage for intuitive 
understanding. In the HGLM modeling, all continuous variables were standardized (i.e.  
z-scored), and all categorical ones were converted to dummy-coded ones. Therefore, the 
coefficient estimates in the HGLM models can be interpreted as effect sizes. Note that the 
reported results are statistically significant at the p level of 0.05, unless otherwise 
explicitly stated. 
Results from the Large Urban and Suburban Districts 
This section first presents findings from the descriptive analyses, then results from 
the Hierarchical Generalized Linear Modeling (HGLM). Descriptive analyses provide 
information on teacher quality and unionization status across large urban and suburban 
districts as well as related district-level characteristics. The results from HGLM models 
explore the relationship between teacher unions and teacher quality after accounting for 
potential confounding district and state factors.  
Descriptive Results 
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics for all the district-level and state-level 
variables I use in the “Large Urban and Suburban Districts” sample. Table 4 presents 
descriptive statistics for the same variables but separates the results into subgroups based 
on districts’ unionization status— stronger unionization, weaker unionization, and no 
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union agreement. Stronger and weaker unionization districts are compared against non-
unionized ones. Differences on categorical variables were tested using chi-square test 
(specifically through the logistic regression technique), and continuous variables using t-
test (specifically through the ANOVA multiple comparison technique).   Correlation 
statistics between district-level variables are included in Table 6. In all tables, I weighted 




































Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of Variables in Large Urban and Suburban Districts  
(District n=480) 
Variables Mean SD Min. Max.
% District ETQ Teachers 15.22 16.48 0 79.26
% District Highly Qualified Teachers (HQTs) 68.58 22.05 0 100
DVb % District Teachers with  at least Five Years of Experience 77.89 17.11 0 100
% District Teachers with In-field Certifications 70.86 21.56 0 100
% District Teachers with In-field Degrees 65.52 23.47 0 100
% District Teachers Who Graduated from Selective 
Colleges
35.48 25.84 0 100
 Unionization Status
                                   Stronger Unionizationa1 0.58 ‐‐ 0 1
                                  Weaker Unionization 0.14 ‐‐ 0 1
                                   No Unionization 0.28 ‐‐ 0 1
 Per Pupil Total Expenditure(X1000) 9.35 2.19 5.34 19.46
Salary Schedule--Bachelor & No Experience (x1000) 32.71 3.27 24.23 44.51
Student/Teacher Ratio 17.52 3.18 9.2 26.83
IVb  % District Approved FARL Students 41.46 22.83 0.05 100
District % Secondary Teachers 37.08 14.21 0 100
District Minority Student Enrollment
                                       % Minority Students 46.3 28.21 0.44 100
                                       High Minority Enrollment2 0.25 ‐‐ 0 1
                                       Medium Minority Enrollment 0.50 ‐‐ 0 1
                                       Low Minority Enrollment 0.25 ‐‐ 0 1
District Student Enrollment
                                     Enrollment (X1000) 33.04 63.1 10.01 1,023.67
                                     Enrollment 25,000 above 0.35 ‐‐ 0 1
                                     Enrollment 15,000-24,999 0.29 ‐‐ 0 1
                                     Enrollment 10,000-14,999 0.36 ‐‐ 0 1
Urbanicity
                                    Urban 0.44 ‐‐ 0 1
                                    Suburban 0.56 ‐‐ 0 1
Residents Edu. Level  23.31 8.31 5.4 48.95
State Collective Bargaining Law Status
                                    Mandatory 0.67 ‐‐ 0 1
IVb                                     Permissive 0.20 ‐‐ 0 1











Notes: Source: SASS 2003-2004;  District level used normalized district weight variable (NDFNLWGT).  a "Stronger Unionization": refers to 
districts  having a collective bargaining contract and where more than 50% teachers are union members;  "Weaker Unionization" refers to 
districts having "meet and confer" agreement with teacher unions or districts having collective  bargaining agreements but in which no more 
than 50% of teachers are union members. b "DV" and "IV": Abbreviations for "Dependent variables", and "Independent variables", respectively. 1 
Due to rounding, three categories do not add up to 100%. 2"High, medium and low" refer to the top, middle two and bottom quantiles in terms of 




Table 4: Descriptive Statistics of Variables by Unionization Status in Large Urban and 








Mean         
(SD)
Mean         
(SD)
Mean        
(SD)
Mean       
(SD)
Unweighted N (weighted %) 266 (58.36%) 74 (14.33%) 140 (27.31%) 480 (100%)
% District ETQ Teachers 
15.84     
(16.53)
16.47     
(17.05)
13.24     
(16.02)
15.22     
(16.48)
% District Highly Qualified Teachers (HQTs)
71.95**    
(20.84)
64.63     
(22.22)
63.46     
(23.27)
68.58     
(22.05)
% District Teachers with at Least Five Years of Experience
79.67     
(16.56)
73.34     
(18.96)
76.48     
(16.78)
77.89     
(17.11)
% District Teachers with In-field Certifications
74.23***     
(20.68)
68.48     
(22.56)
64.91     
(21.58)
70.86     
(21.56)
% District Teachers with In-field Degrees
65.49     
(24.52)
64.49     
(22.72)
66.14     
(21.66)
65.52     
(23.47)
% District Teachers Who Graduated from Selective Colleges
37.11     
(25.58)
36.95     
(24.39)
31.22     
(26.81)
35.48     
(25.84)
 Per Pupil Total Expenditure(X1000)
9.79***     
(2.52)
8.58         
(1.46)
8.82          
(1.42)
9.35     
(2.19)
Salary Schedule--Bachelor & No Experience (x1000)
32.77         
(3.32)
32.40        
(2.64)
32.73        
(3.46)
32.71     
(3.27)
Student/Teacher Ratio
18.60***     
(3.39)
17.06 ***    
(2.61)
15.44        
(1.42)
17.52     
(3.18)
 % District Approved FARL Students
39.69 ~    
(23.08)
41.73     
(20.33)
45.11     
(23.27)
41.46     
(22.83)
District % Secondary Teachers
36.99     
(15.24)
37.91     
(17.86)
36.83        
(8.88)
37.08     
(14.21)
District Minority Student Enrollment
                                                   %Minority Student Enrollment
45.63     
(29.09)
45.42     
(26.64)
48.19     
(27.21)
46.30     
(28.21)
                                                     High Minority  Enrollment 0.26 0.23 0.24 0.25
                                                    Medium Minority Enrollment 0.43** 0.57 0.60 0.50
                                                     Low Minority  Enrollment 0.31** 0.20 0.17 0.25
District Student Enrollment
                                                      Enrollment (X1000)
35.26     
(78.95)
32.82     
(35.59)
28.40     
(24.43)
33.04     
(63.10)
                                                      Enrollment 25,000 above 0.33 0.37 0.37 0.35
                                                      Enrollment 15,000-24,999 0.26 0.30 0.34 0.29
                                                      Enrollment 10,000-14,999 0.41* 0.33 0.29 0.36
Urbanicity
                                                     Urban 0.46 0.49 0.39 0.44
                                                     Suburban 0.54 0.51 0.61 0.56
Residents Edu. Level  
24.18**     
(8.35)
23.14        
(7.20)
21.54        
(8.54)
23.31     
(8.31)
State Law Status
                                                     Prohibitory 0.00*** 0.20*** 0.78 0.24
                                                     Mandatory 0.91*** 0.35*** 0.02 0.59
                                                     Permissive 0.09** 0.45*** 0.20 0.17
Unionization Categories 
Notes: ~p<0.1, *p<.05, **p<.01,***p<0.001; Source: SASS 2003-2004; District level used normalized district weight variable (NDFNLWGT);  Stronger and weaker 
unionization groups are compared against non-unionized group. Differences on categorical variables are tested using chi-square test, continuous variables using t-test. a 
"Stronger Unionization": refers to districts  having collective bargaining contracts and where more than 50% teachers are union members;  "Weaker Unionization" refers to 
districts having "meet and confer" agreements or districts having collective  bargaining agreements but in which no more than 50% of teachers are union members. 1"High, 




Description of Large Urban and Suburban Districts 
According to the descriptive statistics (see Table 3), slightly more than 15 percent 
of teachers in an average large district are empirically-established high teacher quality 
(ETQ) teachers, while about 6835 percent are classified as NCLB-defined Highly 
Qualified Teachers (HQTs). Slightly less than 78 percent of teachers in an average large 
district have at least five years of teaching experience. Also approximately 70 percent of 
teachers in the average large district are certified in the subject areas and about 
6535percent hold subject-area degrees. Around 35 percent of teachers graduated from 
selective colleges. 
 A majority (58 percent) of the districts have stronger unionization status, which 
means they have collective bargaining agreements with teacher unions and more than 50 
percent of district teachers are union members. Fourteen percent of the districts are 
weakly unionized, which means that either they are covered by “meet and confer” 
agreements or they are covered by a collective bargaining contract but no more than 50 
percent of district teachers are union members. Twenty-eight percent districts have no 
union agreement with teacher unions. On average, these large districts spend $9,35036 per 
pupil in educating their students, and pay an annual salary of $32,71037 to novice teachers 
with bachelors’ degree according to districts’ salary schedule. With a student-teacher 
ratio of 17.5, these large districts have an average enrollment of about 33,000 students. 
                                                 
35 The finding that an average district has higher percentage of HQTs (68 %) than teachers with subject-
matter degree (65%), one of HQT’s components, is due to the methodology adopted in measuring a 
teacher’s competence in the subject area required to be an HQT. In this study, competence in the subject 
area is measured by full certification in the subject area for elementary school teachers, and by an 
academic major in each core subject area taught for middle and secondary school teachers. In the large 
urban and suburban district sample, an average district has 81.57 % elementary teachers fully-certified in 
the subject area, which explains the above finding. 
36 Adjusted with CWI.  
37 Adjusted with CWI. 
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Among the districts, 65 percent have enrollment between 10,000 and 25,000. Slightly 
over 41 percent of district students are approved for the National Free or Reduced Lunch 
(FARL) program, and 46 percent of district students are minority students. About 37 
percent of teachers in an average large urban and suburban district are secondary school 
teachers. About 44 percent of the districts are located in urban settings and 56 percent in 
suburban areas. In an average large urban and suburban district, 23 percent of adults 
within the district boundaries have at least an associate degree. These large districts are 
located in 49 states, of which 67 percent (33 states) require districts to have collective 
bargaining with teacher unions, 20 percent (10 states) grant teacher collective bargaining 
rights at the discretion of district administrators, and 1238 percent (6 states) prohibit 
districts entering collective bargaining agreements with teacher unions. 
Differences between Unionized vs. Non-unionized Districts 
 As shown in Table 4 (above), compared with non-unionized districts (NUDs), 
strongly unionized districts (SUDs, or districts with stronger unionization) have a higher 
percentage of “highly qualified teachers” as defined by NCLB  (71.95 vs. 63.46) as well 
as a higher percentage of teachers with in-field certifications (74.23 vs. 64.91). But SUDs 
are not statistically different from NUDs in teacher quality on the other measures, namely 
percentage of ETQ teachers, teachers with at least five years of experience, teachers with 
in-field degrees, or teachers who graduated from selective colleges. Weakly unionized 
districts (WUDs, or districts with weaker unionization) are not significantly different from 
NUDs on any of the teacher quality measures. 
                                                 
38 Percentage does not add up to 100 due to rounding. 
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In terms of district policies and practices, SUDs tend to spend more in terms of 
per pupil expenditure39 than NUDs ($ 9,790 vs. $8,820), but they do not offer statistically 
higher salaries to new teachers with a bachelors’ degree than NUDs after taking into 
account geographic cost differences. On average, SUDs have a higher student-teacher 
ratio than NUDs (18.60:1 vs. 15.44:1), which contradicts the findings from previous 
research that unionized districts tend to have smaller class sizes.  
SUDs are different from NUDs in a number of district demographic 
characteristics. SUDs are more affluent than NUDs as measured by the proportion of 
students approved for the National Free or Reduced Lunch program (39.69 vs. 45.11 
percent, p<0.10) and their communities tend to have more educated work force as 
measured by the percentage of college degree holders within district boundaries (24.18 vs. 
21.54 percent). Though SUDs and NUDs are not significantly different in terms of their 
overall student enrollment or minority student concentration, SUDs are more likely to fall 
into the category of relatively small districts (10,000-14,999) and low-minority student 
districts (less than 21% of minority students).  The percentage of secondary school 
teachers in SUDs is not significantly different from that in NUDs, and SUDs are equally 
likely as NUDs to be located in urban or suburban settings. 
 In congruence with literature and unionization theory, state collective bargaining 
laws have an instrumental influence on districts’ unionization. An overwhelming 
majority of SUDs (91 percent) are located in states with mandatory bargaining laws and 
the rest in states that grant teachers permissive bargaining rights. Not surprisingly, no 
SUD is located in a state that prohibits districts from collective bargaining. Close to half 
of WUDs (45 percent) are located in states that grant teachers permissive bargaining 
                                                 
39 Adjusted with CWI. 
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rights and 35 percent in states that mandate districts to enter collective bargaining 
contracts with teachers. The majority of NUDs (78%) are located in states that prohibit 
teachers from collective bargaining. Yet even in states that require collective bargaining 
some teachers choose not to do so, as evidenced by the two percent of NUDs located in 
mandatory states, a fact also documented by Hess and Kelly (2005). In order to further 
gauge the law status effect on teacher unionism, I performed a separate analysis 
examining districts’ unionization status according to states’ collective bargaining law 
status (see Table 5).  
Table 5: District Unionization Status by State Law Status 
State Law Status 
Require  Permit  Prohibit  Total 
Mean  Mean  Mean  Mean 
unweighted N(weighted%)  267(58.8%)  93 (16.9%)  120(24.2%)  480 (100%) 
Stronger Unionization  0.91  0.30  0.00  0.58 
Weaker Unionization  0.08  0.38  0.12  0.14 
No Unionization  0.01  0.32  0.88  0.27 
             Source: SASS 2003-2004 
The separate analysis reveals that when states prohibit teachers from collective 
bargaining, the majority of districts choose not to unionize (88 percent) and a small 
portion (12 percent) has weaker unionization status. When states grant teachers 
permissive collective bargaining rights, districts are roughly equally split among the three 
unionization forms: stronger unionization, weaker unionization, and non unionization. In 
states with mandatory collective bargaining laws, though the majority of districts (91 
percent) have stronger unionization, one percent chooses not to unionize and eight 
percent are weakly unionized. 
Correlations among District-level Variables 
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As the bivariate correlations in Table 6 indicate, the two teacher quality 
composite variables are inter-correlated (r=0.218). Also as expected, the two composite 
measures correlate with their component variables, correlations varying from low to high 
(r=0.141-0.692 for ETQ and r=0.607-0.817 for HQT). Unionization status variables 
correlate with a number of district characteristics variables, which corresponds to the 
findings from the above subgroup comparisons. Per pupil expenditure (PPE) is positively 
correlated with salary schedule (r=0.260), but negatively related to student-teacher ratio 
(r=-0.337). This makes sense in that teacher salary makes up the biggest chunk of district 
spending; and as class size increases, fewer teachers are needed, and per pupil 
expenditure will decrease. Salary schedule for novice teachers positively correlates with 
district poverty status and percentage of minority students, which may reflect district 
practices that utilize financial incentives to attract new teachers to their districts as 
documented by recent literature and studies (Prince, 2003; Koski & Horng, 2007). 
Proportion of residents with a college degree is negatively correlated with district poverty 
level (r=-0.66) and percentage of minority students (r=-0.41).  
Summary of descriptive results 
In summary, the descriptive results suggest some trends across the large urban 
and suburban districts in terms of their unionization status. The majority (about 72 
percent) of large urban and suburban districts in the U.S. are unionized. Generally 
speaking, districts with stronger unionization status (SUDs) exhibit some differences 
from non-unionized districts (NUDs); and weakly unionized districts (WUDs) do not 
differ much from their non-unionized counterparts. Compared with NUDs, SUDs tend to 
have a higher concentration of HQTs and teachers with in-field certifications. SUDs 
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spend more in educating each student, and tend to have larger class sizes. SUDs are 











% Certified .245** .817** .094*
% In‐field Degree .322** .607** ‐                   .445**
% Selectivity .692** ‐           ‐                   ‐          ‐                 
Stronger Union ‐            .181** .123** .185** ‐                  ‐            
Weaker Union ‐            ‐           ‐.109* ‐          ‐                  ‐             ‐.484**
No Union ‐            ‐.142** ‐                   ‐.169** ‐                  ‐.101* ‐.726** ‐.251**
PPE ‐            .115* ‐                     .092* .124** ‐              .238** ‐.145** ‐.150**
Salary Schedule ‐.175** ‐           ‐                   ‐          ‐.172** ‐.187** ‐           ‐          ‐          .260**
St‐tch Ratio ‐            ‐           ‐                   ‐          ‐.186** ‐             .404** ‐          ‐.401** ‐.337** .127**
% FARL ‐.193** ‐           ‐                   ‐          ‐                  ‐.268** ‐.092* ‐          .098* .150** .173**
% Second Tch ‐            ‐            ‐                     ‐            .137** .134** ‐            ‐            ‐            ‐            ‐                  
% Min St. ‐.263** ‐           ‐                   ‐          ‐.213** ‐.244** ‐           ‐          ‐          .096* .352**
High Min. ‐.232** ‐           ‐                   ‐          ‐.150** ‐.230** ‐           ‐          ‐          .103* .264**
Med. Min. .113* ‐           ‐                   ‐          ‐                  .118** ‐.155** ‐          .122** ‐          ‐                
Low Min. .101* ‐           .113* ‐          .131** .093* .146** ‐          ‐.121** ‐          ‐.230**
Enrollment ‐            ‐           ‐                   ‐          ‐                  ‐             ‐           ‐          ‐          ‐          ‐                
Size (>25000) ‐            ‐            ‐                     ‐            ‐                    ‐              ‐            ‐            ‐            ‐            ‐                  
Size (15000‐24999) ‐            ‐            ‐                     ‐            ‐                    ‐              ‐            ‐            ‐            ‐            ‐                  
Size (10000‐14999) ‐            ‐           .096* ‐          ‐                  ‐             .112* ‐          ‐.100* ‐          ‐                
Urban ‐.094* ‐           ‐                   ‐          ‐                  ‐.146** ‐           ‐          ‐          .169** .183**
Suburban .094* ‐           ‐                   ‐          ‐                  .146** ‐           ‐          ‐          ‐.169** ‐.183**

























% Min St. ‐            .626** ‐.216**
High Min. ‐            .534** ‐.200** .808**
Med. Min. ‐            ‐.162** ‐          ‐.097* ‐.574**
Low Min. ‐            ‐.346** .098* ‐.693** ‐.337** ‐.578**
Enrollment ‐            .132** ‐          .197** .167** ‐          ‐.128**
Size (>25000) ‐            .140** ‐            .270** .182** ‐            ‐.214** .383**
Size (15000‐24999) ‐            ‐            ‐            ‐            ‐            ‐            ‐            ‐.137** ‐.465**
Size (10000‐14999) .093* ‐.102* ‐          ‐.191** ‐.145** ‐          .171** ‐.249** ‐.552** ‐.482**
Urban ‐            .330** ‐          .313** .260** ‐          ‐.188** ‐           ‐              ‐          ‐         
Suburban ‐            ‐.330** ‐          ‐.313** ‐.260** ‐          .188** ‐           ‐              ‐          ‐          ‐1.000**






















Results from Hierarchical Generalized Linear Modeling (HGLM) Analyses 
HGLM analyses assess the extent to which districts’ unionization status 
influences the proportions of high quality teachers across large urban and suburban 
districts across the nation. Though the variation among states in teacher quality is not the 
focus of this study, due to the impact of state collective bargaining law on teacher 
unionization in a particular state, I first constructed a fully unconditional model to gauge 
the variation among states. In the HGLM analyses, all categorical variables were dummy-
coded (coded 1 and 0) and continuous variables were standardized (z-scored with 
Mean=0, and SD=1). This decision simplifies the interpretation of coefficients, and 
enables comparisons of the relative magnitude of coefficients. Independent variables with 
positive coefficients indicate a higher likelihood of employing high quality teaches, 
whereas negative coefficients suggest an association with lower likelihood. Results from 
binomial HGLM models are reported in log-odds metric. For easier interpretation, in 
reporting the results I frequently translated the log-odds metric into odds metric, which 
allows an estimate of the percent increase or decrease of the odds of having high quality 
teachers. As stated in the Methodology chapter, I built the fully-specified model in a step-
wise fashion. 
Step I: Fully Unconditional Models 
Table 7 presents the results from the unconditional models on the two composite 








Table 7: Step I Models—Fully Unconditional Models 
aEst.      
(SE) Odds
Est.     
(SE) Odds
Est.      
(SE) Odds
Est.     
(SE) Odds
Est.      
(SE) Odds















Reliability, Intercept 0.65 0.43 0.42 0.43 0.58 0.80
Variance Component (τ00), Intercept 0.25*** 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.10*** 0.44***
% ETQ % HQT % In-field Degree
Notes: ~p<0.1, *p<.05, **p<.01,***p<0.001; Source: SASS 2003‐2004;   weighted by normalized district final weight; a can be interpreted as effect sizes since all continuous variables are z‐scored 
and categorical ones dummy‐coded.
% Selectivity% Experienced % In-field Cert.
 
 
The results indicate across the U.S. the average log odds of large urban and 
suburban districts employing ETQ teachers and HQTs are -1.65 and 0.81, respectively. 
Converting log odds to probabilities (p=1/{1+exp(-log-odds)}, we see that these districts 
are about four times more likely to have HQTs than ETQ teachers (probabilities: 0.69 vs. 
0.16). The large urban and suburban districts have similar probabilities of employing 
experienced teachers, in-field certified teachers and teachers with in-field degrees 
(probabilities =0.69-0.77), but have a much lower probability of employing teachers who 
graduated from selective colleges (probabilities=0.35). Given the high correlation 
between the selectivity component and ETQ (r=0.69 from Table 6), it is not surprising to 
have the above finding that districts have relatively low probabilities of employing EQT 
teachers. 
The unconditional models also provide valuable information about the between-
state variability in teacher quality. Given the estimate of τ00=0.25 and τ00=0.05 for EQT 
and HQT respectively, we expect 95% of the states to have log-odds of districts 
employing EQT teachers between -2.63 to -0.6740, and HQTs between 0.38 and 1.24. 
Converting to probabilities, the results reveal that states’ average district concentration of 
ETQ teachers range from 0.07 to 0.34, and HQTs from 0.59 to 0.78. Results from 
modeling the teacher quality component variables show that between-state variability is 
                                                 
40 Calculated from equation: -1.65±1.96*  
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smaller for district proportion of experienced teachers (probability=0.69-0.85), district 
proportion of in-field certified teachers (probability=0.61-0.79), and district proportion of 
teachers with in-field degree (probability=0.55-0.81). States vary more in their districts’ 
probability of employing teachers who graduated from selective colleges, ranging from 
0.13 to 0.66. This between-state variability in teacher quality measures indicates that 
including state-level measures could be fruitful in explaining the variability; therefore it 
provides empirical support for the need to use multilevel methods, beyond the theoretical 
rationale offered in the Methodology chapter. 
Step II: District-level HGLM Models with Only Unionization Status 
District-level HGLM models explore how district-level characteristics are 
associated with the teacher quality outcomes before controlling for state characteristics. 
In step II following the fully-unconditional models, I constructed my models by adding 
the primary variables of interest, i.e. districts’ unionization status, to examine union 
effects without controlling for any other variables.  
Table 8: Step II models—District-level HGLM Models with Only Unionization Status 
Variables 
aEst.      
(SE) Odds
Est.     
(SE) Odds
Est.      
(SE) Odds
Est.     
(SE) Odds
Est.      
(SE) Odds








































Reliability, Intercept 0.65 0.44 0.43 0.44 0.60 0.81
Variance Component (τ00), Intercept 0.25*** 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.12*** 0.45***
 District-level equation: effects on district proportion of high quality teachers within states





% Experienced % In-field Cert.
 
 
Results from step II models (see Table 8) indicate that compared with non-
unionized districts (NUDs), districts with stronger teacher unionization (SUDs) are more 
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likely to employ HQTs (log-odds=0.27, or odds=1.31 or a 31 percent increase of the 
odds), but are equally likely to have ETQ teachers. Weakly unionized districts (WUDs) 
are not statistically significantly different from NUDs in terms of employing ETQ 
teachers or HQTs.  
Examining the effects of unionization on the teacher quality component measures 
reveal that the log-odds of having in-field certified teachers is higher in SUDs (log-
odds=0.24 or an increase of odds of 26 percent) than in NUDs, but there exists no 
significant difference between WUDs and NUDs. SUDs are not significantly different 
from NUDS in log-odds of employing in-field degree teachers, experienced teachers or 
teachers who graduated from selective colleges.  A noteworthy finding is that WUDs 
demonstrate some very different patterns from SUDs in employing more experienced 
teachers. Specifically, in comparison with NUDs, WUDs are less likely to have teachers 
with at least five years of teaching experience (log-odds=-0.23, or odds=0.79 or a 
decrease of odds of 1-0.79=0.21). WUDs are not significantly different from NUDs in 
terms of the other teacher quality indicators, namely ETQ, HQT, teachers with in-field 

















Table 9: Step III models—District-level HGLM Models with Demographic Controls 
aEst.      
(SE) Odds
Est.     
(SE) Odds
Est.      
(SE) Odds
Est.     
(SE) Odds
Est.      
(SE) Odds
















































































































































Reliability, Intercept 0.62 0.45 0.37 0.41 0.58 0.78







 District-level equation: effects on district proportion of high quality teachers within states
% Experienced % In-field Cert.% ETQ % HQT % In-field Degree % Selectivity
 
 
Step III: District-Level (Level-1) Models with Demographic Controls 
 Results from Step III models (see Table 9) focus on unionization effects after 
controlling for the possible effects of district demographic variables on districts’ 
likelihood of hiring high quality teachers. The likelihood of SUDs having HQTs remains 
virtually unchanged (log-odds=0.26) after controlling for districts’ size, urbanicity, 
poverty level, minority student concentration, percentage of secondary school teachers, 
and residents’ education level within district boundary. Yet, holding constant the district 
demographic characteristics, the effects of SUDs on the likelihood of employing ETQ 
teachers increased. Now, SUDs are significantly more likely to have ETQ teachers (log-
odds=0.25, or an increase of odds of 28 percent, p<.10) than NUDs. The inclusion of 
these demographic variables also demonstrates that district proportions of ETQ teachers 
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or HQTs vary with district characteristics. In the model on ETQ, districts with student 
enrollment of between 15,000 and 24,999 have a higher likelihood of employing ETQ 
teachers than districts with 10,000 to 14,999 enrolled students (log-odds=0.28, or an 
increase of odds of 32 percent, p<.10). The higher percentage residents having college 
education within district boundary, the more likely a district to have ETQ teachers (log-
odds =0.24 or an increase of odds of 27 percent). A puzzling finding about residents’ 
education level is its effect on HQT. A standard deviation increase in the percentage of 
residents with college degree and above is associated with a 9 percent decrease in the 
odds of employing HQTs. We would typically assume that a more educated workforce 
would increase teacher quality in the schools. But here the results suggest a different 
story in the large urban and suburban schools when using NCLB’s definition of teacher 
quality. Low minority student enrollment is positively associated with HQT 
concentration, which is not surprising. Compared with districts with medium minority 
student enrollment, low-minority districts have 33 percent greater odds of having HQTs.  
In addition, a district’s composition of grade levels is associated with districts’ 
concentration of HQTs. As expected, districts with more secondary school teachers are 
less likely to have HQTs (log odds=-0.13 or a reduction of odds of 12 percent). 
 Examination of the teacher quality component variables reveals similar trends. 
After accounting for district demographic characteristics, the effects of unionization 
status on districts’ concentration of experienced teachers, teachers with in-field degree 
and teachers who graduated from selective colleges remain virtually unchanged. Stronger 
unionization status still has no significant effect on proportions of experienced teachers, 
teachers with in-field degrees or teachers who graduated from selective colleges. One 
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exception is the effect on the proportion of teachers with in-field certification. Holding 
constant district demographic characteristics, SUDs are no longer significantly different 
from NUDs in employing teachers with in-field certification. The effects of weakly 
unionization status on districts’ ability to employ high quality teachers remain virtually 
unchanged after adjusting districts’ demographic characteristics. WUDs are still less 
likely to have experienced teachers than NUDs (log-odds=-.0.20, or an odds decreases of 
19 percent), and they are not significantly different from NUDs in employing high quality 
teachers as measured by the rest of the indicators. 
 District demographic variables are associated with the teacher quality component 
variables too. All else equal, compared with districts enrolling 10,000 to 14,999 students, 
districts with enrollment of 15,000 to 24,999 are less likely to have experienced 
teachers(log-odds=-0.32), but more likely to have teachers with in-field certification (log-
odds=0.17, p<0.10). Compared with medium-minority districts, high-minority districts 
are less likely to have experienced teachers (log-odds=-0.33 or a 28 percent decrease of 
odds), while low-minority districts have a higher likelihood to have experienced teachers 
(log-odds=0.31 or a 37 percent increase of odds) and teachers with in-field certifications 
(log-odds=0.35 or an increase of odds of 41 percent). Thus there exists a teacher quality 
gap between districts with varying minority student enrollment: the more minority 
students, the less likely for a district to employ teachers with in-field certifications or 
retain experienced teachers.  
The average education level of residents in a district community exerts 
differential effects on districts’ concentration of teacher quality as measured by the 
component variables. A standard deviation increase in the percentage of residents with at 
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least an associate’s degree is related to a 10 percent decrease in the odds of employing in-
field certified teachers (log-odds=-.11, p<0.10), but is positively associated with the 
likelihood of employing teachers who graduated from selective colleges (log-odds=0.31, 
or a 36 percent increase in the odds). Given the binary correlations findings (see Table 6) 
that ETQ is highly correlated with the selectivity measure (r=0.69) and HQT is highly 
correlated with the in-field certification measure (r=0.82), it is no surprise that resident 
education level has positive effects on both ETQ and the college selectivity measure, but 
negative effects on both HQT and in-field certification measures. 
Step IV: Fully Constructed District-level Models 
 I build step IV models on top of step III models by including variables measuring 
district practices and policies, which are districts’ per pupil expenditure (PPE), student-
teacher ratio, and salary schedule for new teachers with a bachelor’s degree. After taking 
into consideration district demographic characteristic and policy practices, the effects of 
stronger unionization on ETQ and HQT both are reduced (see Table 10). Specifically, the 
effect of stronger unionization on ETQ drops from log-odds 0.25 to log-odds 0.20 and is 
no longer statistically significant (p<0.10), and the effect on HQT  is no longer significant 
at the 0.05 level, but only significant at 0.10 level though its magnitude remains at log-
odds 0.26, unchanged from step III model. Results from step IV model also indicate that 
districts’ PPE is positively associated with districts’ proportion of ETQ teachers.  
Holding all else equal, one standard deviation increase of PPE increases the odds of 
employing ETQ teachers by 11 percent (log-odds=0.11 or odds=1.11). Yet, none of the 
district practices and policies measures is associated with the likelihood of employing 
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HQTs.  The effects of weaker unionization remain non-significant on both the ETQ and 
HQT measures. 
Table 10: Step IV models—Fully Constructed District-level HGLM Models 
aEst.      
(SE) Odds
Est.     
(SE) Odds
Est.      
(SE) Odds
Est.     
(SE) Odds
Est.      
(SE) Odds























































































































































































Reliability, Intercept 0.64 0.48 0.41 0.46 0.57 0.78
Variance Component (τ00), Intercept 0.23*** 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.10*** 0.36***
 District-level equation: effects on district proportion of high quality teachers within states









 It is noteworthy that the district policies and practices variables have a suppressor 
effect on the stronger unionization variable when modeling two of the teacher quality 
component variables, namely, proportion of experienced teaches and proportion of 
teachers within in-field degrees. The log-odds for SUDs to have experienced teachers 
increases from 0.13 (non-sig.) to 0.19 (p<0.05) after controlling for student-teacher ratio, 
PPE, and salary schedule for novice teachers with a bachelor’s degree.  And the log-odds 
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for SUDs to have teachers with in-field degrees increases from 0.17 (non-sig.) to 0.22 
(P<0.10). Yet, the inclusion of the district practice and policy variables does not change 
the effects of unionization variables on the rest of teacher quality component variables, 
namely proportions of in-field certified teachers and teachers who graduated from 
selective colleges. Student-teacher ratio and salary schedule have small but significant 
effects on proportion of experienced teachers in a district, though working in opposing 
directions (for student-teacher ratio log-odds=-0.14 or a 13 percent decrease of odds, 
p<.10, and for salary log-odds =0.07 or a seven percent increase of odds). One SD 
increase in PPE slightly increases the odds of districts employing teachers who graduated 
from selective colleges (log-odds=0.1 or a 10 percent increase in the odds). The effects of 
weaker unionization on the four teacher quality component variables remain unchanged 
from those of the model specifications in step III. 
Step V: Final models—Fully Specified State-level Models 
Table 11 presents results from the final models after accounting for related district 
and state variables that might have confounding effects on teacher quality. Results from 
these models indicate that stronger unionization status has a large effect on districts 
employing HQTs and has no statistically significant effect on districts’ proportion of 
ETQ teachers. After accounting for state and district characteristics, the odds of 
employing HQTs in SUDs are 56 percent higher than in NUDs (log-odds=0.45).  States 
with mandatory laws have an average lower proportion of HQTs. Specifically, compared 
with states with mandatory collective bargaining laws, states where teachers have 
permissive collective bargaining rights and states that prohibit districts from entering 
collective bargaining with unions are more likely to have HQTs (log-odds=0.36 p<0.10, 
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and log-odds=0.35, respectively).41 The fact that the coefficient of stronger unionization 
in modeling HQT increases after the inclusion of state collective bargaining law status 
variables suggests collective bargaining law has a suppressor effect on stronger 
unionization. The suppressor effect of law status indicates that district unionization status 
interacts with state law status to affect district proportion of HQTs. For example, the 
combined effect of stronger unionization and permissive law status on HQTs is 0.81 log-
odds (i.e. 0.45+0.36), while the combined effect of stronger unionization and mandatory 
law status is 0.45. I will provide a more in-depth possible explanation for the state law 
effect and guidance for future research in Chapter Five. 
The collective bargaining law status has no statistically significant effect on the 
likelihood of districts employing ETQ teachers.  The inclusion of a state’s collective 
bargaining law status does not change much the effects of other predictors on ETQ and 
HQT, except for PPE’s effect in the HQT model. One standard deviation increase in PPE 
now is slightly associated with a higher likelihood of districts employing HQTs (log-
odds=0.06, or an odds increase of 6 percent, p<0.10). 
In models on teacher quality component variables, the inclusion of state collective 
bargaining law status boosts the effect of stronger unionization on proportion of 
experienced teachers (log-odds from 0.19 to 0.22 [p<0.10]), proportion of in-field 
certified teachers (log-odds from 0.22 [non-sig.] to 0.36), and proportion of teachers with 
in-field degree  (log-odds from 0.22 [p<0.10] to 0.34). Compared with states having 
mandatory collective bargaining laws, states prohibiting districts from entering collective 
bargaining agreements have a higher average proportion of in-field certified teachers 
                                                 
41 I ran models without the unionization status variables, and found state law status has no significant effect 




(log-odds=0.25, p<0.10)  and teachers with in-field degrees (log-odds=0.36) after taking 
into consideration district unionization status and other variables.  Similar to the law’s 
effect when modeling HQT, law status also has a suppressor effect on stronger 
unionization status when modeling proportions of experienced teachers, teachers with in-





















Table 11: Step V Models—Fully Specified State-Level Models  
(District n=480; State n=48) 
aEst.      
(SE) Odds
Est.     
(SE) Odds
Est.      
(SE) Odds
Est.     
(SE) Odds
Est.      
(SE) Odds

















































































































































































































Reliability, Intercept 0.64 0.46 0.42 0.45 0.56 0.78
Variance Component (τ00), Intercept 0.23*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.09*** 0.38***









% In-field Degree % Selectivity% Experienced % In-field Cert.% ETQ % HQT
 State-level equation: effects on mean district proportion of  high quality teachers between states
 
 
Summary of Key Findings from HGLM models 
In summary, among large urban and suburban districts in the U.S., strongly 
unionized districts (SUDs) have a higher likelihood of employing a high quality teaching 
workforce as measured by some but not all of the teacher quality indicators. Specifically, 
SUDs are more likely to have high quality teachers as defined by the NCLB “highly 
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qualified teachers” (HQTs) indicator (log-odds=0.45), but not by the empirically-defined 
teacher quality (ETQ) indicator. By exploring the association between unionization and 
components of the above teacher quality indicators, this study finds that compared with 
NUDs, SUDs have higher concentrations of teachers with at least five years of experience 
(log-odds=0.22), teachers with in-field degrees (log-odds=0.34), and teachers with in-
field certifications (log-odds=0.36). Findings also reveal that SUDs are not significantly 
different from non-unionized districts in employing teachers who graduated from 
selective postsecondary institutions. Weakly unionized districts (WUDs) are not 
statistically significantly different from NUDs in terms of teacher quality except in 
proportions of experienced teachers:  WUDs are less likely to have experienced teachers 
than NUDs (log-odds=-019). 
The magnitude of the stronger unionization status effect is worth noting. Besides 
the small effect on the experienced teachers indicator (log-odds=0.22), stronger 
unionization status has a modest effect on other teacher quality indicators (i.e. HQT, in-
field degree, in-field certification).42 In fact, the magnitude of the stronger unionization 
status effect on HQT, in-field degree, and in-field certification ranks the top one or two 
largest among all variables included in their respective models. The relatively large and 
positive effect of stronger unionization on some of the teacher quality proxies suggests 
districts’ unionization status has an important bearing with attracting teachers to and 
retaining teachers in the districts, and teacher unions should not be left out of school 
improvement efforts.  
                                                 
42 I follow the standard of Rosenthal and Rosnow (1984, p.360). Effects less than 0.1 SD are very small, .10—0.29 SD small, and 




Results from the final models indicate besides the positive effect of stronger 
unionization on some of the teacher quality proxies, low-minority status is also positively 
associated with districts’ proportions of HQTs, experienced teachers, and teachers with 
certification in their teaching fields. Therefore, the teacher quality gap among districts 
with different minority student concentration still exists after holding constant other 
district characteristics and state collective bargaining law status. An interesting finding 
concerns the effect of education level of residents within district boundaries. After 
controlling other variables, education level is positively associated with the concentration 
of ETQ teachers and the proportion of teachers who graduated from selective colleges, 
yet it is negatively related to concentrations of HQTs and teachers with certification in 
their teaching field. Conventional wisdom holds that the greater the level of education, 
the more likely schools would be equipped with high teacher quality. The results here 
suggest that this conventional wisdom is partially true; it depends on how teacher quality 
is defined.  
Findings from the final models reveal that state law status has a suppressor effect 
on stronger unionization, which suggests that state law status interacts with district 
unionization status to affect the district proportions of HQTs, experienced teachers, 
teachers with in-field certifications, and teachers with in-field degrees.  
Results from the “Largest Districts” Sample 
This section presents results from the descriptive analyses and HGLM models of 
the “Largest Districts” sample. The “Largest Districts” sample has 52 districts and is 
derived from the 100 largest districts list obtained from NCES.  This sample is used to 
investigate the second research question: How does a district’s union status affect the 
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intra-district distribution of teacher quality across schools with different poverty level and 
minority student concentration? Here, teacher quality is measured by: a) The proportion 
of teachers in a school who are classified as high quality by the empirically-established 
teacher quality (ETQ) indictor; b) The proportion of teachers in a school who are highly 
qualified teachers (HQTs) as defined by NCLB; and c) proportion of teachers in a school 
who possess one of the following teacher quality components: selectivity of the 
postsecondary institutions that teachers attended, holding a subject-matter degree, 
holding a certificate in the subject matter, and at least five years of experience. 
Descriptive Results 
Table 12 presents some of the key findings from the descriptive statistics analyses 
of the schools and districts. Across the 52 largest districts included in this study, the 
average school percentage of ETQ teachers is 17, while the average school percentage of 
HQTs is 68. On average, schools in the 52 largest districts are high-minority high-poverty 
ones, and over 12 percent of their students have individualized education plans (IEPs). 
Specifically, in an average school, close to 70 percent of enrollment is minority and about 
60 percent have been approved for the free or reduced lunch program (FARL).  
 A majority (79 percent) of the 52 districts are unionized. Among all the districts, 
62 percent have stronger unionization, which means they have collective bargaining 
agreements with teacher unions and more than 50 percent of district teachers are union 
members.  Seventeen percent of the districts have weaker unionization, which indicates 
that either they are covered by “meet and confer” agreements or they are covered by 
collective bargaining contracts but no more than 50 percent of district teachers are union 
members. On average, these largest districts spend $9,570 per pupil each year in 
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educating their students, and pay an annual salary of $32,360 to novice teachers with 
bachelors’ degree according to districts’ salary schedules. These large districts have an 
average enrollment of 142,200 students, which is no surprise since we are focusing on the 
largest districts in the U.S. For an average district, close to 49 percent of students are 
approved for the free or reduced lunch program, and about 59 percent of district students 
are minority students. The 52 districts are equally distributed in urban and suburban areas, 



































Table 12: Descriptive Statistics of Variables in "Largest Districts" Sample 
Mean SD Min Max
% School ETQ Teachers 17.47 24.29 0.00 100.00
% School Highly Qualified Teachers (HQTs) 67.69 32.21 0.00 100.00
% School Teachers with over 5 Years of Experience 73.42 26.39 0.00 100.00
% School Teachers with In-field Certifications 66.70 32.26 0.00 100.00
% School Teachers with In-field Degrees 66.16 32.35 0.00 100.00
% School Teachers Who Graduated from Selective Colleges 38.58 32.89 0.00 100.00
Elementary School 0.81 0.39 0.00 1.00
Secondary School 0.17 0.37 0.00 1.00
Combined School 0.03 0.16 0.00 1.00
School student_teacher ratio 16.09 4.14 3.97 32.81
PD Characteristics Factora 0.15 0.99 -3.51 2.86
% FARL studentsb 60.63 30.73 0.00 100.00
% Minority Studentsb 69.80 30.53 0.91 100.00
School Poverty/minority Indicator 65.21 28.34 4.55 100.00
% school students with IEPs 12.52 6.81 0.00 47.34
School Total Studentsd 839.75 563.78 35.00 4,582.00
School size (over 1000) 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00
School Size (500-1000) 0.39 0.49 0.00 1.00
School size (below 500) 0.35 0.48 0.00 1.00
Stronger Unionization 0.62 0.49 0.00 1.00
Weaker Unionization 0.17 0.38 0.00 1.00
No Unionization 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00
% District FRL studentsc 48.69 24.46 3.20 100.00
% District Minority Studentsc 58.84 25.56 7.66 96.84
District Poverty/minority Indicator 53.77 22.94 8.06 90.79
PPE (X1000) 9.57 1.87 5.97 15.26
Salary schedule -Bachelor w/o experience (X1000) 32.36 2.79 26.62 37.55
Student-teacher ratio 17.24 2.62 13.29 24.48
district enrollment (X1000)d 142.20 172.43 46.59 1,023.67
large district size 100,000 above 0.38 0.49 0.00 1.00
large district size 60,000-99,999 0.44 0.50 0.00 1.00
large district size 40,000-59,999 0.17 0.38 0.00 1.00
Urban 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00
suburban 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00























































































































































































































































































































































Unionized vs. Non-unionized Schools and Districts 
As shown in Table 13, school comparisons indicate that unionized schools are not 
statistically different from non-unionized ones in terms of the percentage of ETQ teachers, 
HQTs or any of the teacher quality components.  Yet, schools with different unionization 
status are different with respect to a number of school characteristics. Specifically, 
compared with non-unionized schools (NUS), strongly unionized schools (SUS) have 
higher student-teacher ratio (16.64 vs. 14.86) and higher scores on the professional 
development factor (0.23 vs. -0.12). SUSs have higher scores on the school 
poverty/minority indicator variable than NUSs (68.04 vs. 51.53), which indicates that 
SUSs have higher percentage of students approved for free or reduced lunch program 
(62.88 vs. 45.05) and higher minority students concentration (73.20 vs. 58.01).  
District characteristics in Table 13 43  (above) indicate that strongly unionized 
districts are not statistically different from the non-unionized districts in any of the 
demographic characteristics or district policies and practices included in this analysis. 
Results from Hierarchical Generalized Linear Modeling (HGLM) Analyses 
As stated in Chapter 3, I construct schools-within-district HGLM models to 
examine the extent to which districts’ unionization status influence the intra-district 
distribution of high quality teachers across schools in the 52 largest districts in the U.S.  
Results are presented in a step-wise fashion with simpler models presented first. I first 
present results from the fully unconditional models (step I models), which are followed 
by results from step II models, or school level models. On top of step II models, if the 
                                                 
43 The 52 largest districts do not present similar characteristics as found in the large urban and suburban districts sample, which I 




school poverty/minority slope varies across districts, step III models include unionization 
status variables to simultaneously model the intercept and school poverty/minority slope. 
The final models (step IV models) take into consideration other related district 
characteristics that might have confounding effects on the relationship between 
unionization status and intra-district teacher quality distribution.  
As mentioned above, in the HGLM analyses, all categorical variables were 
dummy-coded (coded 1 and 0) and continuous variables z-scored (with M=0, and SD=1). 
The reported results are statistically significant at the p level of 0.05, unless otherwise 
explicitly stated. 
Table 14: Step I—Fully Unconditional Models 
Fixed Effect
aEst.          
(SE)
Odds Est.        (SE) Odds
Est.       
(SE) Odds
Est.        
(SE) Odds
Est.        
(SE) Odds














































0.40*** 0.65 0.14*** 0.53 0.08** 0.37 0.07** 0.37 0.22*** 0.62
0.65*** 0.81
% ETQ % HQT % Experience % In-field Cert.
Notes: ~p<0.1, *p<.05, **p<.01,***p<0.001; Source: SASS 2003‐2004; School level variables weighted by within‐district weight.a can be interpreted as effect sizes since all continuous variables are z‐scored and categorical ones dummy‐
coded. 
% In-field Degree % Selectivity
 
 
Step I: Fully Unconditional Model Results 
Table 14 presents the results from the unconditional models on the two composite 
teacher quality measures as well as on their components. The results indicate in the 52 
largest districts the log-odds of schools employing ETQ teachers and HQTs are -1.60 and 
0.72, respectively. This suggests for an average school in the 52 districts, the expected 
odds of employing HQT teachers are much higher than those of employing ETQ teachers 
(odds=exp{0.72}=2.05 VS. odds=exp{-1.60}=0.20). Converting odds into probabilities,44 
we see on average these schools are about four times more likely to have HQTs than ETQ 
teachers (0.67 vs. 0.17). The log-odds of schools employing experienced teachers, in-
                                                 




field certified teachers and teachers with in-field degrees are similar (log-odds=0.68-1.04), 
but have much lower log-odds of employing teachers who graduated from selective 
colleges (log-odds= -0.54). 
The unconditional models also provide valuable information about the between-
district variability in teacher quality. Assuming the schools’ log-odds of employing high 
quality teachers, β0j, to be approximately normally distributed, and given the estimate of 
τ00=0.40 and τ00=0.14 for EQT and HQT respectively, we expect 95% of the 52 districts 
to have log-odds of schools employing EQT teachers between -2.84 and -0.36, and HQTs 
between -0.01 and 1.45. Converting to probabilities, the results reveal that districts’ 
average school concentration of ETQ teachers ranges from 0.05 to 0.41, and HQTs from 
0.50 to 0.81. Similarly, from the β0j and τ00 of the component variables, we can see 
between-district variability is smaller in terms of school concentrations of experienced 
teachers, teachers with in-field certifications, and teachers with in-field degrees, but there 
is much larger between-district variability in employing teachers who graduated from 




















Table 15: Step II Models—School-Level (Level-1) HGLM Models 
Fixed Effect
aEst.          
(SE)
Odds Est.        (SE) Odds
Est.       
(SE) Odds
Est.        
(SE) Odds
Est.        
(SE) Odds















































































































































































Tau (as correlations) Intercept Slope Intercept Slope Intercept Slope Intercept Slope Intercept Slope Intercept Slope

























Mean concentration of teacher quality 0.55*** 0.68 0.14*** 0.49 0.06** 0.27 0.03* 0.18 0.31*** 0.67 0.80*** 0.82
Poverty/minority teacher quality slope 0.16~ 0.24 0.04 0.12 0.05~ 0.15 0.14** 0.30 0.11** 0.27 0.29*** 0.43
% ETQ % In-field Degree % Selectivity% HQT % Experience % In-field Cert.
Notes: ~p<0.1, *p<.05, **p<.01,***p<0.001; Source: SASS 2003-2004;  a can be interpreted as effect sizes since all continuous variables are z-scored and categorical ones dummy-coded; School level variables weighted by within-district weight   1Reference group 
"Elementary schools"; 2 reference group school enrollment 500-1000.  
 
Step II: School Level (Level-1) HGLM Models 
School Level HGLM models explore how school-level characteristics are 
associated with the school teacher quality measures before adjusting for district 
characteristics. Results (see Table 15) indicate that as schools’ poverty/minority level 
increases the likelihood of employing ETQ teachers decreases (log-odds=-.39, or a 
decrease of odds of 32 percent) holding constant other school variables. Further, the 
relationship between poverty/minority level and ETQ (that is, the poverty/minority slope 
in the model) is significantly different across districts (µ1j =0.16, p<0.10); this provides 
evidence that including district-level variables, such as unionization status, to model the 
ETQ gap could be fruitful. Other school level characteristics, such as school’s grade level, 
school size, student-teacher ratio, etc. are not significant predictors of schools employing 




Results from the model on HQTs reveal that holding all other school 
characteristics equal, schools’ poverty/minority level is not a significant predictor of 
school concentration of HQTs, and the poverty/minority slope does not vary significantly 
across districts. The non-varying school poverty/minority slope suggests that the effect of 
school poverty/minority level on school HQT concentration is not significantly different 
across districts.  Schools with high and low levels of poverty/minority enrollment are 
equally likely to employ teachers classified as HQTs. There is no need to further model 
the slope; therefore, this school-level model serves as my final model for HQT.  
In the model on HQTs, a school’s size matters in terms of employing HQTs. 
Specifically, all else equal large schools (over 1,000 enrollment) are less likely to have 
HQTs than medium-sized schools (500-1000 enrollment, logs-odds=-0.94, or a decrease 
of odds of 61 percent). In addition, compared with elementary schools, combined k-12 
schools have a much lower probability of employing HQTs (log-odds=-1.76, or a 
decrease of odds of 83 percent).  
Results from the school level models on the teacher quality components indicate 
school poverty/minority level is significantly associated with a school’s proportion of 
experienced teachers (log-odds=-0.57). The significant variance components for the 
school poverty/minority slope indicate that the relationship between poverty/minority and 
each of the four component variables varies significantly across districts. The varying 
slopes provide empirical evidence that it would be fruitful to build district-level models 
to account for the variability. That is, I can include district-level variables to understand 
why in some districts the association between poverty/minority and each of the teacher 




HQTs, school size and schools’ grade level are significantly associated with school 
concentrations of experienced teachers, teachers with subject-matter certifications, 
teachers with subject-matter degrees, and teachers who graduated from selective colleges. 
Overall, medium-sized schools are more likely than large or small schools to have higher 
concentrations of teachers possessing these aforementioned characteristics. School 
percentage of IEP students is negatively associated with school concentrations of teachers 
with subject-matter certifications and teachers with subject-matter degrees.  
Step III: District-Level HGLM Models with only Unionization Status 
Step III models include the two major district-level variables, i.e. stronger 
unionization and weaker unionization variables, to model the intercept and the school 
poverty/minority slope to explore whether unionization status may account for variability 
in district average school teacher quality and variability in the relationship between 
poverty/minority and school teacher quality across districts. The results for the slope (see 
Table 16) indicate that one standard deviation increase in the school poverty/minority 
level is associated with 0.59 log-odds decrease in school’s concentration of experienced 
teachers in non-unionized districts (NUDs), and in strongly unionized districts (SUDs) 
one SD increase in poverty/minority level is linked with 1.15 log-odds (0.59+0.56) 
decrease of school’s concentration of experienced teachers. In other words, the gap 
between high and low poverty/minority schools in employing experienced teachers is 
wider in SUDs than in non-unionized districts (NUDs). On modeling school proportion 
of teachers with in-field certifications, weaker unionization status has a significantly 
positive effect on the relationship between poverty/minority and school’s concentration 




effect of school poverty/minority level on school proportion of teachers with in-field 
certifications in NUDs, we can state that in WUDs as school poverty/minority level 
increases the likelihood of employing teachers with in-field certifications increases. 
Unionization status variables have no significant effects on any of the intercepts of ETQ 
and the teacher quality component variables, or any of the slopes of ETQ, in-field degree, 
and selectivity. The effects of school level variables remain virtually unchanged from 
those of step II school-level models. 
Table 16: Step III Models—District-Level (Level-2) HGLM Models with only 
Unionization Status Variables 
Fixed Effect
aEst.         
(SE)
Odds Est.        (SE) Odds
Est.       
(SE) Odds
Est.        
(SE) Odds




















































































































































































































Tau (as correlations) Intercept Slope Intercept Slope Intercept Slope Intercept Slope Intercept Slope






















Mean concentration of teacher quality 0.59*** 0.69 0.07** 0.31 0.03* 0.18 0.31*** 0.67 0.85*** 0.83
Poverty/minority teacher quality slope 0.20~ 0.28 0.03 0.09 0.15** 0.31 0.12** 0.28 0.23*** 0.39
% ETQ % Experience % In-field Cert. % In-field Degree % Selectivity
Notes: ~p<0.1, *p<.05, **p<.01,***p<0.001; Source: SASS 2003-2004;  a can be interpreted as effect sizes since all continuous variables are z-scored and categorical ones dummy-coded; School level variables weighted by 
within-district weight b. "Stronger Unionization": refers to districts  having a collective bargaining contract and at least 50% teachers are union members;  "Weaker Unionization" refers to districts having "meet and confer" 
agreement with teacher unions or having collective  bargaining agreements but less than 50% of teachers are union members; c Composed of district % FARL and % minority students; 1 reference group “no unionization”; 2 
reference group "district enrollment 60,000-99,999 students"; 3reference group "Suburban";  dadjusted using comparable wage index (CWI);    dComposed of district % FARL and % minority students;  4 Reference group 
"Elementary schools"; 5 reference group school enrollment 500-1000;   




Step IV models (see Table 17) build upon step III models by including variables 
measuring district demographic characteristics and district policies and practices. Holding 
constant these district demographic variables and district policies and practices, the 
negative effect of stronger unionization on the poverty/minority experienced teachers 
slope remains virtually unchanged in magnitude (log-odds=-0.55, p<0.10) from that of 
the step II model. In the in-field certification model, the positive effect of weaker 
unionization status on the school poverty/minority slope decreases from 0.56 to 0.43 and 
is no longer significant at the p<0.10 level. However, holding other variables equal, 
weaker unionization status does have a significantly positive effect on the district average 
concentration of teachers with in-field degrees (log-odds=0.69, p<0.10). One noteworthy 
finding concerning district control variables is the contextual effect of district 
poverty/minority level on district average school teacher quality. When modeling the 
proportion of ETQ teachers and teachers who graduated from selective colleges, the 
district-level poverty/minority level has an additional negative effect on the school level 
poverty/minority teacher quality gap (log-odds=-0.51, p<0.10 and -0.62, respectively). 
The contextual effect of poverty/minority level suggests that the social-class composition 
of a district has a substantial association with its individual school’s concentration of 
teacher quality. 
However, as shown in table 17, even after accounting for district-level 
characteristics, the effects of school poverty/minority level on some of the school teacher 
quality measures (i.e. ETQ, teachers with in-field certifications, teachers with in-field 
degrees or teachers who graduated from selective colleges) still vary significantly across 




on schools employing ETQ teachers ranges from log-odds-1.50 to 0.45 and employing 













































Table 17: Step IV—Fully Specified District-Level HGLM Models 
Fixed Effect
aEst.          
(SE)
Odds Est.        (SE) Odds
Est.       
(SE) Odds
Est.        
(SE) Odds




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Tau (as correlations) Intercept Slope Intercept Slope Intercept Slope Intercept Slope Intercept Slope






















Mean concentration of teacher quality 0.45*** 0.62 0.02 0.12 0.02 0.14 0.32*** 0.67 0.62*** 0.77
Poverty/minority teacher quality slope 0.28* 0.32 0.04 0.12 0.24** 0.38 0.14** 0.29 0.28*** 0.42
% In-field Cert.% ETQ % In-field Degree % Selectivity% Experience
Notes: ~p<0.1, *p<.05, **p<.01,***p<0.001; Source: SASS 2003-2004;  a can be interpreted as effect sizes since all continuous variables are z-scored and categorical ones dummy-coded; School level variables weighted by within-
district weight; b "Stronger Unionization": refers to districts  having a collective bargaining contract and at least 50% teachers are union members;  "Weaker Unionization" refers to districts having "meet and confer" agreement with 
teacher unions or having collective  bargaining agreements but in which no more than 50% of teachers are union members; reference group “no unionization”; c Composed of district % FARL and % minority students; dadjusted using 
comparable wage index (CWI); eComposed of school % FARL and % minority students; 1 reference group "district enrollment 60,000-99,999 students"; 2reference group "Suburban";3 Reference group "Elementary schools"; 4 reference 






Summary of Findings from HGLM models in the Largest Districts 
Results from schools-within-district models suggest that in the 52 largest districts 
a district’s unionization status has no statistically significant effect on the intra-district 
distribution of ETQ teachers or HQTs or three of the teacher quality components 
(concentrations of teachers with in-field certifications, teachers with in-field degrees, or 
teachers who graduated from selective colleges) across schools with differing poverty 
and minority student concentration. The social-class composition of school has a stronger 
effect on the distribution of experienced teachers across schools in SUDs than in NUDs, 
which suggests that in SUDs the gap between high and low poverty/minority schools in 
employing experienced teachers is much wider than in NUDs. The very limited sample 
size (613 schools in 52 districts, with a mode of 5 schools per district), and the skewness 
of the poverty/minority variable may pose some challenges in finding significant results, 























Table 18: Description of Variables Used in Supplementary Working Conditions Analysis 
Questionnaire 
Type Variable Name Description of Variables Variable Value Range
Salary_BA+0 Base salary for teachers with a bachelor's degree and no teaching experience Continuous
Salary_BA+10 Base salary for teachers with a bachelor's degree and 10 years of teaching experience Continuous
Salary_master+0 Base salary for teachers with a master's degree (or equivalent credit hrs) and no teaching experience Continuous
Salary_master+10 Base salary for teachers with a master's degree (or equivalent credit hrs) and 10 years of teaching experience Continuous
Salary_Highest Salary on the highest possible step Continuous
Districts with Formal 
Procedure to Counsel Out 
Incompetent Teachers
Are there formal procedures to counsel out poor-performing 
or incompetent teachers? Dichotomous, 1=yes; 0=no
Full State Certification 
Requirement for Teaching
Criteria used in considering applicants: Full standard state 
certification for field to be taught Dichotomous, 1=yes; 0=no
College Major or Minor 
Requirement for Teaching 
Criteria used in considering applicants: College major or 
minor in field to be taught Dichotomous, 1=yes; 0=no
Contract Year Length Months in a normal contract year
1=less than 8 hrs; 2=9-16 
hrs; 3=17-32 hrs; 4=over 33 
hrs
Pct District Teachers 
Dismissed
Total number of teachers dismissed last year/total teachers 
(not FTE) Continuous
Pct District Teachers 
Dismissed with <3 yrs 
Experience
Number of teachers dismissed with less than 3 years of 
experience/total teachers (not FTE) Continuous
Pct District Teachers 
Dismissed with >3 yrs 
Experience
Number of teachers dismissed with more than 3 years of 
experience/total teachers (not FTE) Continuous
Medical Insurance Does this district offer general medical insurance to teachers? Dichotomous, 1=yes; 0=no
Dental Insurance Does this district offer dental insurance to teachers? Dichotomous, 1=yes; 0=no
Life Insurance Does this district offer group life insurance to teachers? Dichotomous, 1=yes; 0=no
Retirement Plan Does this district offer retirement plan to teachers? Dichotomous, 1=yes; 0=no
Tuition Remission Does this district offer tuition reimbursement to teachers? Dichotomous, 1=yes; 0=no
Support for PD: release time from teaching Dichotomous, 1=yes; 0=no
Support for PD: scheduled time in contract Dichotomous, 1=yes; 0=no
Support for PD: stipend for PD outside regular work hrs Dichotomous, 1=yes; 0=no
Support for PD: partial or full reimbursement for college Dichotomous, 1=yes; 0=no
Support for PD: reimbursement for conference/workshop Dichotomous, 1=yes; 0=no
Support for PD: reimbursement for travel and/or daily 
expenses Dichotomous, 1=yes; 0=no
PD hrs on content In the past 12 months, hrs spent on professional development concentrating on the contents of teaching field
1=less than 8 hrs; 2=9-16 
hrs; 3=17-32 hrs; 4=over 33 
hrs
Induction program In your first year teaching, did you participate in an induction program? Dichotomous, 1=yes; 0=no
Mean hrs in school/wk Total weekly hrs spend on teaching and all school-related activities Continuous
Mean base pay hrs/wk Weekly hrs rquired to work to receive base bay Continuous
Mean teaching Hrs/wk Weekly hrs spent on delivering instruction to students Continuous















Supplementary Analysis for the Large Urban and Suburban Districts 
Results from the HGLM analysis find that in the large urban and suburban 
districts, districts with stronger unionization tend to have more high quality teachers as 
defined by certain indicators. Though not a focus of this study, I am interested in the 
possible reasons that teacher unions have any effect on teacher quality. In the theory of 
action section in Chapter 2, I theorized, in concurrence with others (Koski & Horng, 2007, 
Johnson & Donaldson, 2006) that the negotiated items on union contracts, such as teacher 
pay, class size, seniority rule in transfer, etc, affect school districts’ ability to hire and 
retain quality teachers. In this section, I conducted a supplementary analysis comparing 
unionized districts with non-unionized districts on frequently negotiated contract items 
(see Table 18 of the description of items). Specifically, I focus on districts included in the 
“Large Urban and Suburban Districts” sample. Table 19 presents comparisons of the 
frequently negotiated contract items between districts with varying unionization status—
stronger unionization, weaker unionization, and no union agreement. Stronger and 
weaker unionization districts are compared against the non-unionized ones, respectively. 
Differences on categorical variables were tested using chi-square test (specifically 
through the logistic regression technique), and continuous variables using t-test 
(specifically through the ANOVA multiple comparison technique). The analysis suggests 
some trends in the differences between strongly-unionized districts and non-unionized 
districts. The reported results are statistically significant at the p level of 0.05, unless 




Strongly unionized districts (SUDs), on average, offer higher teacher salaries45 
than non-unionized ones according to their salary schedules (see Table 19). Though 
SUDs do not offer statistically significantly higher salaries to entry level bachelor degree-
holders than NUDs, they do offer higher salaries to more experienced teachers. The 
salary premium in SUDs is larger than that in NUDs as teachers stay longer in teaching, 
as evidenced by the salary increase of more than $10,000 from the” bachelor without 
experience” step to the step of “bachelor with 10 years of experience” in  SUDs, while 
the increase in NUDs between the two steps is only about $6,600. The same case is true 
between the two steps of “master with no experience” and “master with 10 years of 
experience”; the salary difference is over $13,000 in SUDs and about 7,300 in NUDs.  
Further testing reveals that the differences in salary premium between SUDs and NUDs 
are statistically significant. The result that SUDs consistently pay more to teachers with 
more experience, or backload teacher salary schedules, echoes the findings of Lankford 


















                                                 












Variables Mean        
(SD)b
Mean        
(SD)
Mean        
(SD)
Mean         
(SD)
Unweighted N (Weighted%) 266 (58.36%) 74 (14.33%) 140 (27.31%) 480 (100%)
Salary_BA+0 yrs (x1000) 32.77        (3.32)
32.40        
(2.64)
32.73        
(3.46)
32.71         
(3.27)
Salary_BA+10 yrs2(x1000)
43.26***      
(7.09)
38.54        
(3.94)
39.33        
(3.46)
41.47         
(6.22)
Salary_master+0 yrs(x1000)     36.18~       (3.51)
35.30        
(3.27)
35.34        
(3.80)
35.83         
(3.58)
Salary_master+10 yrs3 (x1000)
49.37 ***    
(7.81)
43.69        
(5.34)
42.62        
(4.38)
46.72         
(7.41)
Salary_Highest (x1000) 66.43***     (8.67)
62.69**     
(7.18)
59.13        
(8.10)
63.90         
(8.89)
Salary dif. Between Ba 0 and 10 yrs2
10.39***    
(5.71)
6.13         
(3.20)
6.60         
(2.48)
8.71          
(5.07)
Salary dif between master 0 and 10 yrs3
13.18***     
(6.17)
8.39         
(4.32)
7.28         
(3.08)
10.89         
(5.91)
Contract Yr:  <= 9 Mon 0.16**       0.28 0.28 0.21
Contract Yr: 9.5-10 Mon 0.75 0.67 0.71 0.73
Contract Yr: >=11 Mon 0.09*         0.06 0.01 0.06
Days in sch yr for students 179.18      (3.19)
178.55      
(4.38)
179.34      
(2.78)
179.13        
(3.29)
Mean hrs in school/wk 53.70         (4.19)
54.16      
(3.41)
54.40      
(3.79)
53.96        
(3.98)
Mean base pay hrs/wk 37.33***      (2.28)
38.54*      
(1.57)
39.15      
(1.53)
38.00         
(2.16)
Mean teaching Hrs/wk 28.01***      (2.52)
28.67      
(2.75)
29.29      
(3.14)
28.45         
(2.79)
Student/Teacher Ratio 18.60***     (3.39)
17.06 ***    
(2.61)
15.44        
(1.42)
17.52         
(3.18)
Full State in-Field Certification Requirement for 
Teaching 1 1 0.99 1
College Major or Minor Requirement for Teaching 0.96 0.97 0.98 0.96
% Teachers Participated in New Teacher Induction 
program1
68           
(29)
72           
(28)
71           
(31)
70           
(30)
Average PD Support 2.31*         (0.71)
2.25        
(0.71)
2.12         
(0.74)
2.25          
(0.72)
Districts with Formal Procedure to Counsel Out 
Incompetent Teachers 0.81 0.84 0.8 0.81
% District Teachers Dismissed 1.90         (10.73)
0.52        
(1.09)
1.59         
(9.61)












Table 19: Working Conditions Comparisons across Districts with Varying Unionization 








Mean        
(SD)
Mean        
(SD)
Mean        
(SD)
Mean         
(SD)
% District Teachers Dismissed with <=3 yrs 
Experience
1.24          
(9.49)
0.04        
(0.11)
1.08         
(8.10)
1.02          
(8.39)
% District Teachers Dismissed with >3 yrs 
Experience
0.66          
(1.98)
0.48        
(1.06)
0.51         
(2.47)
0.59          
(2.03)
Medical Insurance 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Dental Insurance 0.99 0.95 0.94 0.97
Life Insurance 0.93 1.00 0.95 0.94
Retirement Plan 0.97 0.96 0.96 0.97
Tuition Remission 0.34 0.39 0.45 0.38
Notes:  Non-union group is compared against stronger and weaker unionization groups. Differences on categorical variables are tested using chi-square test, 
continuous variables using t-test. a "Stronger Unionization": refers to districts  having a collective bargaining contract and more than 50% teachers are union 
members;  "Weaker Unionization" refers to districts having "meet and confer" agreement with teacher unions or having collective  bargaining agreements 
but less than 50% (inclusive) of teachers are union members.  b SD for conitunous variables; 1 Due to missing data, the ns are 203(54.8%), 64 
(16.1%),119(29.1%), 386 (100%) respectively. 2 Due to missing data, the ns for the subgroups and total are  255, 74, 140, 469 respectively.  3Due to missing 




Unionization theory suggests that unions would decrease teachers’ workload, such 
as shortening work time and reducing class size. This analysis reveals mixed findings 
regarding work time. Among the large urban and suburban districts, nine percent of 
SUDs have a contract year length of over 11 months, as compared with only one percent 
of NUDs. And, in comparison with NUDs, a smaller percentage (16%) of SUDs negotiate 
contract year length to be less than or equal to 9 months (16% vs. 28%). In short, we may 
infer that teachers in SUDs, on average, have a longer contract year. This analysis also 
reveals that students’ school year is of comparable length between SUDs and NUDs 
(179.18 vs. 179.34 days). Piecing together the length of teachers’ contract year and 
students’ school year, we can infer that, on average, teachers in SUDs have more days in 
school without instructing students.  Teachers in SUDs, on average, have a longer 




week to receive base pay (district average 37.33 vs. 39.15 hrs) and they spend fewer 
hours per week in teaching (28.01 vs. 29.29 hrs), though their total weekly in-school time 
is not significantly different from that of their peers in NUDs. Thus, the above findings 
on school time implies that teachers in SUDs have a lighter workload46 in terms of 
working with students, but more time to engage in activities without supervising students. 
Contrary to previous findings, the student-teacher ratio is higher in SUDs than in NUDS 
(18.60 vs. 15.44). 
 In terms of requirements for new hires, this analysis reveals that almost all SUDs 
and NUDs require teacher candidates to have both certification and college major or 
minor in the teaching field, and there is no difference between SUDs and NUDs in this 
regard. Once new teachers are hired, both SUDs and NUDs (close to 70 percent) are 
equally likely to offer induction programs to assist them in their first year of teaching. 
However, teachers in SUDs report more support for engaging in professional 
development 47  activities in the form of scheduled time in contract, stipend for 
professional development outside regular work hours, reimbursement for college tuition, 
or workshop or travel expenses, etc. 
Similar percentages of SUDs and NUDs (81 vs. 80 %) have formal procedures in 
place to counsel out incompetent teachers. In addition, on the percentage of teachers 
dismissed (total, with less than or equal to three years of teaching experience, and with 
over three years of teaching experience) for poor performance, SUDs and NUDs are not 
significantly different from each other.  
                                                 
46 Here I define “lighter work load” solely by instructional time length and the number of working hours required to receive base pay. 
That said, I acknowledge that I do not have information from SASS on how teachers spend their in-school time or instructional time. 
47 Support for PD is composed of six items as specified in Table 18: 1) release time from teaching, 2) scheduled time in contract, 3) 
stipend for PD outside regular work hrs, 4) partial or full reimbursement for college tuition, 5) reimbursement for 




So what do we make of the difference in salary, working conditions and all the 
other frequently negotiated items between SUDs and NUDs? In general, SUDs tend to 
pay teacher more, especially veteran teachers and teachers with more education. On 
workload, teachers in SUDs have a shorter contract week and spend less time on teaching. 
And teachers in SUDs have more paid days exempt from instructing students based on 
information of contract year length and student school year length. Contradicting 
previous findings and perceptions, this analysis finds that SUDs have a higher student-
teacher ratio than NUDs. This finding does not suggest that unions forgo their demand 
for smaller classes to better their members’ working conditions. One potential 
explanation may be that non-unionized districts decreased their overall student-teacher 
ratio through providing more special programs to accommodate the diverse needs of their 
students, such as LEPs, ESL students. SUDs tend to offer more support for teachers’ 
professional development activities. Yet, SUDs and NUDs are very similar in 
certification and degree requirements for teacher candidates, and equally likely to offer 
induction programs to new teachers. And SUDs are not different from NUDs in terms of 
whether having a formal procedure to counsel out incompetent teachers, or the 
percentage of teachers being dismissed. Unionized districts (strongly-unionized as well as 
weakly-unionized ones) are equally likely as non-unionized ones to provide benefits, 




CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
Discussion 
The purpose of this dissertation research is to study the relationship between 
teacher unionization and teacher quality in large urban and suburban districts. 
Specifically, this study examined whether unionized districts had more or fewer qualified 
teachers than non-unionized districts, and whether a district’s unionization status was 
associated with the intra-district distribution of teacher quality across schools in 
America’s largest districts. In this research, I adopted two  composite indicators to 
measure teacher quality: a) the empirically-established teacher quality (ETQ) indicator, 
which is composed of selectivity of the postsecondary institutions teachers attended, 
holding at least a bachelor’s degree in the teaching field, holding a certificate in the 
teaching field, and at least five years of experience; and b) the NCLB-defined “highly 
qualified teachers”(HQT) indicator, which is composed of at least a bachelor’s degree 
from a four-year institution, full state certification, and competence in the subject area.  
 Addressing the first research question whether unionized districts have more or 
fewer qualified teachers, the study finds that in the nation’s large urban and suburban 
districts, districts with stronger unionization status, which refers to districts that have 
collective bargaining agreements and in which over 50 percent of teachers are union 
members, tend to have higher proportions of HQTs and have comparable proportions of 
ETQ teachers when compared with non-unionized districts. Unpacking the association 
between unionization and components of the above teacher quality indicators, this study 
finds that districts with stronger unionization status have higher concentrations of 




teachers with subject-area certifications. Yet, findings also reveal that districts with 
stronger unionization are not statistically significantly different from non-unionized 
districts in employing teachers who graduated from selective postsecondary institutions, a 
key component in the ETQ composite. Weakly unionized districts, which refer to districts 
either 1) having a meet-and-confer agreement or 2) having a collective bargaining 
agreement but with union membership no more than 50 percent of total number of district 
teachers, are not significantly different from non-unionized districts in employing high 
quality teachers as defined by either of the composite variables or any of their component 
variables, except the experience component. Weakly unionized districts are less likely to 
be equipped with teachers with at least five years of experience. 
The fact that stronger unionization exhibits different relationships with the ETQ 
and HQT indicators is intriguing and it could be attributed to unions’ stance on teacher 
quality issues. As literature reviewed in Chapter Two suggests, teacher unions are 
advocates of teacher professionalism. Unions support teacher licensing and call for 
academic major and pedagogical studies for teacher candidates (AFT, 2003; Kerchner & 
Koppich, 1993). In addition, the seniority rule as well as single-salary schedules unions 
typically negotiate give preference to experienced teachers. Therefore, the findings that 
strongly unionized districts, on average, have higher concentrations of HQTs and 
teachers with certain characteristics (i.e. teachers with subject-matter degrees, teachers 
with subject-matter certifications, and experienced teachers) are in line with teacher 
unions’ standing on teacher professionalism and their negotiated policies. However, 
selectivity of postsecondary institutions teacher attended, the key component of ETQ, is 




districts are not significantly different from their non-unionized peers in employing ETQ 
teachers or teachers who graduated from selective colleges. 
The second research question examines whether a district’s union status affects 
the intra-district distribution of teacher quality across schools with different poverty 
status and minority students concentration in the largest districts. Results from the 
analysis reveal that the poverty/minority level of a school has a stronger (and negative)  
effect on the distribution of experienced teachers in strongly unionized districts than in 
non-unionized districts, which suggests that in strongly unionized districts the teacher 
quality gap is much wider across high and low poverty/minority schools in terms of 
retaining experienced teachers. However, this research finds little evidence that 
unionization is associated with the teacher quality gap as measured by either the EQT or 
HQT indicator, or the other three component variables (teachers with in-field 
certifications, teachers with in-field degrees or teachers who graduated from selective 
colleges).  
What do the results mean to us? At first glance, one may infer that teacher 
unionization promotes teacher quality in large urban and suburban districts, but 
exacerbates intra-district teacher quality distribution in the largest districts. However, we 
should interpret the findings with caution for the following reasons.  
First, the issue of teacher quality is complex. Though researchers have reached 
consensus that teachers are the single most important factor in determining students’ 
schooling experience, the debate continues on the fundamental question of what exactly a 
high quality teacher is. Even on the two alternative proxies of teacher quality adopted in 




with them. Unpacking the relationships between teacher unions and components of the 
two composite measures, this study reveals that stronger unionization has a non-
significant relationship with the selectivity component, a key component of ETQ, but 
significant relationship with other components (i.e. experience, subject-matter degree, 
and certification). The complexity manifested in the relationships between stronger 
unionization and different teacher quality measures cautions against oversimplification of 
the findings. Second, teacher unionization has varying forms and the strength of unions 
can be measured in varied ways, be it a collective bargaining agreement, meet and confer 
agreement, or union membership. Even under the broad category of collective bargaining, 
teacher unions adopt different strategies in negotiating with school districts and can reach 
varying contracts covering varied items, besides the traditional “bread and butter” items 
(i.e. pay, working conditions etc).   Therefore, given the complexity in measuring teacher 
unionization, results from this study should only be interpreted congruent with how 
teacher unionization is measured. Third, though the findings show that stronger 
unionization is positively related to the concentration of HQTs, experienced teachers, and 
teachers with subject-matter degrees and certifications, we still cannot state with certainty 
that teacher unionization creates a more qualified teaching force, as similarly argued by 
Koski and Horng (2007); the causality may be working in the other direction. Fourth, 
even though this dissertation study has made diligent efforts to include potential 
confounding factors which may provide alternative explanations for the unionization 
effect, this study cannot rule out the possibility that teacher unionization serves as a 
proxy for some unobservable factors that are linked with teacher quality. For instance, 




Hoxby (1996); therefore, the effect of teacher unionization may indeed be the effect of 
poor school management. Lastly, unions’ effect on the within-district distribution of 
teacher quality only pertains to experienced teachers.  
Yet, even with all these caveats, the positive link between stronger unionization 
and districts’ concentrations of HQTs, more experienced teachers, and teachers with 
subject-specific degrees and certifications offers a piece of empirical evidence to the 
prolonged and much ideologically-centered debate on the relationship between teacher 
unionism and some of the frequently used, though far from perfect, proxies of teacher 
quality. Now with increased attention and efforts to increase teacher quality, the single 
most important resource provided to students, the positive findings provide a glimpse of 
what might attract potential high quality teacher candidates to classrooms. This 
dissertation study began with the assumption that teachers are attracted to a particular 
school district not by the ideology whether a district is unionized or not, but by working 
conditions that district may offer. With this underlying assumption in mind, I performed a 
supplementary analysis of the large urban and suburban district sample seeking to explore 
whether working conditions in unionized districts are different from those in their non-
unionized counterparts.  
Results from the supplementary analyses reveal that the working conditions in 
strongly-unionized districts and non-unionized ones are significantly different in some 
aspects, but not in all aspects. The differences between strongly-unionized districts and 
their non-unionized counterparts in compensation offered to teachers, teachers’ working 
time, and support for professional development may offer some potential explanations for 




unionized districts, districts with stronger unionization status tend to pay higher average 
salaries to teachers, particularly to teachers with more years of experience and higher 
educational levels. The backloading of salaries, that is paying disproportionally higher 
salaries to teachers with more years of experience, may serve as one possible explanation 
for the finding that strongly unionized districts have higher concentrations of quality 
teachers, particularly experienced teachers. There has been much attention given to the 
effect of compensation on teachers’ decision to teach, or where to teach. And a large 
body of literature as synthesized by Lankford and colleagues (2002) suggests that 
teachers are responsive to pay differences. Though teachers may not enter teaching in 
hopes of high salaries, researchers found low pay is one of the reasons teachers express 
dissatisfaction, or quit teaching (Baugh & Stone, 1982; Johnson, 1990). Plus, each urban 
or suburban area has a larger number of school districts, which provides teachers, 
particularly experienced ones, with options for where they choose to teach. Given the 
finding that strongly-unionized districts tend to backload teachers, teachers have an 
incentive to stay in or move to these backloading districts from neighboring ones without 
similar salary schedules.  
Salary structure is one factor that contributes to teachers’ employment decision; 
other non-pecuniary characteristics, such as working conditions, opportunities for 
professional development, are also important. The supplementary analysis finds that on 
average teachers in strongly-unionized districts are required to work fewer weekly hours 
to receive base pay, and they spend fewer weekly hours in instructing students. Plus, 
teachers report more support for their professional development in strongly unionized 




professional development outside regular work hours, and reimbursement for college 
tuition, workshop or travel expenses. According to information on district contract year 
length and student school year length, the supplementary analysis also reveals that 
teachers in strongly-unionized districts have more in-school days without supervising or 
instructing students. The reported lighter workload 48  in strongly-unionized districts 
(fewer weekly hours on instruction and fewer required working hours to receive base pay) 
and more support for professional development activities could also work to attract 
teachers to these districts. 
In summary, the supplementary analysis on compensation and working conditions 
in districts with varying unionization status provides a preliminary insight into what 
might work to attract and retain teachers of high quality. Though this analysis is not able 
to test the extent to which the various factors contribute to the findings of higher 
concentrations of certain teacher quality attributes in strongly unionized districts, higher 
average salary, lighter workload49 and more support for professional development create 
more favorable conditions for teachers. Yet, the conditions benefiting teachers may not as 
well be beneficial to students. One particular “double-edge sword” item concerns 
teachers’ work time length and time use. Teachers affect students’ schooling experience 
through their interaction with students. The duration as well as effectiveness of the 
interaction contributes to students’ growth. On the one hand, shorter weekly working 
hours and some extra days without supervising students may lessen the problem of 
teacher burnout; on the other, the shortened interaction time could also negatively affect 
                                                 
48 Here I define “lighter work load” solely by instructional time length and the number of working hours required to receive base pay. 
That said, I acknowledge that I do not have information from SASS on how teachers spend their in-school time or instructional time. 
 




students’ learning in school. Though this research finds that higher proportions of 
teachers in strongly-unionized districts possess certain characteristics (i.e. teacher 
experience, subject-matter degree and subject-matter certification) contributing to 
students’ academic achievement, the unionized districts may find themselves 
shortchanging their students through shortening students’ instructional time. Teachers are 
one and one most significant resource provided to students (Rice, 2008). Making good 
use of this resource is of ultimate importance to schools and students. Teachers in 
strongly-unionized districts have more days to themselves when students are not at school. 
To the extent that teachers typically spend their in-service days without instructing 
students on professional development and preparing for classroom instruction, we may 
infer that teachers in strongly unionized districts have more time for professional 
development or preparing for instruction. However, we do not have information on how 
these extra days are spent. Future research needs to examine how the union provisions 
affect the use of teachers’ time, and ultimately students’ schooling.  
Taking together the findings of this research, we conclude that strongly-unionized 
districts are able to leverage more educational resources. Overall, these districts spend 
more on educating each student; they have more teachers possessing certain 
characteristics associated with high teacher quality, more time available for teachers’ 
professional development. How to make good use of the resources to simultaneously 
better teachers and students is at the crux of the issue of teacher unionization. In 
unionized districts both teacher unions and school district management should shoulder 
the responsibility of effectively using the resources available to improve their students’ 




adopted collaborative bargaining with district management to improve school 
performance. A few of successful cases, such as Montgomery (MD) created a labor-
management partnership that resulted in an extensive school-based professional 
development program tied to increasing student achievement (Koppich, 2006), and 
Cincinnati’s (Ohio) pay for performance, have demonstrated that teacher unions can work 
with school management to improve teacher performance, and thus ultimately benefit 
students. Future research that examines student performance in districts with varying 
unionization status should be of interest to researchers and policy makers. 
The finding that state law status has a suppressor effect on stronger unionization 
when modeling some teacher quality proxies (i.e. HQTs, experienced teachers, teachers 
with in-field certifications, and teachers with in-field degrees) warrants particular 
attention when interpreting the results. The finding reveals that district unionization status 
interacts with state law status to affect district proportion of teachers with these teacher 
quality attributes. A possible explanation could be that state law status serves as a proxy 
for other state teacher-related policies. States with different collective bargaining law 
status may also have varying state policies and practices with regard to teacher 
qualification, hiring, or compliance with NCLB’s HQT requirement. Some anecdotal 
evidence suggests that some states with prohibitory laws, such as Georgia and 
Mississippi, exhibit a higher level of compliance with the HQT requirements than some 
mandatory collective bargaining states, such as Maryland (Department of Education, 
2009c). This finding on and possible interpretation of the state collective bargaining law 
effect suggests future research needs to account for state policy environment in studying 




Another noteworthy finding concerns the student-teacher ratio difference between 
strongly-unionized districts and non-unionized ones. The finding that the student-teacher 
ratio in strongly-unionized districts is higher than that in non-unionized ones contradicts 
the findings of previous research that unionized districts tend to have smaller class sizes 
(Eberts, 1984; Hoxby, 1996). One potential explanation may be that collective bargaining 
tends to standardize workplaces, in part to reduce the variation in working conditions as 
well as to reduce arbitrary treatment by employers (Stone, 2000). In the school setting, 
the “standardizing” effect of unions leads to greater reliance on traditional classroom 
organization, and less on specialized instructional modes (i.e. with a specialist in an 
independent, programmed study) as found by Eberts and Stone (1984) and Argys and 
Rees (1995). As nonunionized districts offer more specialized (usually of much smaller 
student-teacher ratio) instruction tailored to the needs of a diverse student body, such as 
special education students, English as a Second Language Learners (ESL) students, the 
overall average district student-teacher ratio are reduced. 
This study began with the understanding that one of the challenges in teasing out 
the effect of unionization on teacher quality lies in unions’ “spillover effect”, that is non-
unionized districts frequently adopt the practices of unionized districts to preempt their 
teachers from unionizing. This study finds some traces of evidence that non-unionized 
districts are similar to their unionized peers in some aspects. Non-unionized districts are 
equally likely as unionized districts (strongly-unionized as well as weakly-unionized ones) 
to counsel out teachers and provide health insurance and retirement plans to teachers. The 
similarities are most evident in requirements of and offerings to new teachers. Districts 




similar salaries to new hires with bachelors’ degree, and have in-field certification and 
degree requirements in place. Though this analysis finds similarities across districts with 
varied unionization status with respect to these frequently union-negotiated items, I am 
not able to attribute the similarities to unions’ spillover effect. Studies using interviews or 
other appropriate methods are needed to investigate whether the similarities across 
districts with differing unionization status may be due to the spillover effect. 
Addressing the second research question whether a district’s union status affects 
the intra-district distribution of teacher quality across schools with different poverty 
status and minority students concentration in the 52 largest districts, the analysis finds 
that the poverty/minority level of a school has a stronger (negative) effect on the 
distribution of experienced teachers in strongly unionized districts than in non-unionized 
districts, but no effect on the distribution of teacher quality as measured by other 
indicators adopted in this study. The effect of stronger unionization on the distribution of 
experienced teachers should not be surprising according to teacher unionization theory. 
Teacher unions, particularly the seniority-based transfer rules give experienced teachers 
much latitude in choosing where to teach. Experienced teachers typically take advantage 
of the rule, and they choose to leave undesirable schools, usually high poverty and high 
minority schools, to teach at schools they find more desirable. 
Two interpretations may be offered for the findings that unionization has no effect 
on the intra-district distribution of teacher quality as measured by the other indicators, i.e. 
ETQ, HQT, in-field degrees, in-field certifications, and selectivity of colleges. One 
possible explanation is that district administrators either negotiate flexibility in the union 




work around the district’s strict formal polices to aim for a balance in the teacher quality 
distribution across schools (Koski & Horng, 2007). Koski and Horng, from their 
interviews with nineteen district human resource directors in California, found out that 
district and school administrators worked creatively to get around contract languages to 
meet the needs of students in hard-to-staff schools, such as developing strong working 
relationships with union leaders to mutually suspend transfer rules, “hiding” open 
positions until the internal transfer period completed. Besides districts working around 
union rules, districts policies that encourage best candidates to teach in hard-to-staff 
schools may also help mitigate poverty/minority’s effect on teacher quality distribution 
across schools (Koski & Horng, 2007; Prince, 2003). 
The other alternative explanation pertains to the data structure of the sample 
utilized in addressing the second research question. Due to the limited number of schools 
sampled within districts, out of the 100 largest districts in the U.S. only 613 schools in 52 
districts have sufficient data to allow modeling the intra-district distribution of teacher 
quality. In addition, the distribution of one of the major independent variables, school 
poverty and minority concentration level, is very negatively skewed, meaning that a large 
number of schools have high poverty/minority levels (see Figure 4). Furthermore, about 
half the sampled districts have low intra-district school poverty/minority variance, which 
suggests that these sampled schools are not much different from each other in terms of 
schools’ socioeconomic composition. Therefore, the relatively small sample size of 
districts, skewness and the low intra-district variance of the school poverty/minority 




unions’ effect on the intra-district distribution of teacher quality across schools with 
varying poverty/minority levels. 
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The auxiliary statistics from the schools-within-district HGLM models offer an 
additional piece of evidence that data used in addressing this research question is limited 
and the ensuing models based on the data may be unstable. For example, on modeling 
two of the dependent variables, i.e. proportion of teachers with in-field certification and 
proportion of experienced teachers, the variance of intercept and of poverty/minority 
slope in each model is highly correlated (close to “1” for in-field certified and 
experienced teachers), see Tables 15-17. The high correlation between the variance of 
intercept and of slope suggests that there is not enough information to separately model 
the intercept and slope and this may cause instability in the model (SSI, 2009).  
Given the limitations existent in the data, the results from the models addressing 




caution. Future research could be more fruitful in examining the relationship between 
teacher unionization and intra-district distribution of teacher quality when researchers 
have access to datasets with a larger number of schools sampled within districts. 
In summary, this dissertation examined the relationship between teacher unions 
and teacher quality, based on the conceptual framework that multilevel factors—district, 
school, and state factors—influenced teachers’ decisions on where to teach. This study 
fills a gap in understanding the relationship between teacher unions and teacher quality in 
large urban and suburban districts across the U.S. Particularly, this study extends prior 
research on the union effect through the adoption of multilevel analysis technique as well 
the use of the SASS 03-04, a national representative sample of schools and districts that 
reflect the current educational context, such as accountability, and the implementation of 
NCLB. Findings from this research provide empirical support to the notion that teacher 
unionization has a significant effect on teachers and public schools, and teacher unions 
should not be left out of school improvement efforts. Unions’ differential effects on the 
alternative proxies of teacher quality adopted in this research (non-significant effect on 
ETQ and selectivity; and significant effects on HQT, experience, subject-matter degree 
and certification) as well as results from the supplementary analysis on working 
conditions further suggest that union-negotiated policies and their police emphases matter 
in attracting and retaining teachers of certain characteristics.  The union influence is most  
apparent with respect to qualifications related to legal requirements (NCLB). Findings 
from this study also suggest that research focused on teacher quality and other teacher 
related topics should take into consideration the strength of teacher unions to better 




Limitations and Future Research 
This dissertation study provides a piece of empirical evidence with respect to the 
relationship between teacher union and teacher quality, however it is important to 
identify limitations of this study that may affect the interpretation of the findings. One 
limitation of this dissertation study pertains to the possible endogeneity issue. In this 
analysis, to tease out unionization effect, I constructed multilevel models and controlled 
for district policies and practices which may serve as alternative explanations for union 
effect, such as district pay schedule for novice teachers, student-teacher ratio, and 
districts’ per pupil expenditure. Yet, according to unionization theory, these policies and 
practices may have potential endogenous links with unionization; that is unionization 
may well cause district policies and practices to be different from their non-unionized 
peers, and thus impact teacher quality through the mediating effects of these practices. By 
treating these district policies and practices as controls, this study may accidentally 
underestimate the union effect. While it would be of ultimate satisfaction to build 
multilevel empirical models that simultaneously taking into consideration the potential 
mediating effects of the district policies and practices, and the clustering nature of 
schools within districts and districts within states, the current multilevel modeling 
techniques do not provide tools to build such models. Therefore, with the advancement of 
multilevel modeling techniques, future research could be more fruitful in sorting through 
the intertwined relationship between teacher unions and other potential endogenous 
district policies, and result in a better estimate of teacher union effect. 
Second, the validity of the teacher quality measures should be interpreted with 




backed up by the best empirical evidence available, should not be interpreted as the final 
word on teacher quality. Research shows that the components of the ETQ variable have 
modest effects on student achievement, much smaller than what we know to be the effect 
of a good teacher. Teacher quality is a complex phenomenon in itself. Before the 
education field is certain about the crucial attributes of effective teachers, any measure 
can only serve as a snapshot of what teacher quality is supposed to be. Furthermore, the 
ETQ measure is defined solely on the effect of its components upon students’ academic 
achievements, which sets a much narrower boundary on teachers’ work. The same 
caution should be paid to the NCLB teacher quality measure. Findings based on this 
measure should only be interpreted as unions’ association with a currently-held view of 
teacher quality by the federal government.  
Third, the method of comparing the difference in teacher quality measures 
between unionized and non-unionized districts to obtain unionization effect poses another 
limitation in the findings. Unionization does not take place haphazardly. Unions are more 
likely to form in certain industries or in certain geographic areas (Goldhaber, 2006). 
Applying this analogy to education, it could well be that unionized districts have distinct 
teacher characteristics that prompt teachers to join unions. Meanwhile, these teacher 
characteristics may be related to the teacher quality indicators adopted in this research. 
The exclusion of the unknown factors in the models could limit the findings from this 
research. The fact that the level-1 variance of outcome variables (Yij) is higher than the 
variance assumed by level-1 sampling models50 used in this study may demonstrate that 
there are important factors omitted. In addition, excluded variables, which refer to those 
                                                 




variables included in the theoretical framework but are absent from the empirical models 
due to data unavailability, present another limitation to this study. 
Data points available for constructing the empirical models pose another 
limitation to the findings, particularly in regard to addressing the second research 
question. As discussed above, when building the schools-within-districts models, only 
about 613 schools in 52 districts have valid information to conduct the analysis. The 
relatively small sample size of districts, skewness and the low intra-district variance of 
the school poverty/minority variable, pose a challenge in constructing statistical models 
to tease out the potential union effects on the distribution of teacher quality.  
This dissertation study finds that stronger teacher unionization status is associated 
with districts employing teachers possessing certain characteristics related to teacher 
quality. The ensuing supplementary analysis reveals that working conditions in strongly 
unionized districts are different from non-unionized ones in a number of ways, which 
may serve as an exploratory explanation for the findings on union effect. For an in-depth 
understanding of how teacher unions might affect teacher quality, future research needs 
to construct multilevel pathway models (with the advancement of the multilevel 
modeling techniques) that empirically test the mediating effects of these working 
conditions as suggested in the beginning of the limitation section. In addition, the 
findings from this research also call for qualitative studies to investigate how and why 
teacher unions are associated with teacher quality. Teacher union literature has 
documented that teacher unions negotiate a myriad of items besides the traditional “bread 
and butter” issues (Johnson, 2004). The real effect on teachers and potentially on teacher 




administrators and teachers in the district interpret and apply the contract provisions. 
Interview and observational data from local school and district administrators, union 
leadership and teachers would provide rich information on how unions and union 
contracts influence teachers’ decision on where to teach.  
Despite the limitations of the study, results from this dissertation provide valuable 
information on whether teacher unionization is related to teacher quality across U.S. large 
urban and suburban districts. Limitations in this study should offer guidance on future 
















Table 20: Definition of Variables Used in this Study 
Variable Type Variable Name Description
% School ETQ Teachers[TQ_MW] 
School level mean aggregate of a teacher level dichotomous composite variable based on empirical evidence, 
composed of teacher experience, in-field certification, in-field degree and selectivity of colleges attended [from 
Barron’s college ratings, and SASS teacher questionnaire variables1]
% School HQTs[HQTJI_MW] School level mean aggregate of a teacher level dichotomous composite variable based on NCLB's HQT requirement1
% School Teachers with at Least Five Years of 
Experience[TexperMW]
School level mean aggregate of a teacher level dichotomous variable measuring whether teachers with at least 5 years 
of teaching experience [from TOTEXPER]
% School Teachers with In-field 
Certifications[CERT2_MW]
School level mean aggregate of a teacher level dichotomous variable measuring whether teachers having subject-
matter certifications1
% School Teachers with In-field Degrees[DEGR_MW]
School level mean aggregate of a teacher level dichotomous variable  measuring whether teachers having subject-
mater degrees1
% School Teachers Graduated from Selective 
Colleges[CORATEMW]
School level mean aggregate of a teacher level dichotomous variable measuring whether teachers attended selective 
colleges [from Barron's ratings]
% District ETQ Teachers[TQ_MW] 
District level mean aggregate of a teacher level dichotomous composite variable based on empirical evidence, 
composed of teacher experience, in-field certification, in-field degree and selectivity of colleges attended [from 
Barron’s college ratings, and SASS teacher questionnaire variables1]
% District HQTs[HQTJI_MW] District level mean aggregate of a teacher level dichotomous composite variable based on NCLB's HQT requirement1
% District Teachers with at Least Five Years of 
Experience[TexperMW]
District level mean aggregate of a teacher level dichotomous variable measuring whether teachers with at least 5 
years of teaching experience [from TOTEXPER]
% District Teachers with In-field 
Certifications[CERT2_MW]
District level mean aggregate of a teacher level dichotomous variable measuring whether teachers having subject-
matter certifications1
% District Teachers with In-field Degrees[DEGR_MW]
District level mean aggregate of a teacher level dichotomous variable  measuring whether teachers having subject-
mater degrees1
% District Teachers Graduated from Selective 
Colleges[CORATEMW]
District level mean aggregate of a teacher level dichotomous variable measuring whether teachers attended selective 
colleges [from Barron's ratings]
School poverty and minority concentration[POVMIN] Continuous composite variable =(% FARL+%Minority Student)/2 [from NSLAPP_S, MINENR_S]
School size (over 1000) Dummy-coded variable recoded from school student enrollment [from s0422_s]
School Size (500-1000) Dummy-coded variable recoded from school student enrollment [from s0422_s]
School size (below 500) Dummy-coded variable recoded from school student enrollment [from s0422_s]
School Student-teacher Ratio[STRATIO_S] Continuous variable [from S0422_S, NUMTCH_S]
School Enrollment[S0422_S] Continuous variable [from S0422_S]
School % student with IEP[IEP] Continuous variable measuring the percentage of students with IEP [from IEP]
Teacher PD Opportunities[FAC1_NW] Continuous composite variable [from A0125, A0126, A0127, A0128, A0129, A0130, A0131, A0132, A0133]
Elementary School [ELEMENTARY] Dichotomous variable where 1=Elementary school; 0=other[from SCHLEVEL]
Secondary School[SECONDARY] Dichotomous variable where 1=Secondary school; 0=other[ from SCHLEVEL]
Combined School[COMBINED] Dichotomous variable where 1=Elementary and secondary combined school; 0=other[ from SCHLEVEL]
                  DEPENDENT VARIABLES:








Table 20: Definition of Variables Used in this Study (continued) 
Variable 
Type Variable Name Description
No Union Agreement[NOUNION] Dichotomous variable where 1=no union agreement; 0=other [from D0094]
Weaker Unionization [WEAKU2] Dichotomous variable [from  D0094 and T0407]. Defined as either having a “meet and confer” agreement or having a collective bargaining agreement but with union membership no more than 50 percent of total number of teachers.
Stronger Unionization [STRONGU2] Dichotomous variable [from D0094 and T0407 ]. Defined as having a collective bargaining agreement and union membership exceeding 50 percent of total number of teachers.
District Per Pupil Total Expenditure(X1000) [CWI-PPE] Continuous variable measuring district total expenditure per pupil FY2004, adjusted by Comparable Wage Index[from TOTPPE, and CWI_2004] 
District Salary Schedule ( Bachelor-no experience)[CWI-
SALARY]
Continuous variable measuring the salary level of teachers with bachelor's degree and no experience [from D0114, 
CWI_2004]
District Student/teacher Ratio [ST_TCCD] Continuous variable measuring student teacher ratio [from CCD Member03 and tottch03]
High Minority  Enrollment[MST3C_3] District minority student exceeding 69% of total enrollment [from NMINST_D, D0064]
Medium Minority Enrollment[MST3C_2] District minority student between 21% and 69% [from NMINST_D, D0064]
Low Minority  Enrollment[MST3C_1] District minority student below 21% [from NMINST_D, D0064]
Enrollment 25,000 above[SIZE3_3] Dummy-coded variable recoded from district student enrollment [from Member03]
Enrollment 15,000-24,999[SIZE3_2] Dummy-coded variable recoded from district student enrollment [from Member03]
Enrollment 10,000-14,999[SIZE3_1] Dummy-coded variable recoded from district student enrollment [from Member03]
Residents Edu. Level [PCTCOLLEGE] %  adults in district boundary with at least a college degree [from Census 2000]
District % FARL Approved Students [NSLAPP_D] Continuous variable measuring the percentage of students eligible for the federal free and reduced lunch program[from NSLAPP_D]
District % Secondary Teachers[PCTSEC] Continuous variable measuring district percentage of secondary teachers[from CCD's SECTCH03, TOTTCH03]
Urban [CTRCITY] Dichotomous variable where 1=mid-sized or central city; 0=suburban or rural [from URBAND03]
Suburban [SUBURBAN] Dichotomous variable where 1=urban fringe of large or mid-sized city; 0=urban or rural [from URBAND03]
Mandatory[REQUIRE] State law mandating school districts engage in collective bargaining with organized teachers[from NEA]
Permissive[PERMIT] State law grant teachers permissive collective bargaining rights at the discretion of employers [from NEA]
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